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(4) Jurisdiction
2. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)(j), as the claim in this civil case are Stalking Injunction and an ex-Parte
Stalking Injunction. This case was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the
Supreme Court.
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(5) Issues for Review:
5.1 Does the Court of Appeals have to follow it's own precedent in Ellison v.
Stam, 136 P.3d 1242, 2006 UT App 150, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 148, 549 Utah
Adv. 24 (2006)?
This issue was not raised in the Trial Court, as it is only an issue on appeal having
to do with the constitutionality of unpublished opinions being used to intentional
discriminate against males by the Court of Appeals. The standard of review is an
issue of law, without discretion to the Court. Are precedents binding for males and
females alike or not?
5.2 Did the Court abuse it's discretion by making an implied finding that case
#050916389 was dismissed with, rather than without prejudice?
This issue was preserved at R. 2-3, R. 63-65, R. 77, R. 98, R. 269, R. 411,
and at the hearing on pages 9, 10, 18, 25-28, 32, and 33. The most stringent
standard of review is to give all deference to the trial court, and upon mustering of
all available evidence only to disturb the ruling if there is no way a reasonable trier
of fact could have reached the conclusion it did from the record in this case. I
argue however that the Court should be given no deference as at it's heart this is

an issue of law, with court orders showing the adjudicated facts being beyond
question any more.
5.3 Did the Court make an error of law in finding that Petitioners Petitioner's Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Motion to Dissolve under 77-3A101(13) was frivolous?
The issue was raised at R. 504 in a motion. The standard of Review is a mixed
standard of law and fact, and Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals review the
law in question in light of the facts of the case.
5.4 Can the Court proceed to transfer and dismiss a case without an order
disposing of an affidavit of bias and motion to recuse?
This issue was raised at R.259-260 in an objection to Judge Lindberg hearing the
case, then at R. 530-531 in the motion to recuse. Petitioner raise the issue of the
missing Court Record and lack of order at R. 723-726 in the Court of Appeals, and
the order at R. 728-731 provided clarity on the issue.
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5.5 Does Flipping off a father in the presence of his children rise to the level of
stalking? Must the Court enter findings on this issue?
There issue was raised at R. 7 and p. 33 and 34. The standard of review is a mixed
issue of fact and law, however the absence of any findings on this admitted
allegation makes this plain error which must be remanded and corrected.
5.6 Does respondents contact with Petitioner in clear violation of a no-contact
order constitute criminal stalking? Must the Court enter findings on this issue?
There issue was raised at R. 1, R 51, and p.27-30, 33 and 34. The standard of
review is a mixed issue of fact and law, however the absence of any findings on
this admitted allegation makes this plain error which must be remanded and
corrected.
5.7 Does the finding of the Court that a stalking injunction under §77-3a-101 does
not allow intentional infliction, rule 56 motions, or anything outside of the limited
scope of the stalking injunction fly in the face of the Court's use of a Guardian ad
Litem and consideration of custody issues and of "civility"?
This issue was not raised in the trial Court partially on April 11 2006 p. 23
1. 8 to p. 24 1. 5, however the Court cut off further argument with " Mr. Bryner,
you may not speak up again, or you will be found in contempt." Prohibiting

elaboration or any defense of Petitioner in response to the sua-sponte issue of
Petitioner's behavior. The standard of review is to give no discretion to the Court,
as orders and findings issues without jurisdiction and without due process are void
on their face.
5.8 Did the Court abuse it's discretion by finding that "Both parties are clearly
combative and highly inappropriate in their dealings with each other."?
As mentioned above, I was prohibited from defending myself from any accusation
by Ms. Luhn or Ms. Smoak, and told that if I opened my mouth or defended
myself in any way I would be held in contempt. For this reason this issue should
be heard on appeal.
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(6)Citations to determinative law. (full quote in part 11)
The 1st Amendment of the Constitution
The 14th Amendment of the Constitution
Anastasoff v. UnitedStates (8th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 898
BARNARD v. MURPHY, 852 P.2d 1023 (Utah App. 1993)
Ellison v. Stam, 136 P.3d 1242,2006 UT App 150,2006 Utah App. LEXIS
148, 549 Utah Adv. 24 (2006)
Rule 12(b)(6)
Rule 41(a)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 63 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33
UCA 76-5-106.5
U.C.A. 77-3(a)

(7) Statement of the Case:
Nature of Case, course of proceedings, and disposition.
1) On 02-27-06 Petitioner filed "02-27-06 Filed: Verified Petition for Civil
Stalking Injunction" found at R. 1-110
2) Judge Reese granted the ex-parte request in "02-27-06 Filed order: Ex Parte
Civil Stalking Injunction, Judge rreese, Signed February 27, 2006" found at R.
111-114.
3) Petitioner amended his complaint under Rule 15(a) with "02-28-06 Filed:
Amended Petition for Stalking Injunction" found at R. 115-121. A Jury request
and civil fee were paid and accepted.
4) Respondent was served the ex-parte injunction and petition by Deputy L.
Brown on February 28th 2006 and Sabrina Palmer entered the service into the state
wide network. See R 237
5) Respondent was served by Constable Travis Reitz with a 20 day summons
and the amended complaint on 03-02-06. R 242-250.
6) Respondent's attorney Emily Smoak filed a notice of appearance and
request for hearing. She also requested that Judge Lindberg hear the case. R.
251-258. Petitioner objected to Judge Lindberg hearing the case R. 259-260, and
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filed a cross motion to have the case heard under binding arbitration per the
agreement between the parties. R. 248-277.
7) Without ruling on the objection or cross motion, Judge Lindberg and Judge
Dever met telephonically in a secret conference and the case was transferred to
Judge Lindberg. See R. 378-379 and R. 739.
8) Petitioner, upon learning that Judge Lindberg would hear the case,fileda
motion to recuse Judge Lindberg based upon an affidavit of bias found in another
case. R. 522-524.
9) Several more motions and documents werefiledby both parties, which
were procedural in nature. They included a Rule 56 motion by Petitioner, a
motion for default by Petitioner, and a motion to dissolve a stalking injunction by
Respondent, and several motions to strike various pleadings and affidavits were
filed by both parties.
10)Petitioner issues three subpoenas, two for phone records and one for after
school care logs. R. 471-474.
1 l)One day later, on April 4th 2006, Judge Lindberg scheduled a hearing for
April 11th by mail. This left only 2 days notice, counting the 3 days for mailing.
R. 484-488.

12) On the morning of April 11 Judge Lindberg apparently noticed that there
was an accusation of bias against her, and reviewed the documents some time
before 9:00am. No record exists.
13) Judge Lindberg passed the documents to Judge Hilder, and had a telephone
conversation with him which was secret and made off the record. R. 739.
14) After the telephone conversation, Judge Hilder sent an email to Judge
Lindberg at 9:08a.m. while the parties were in the Court Room. R. 597.
15) Judge Lindberg started the hearing, and a transcript of this hearing fully
documents the proceedings. R. 653-717
16) Some time after the hearing, Judge Lindberg signed a minute entry to
transfer the affidavit of bias to Judge Hilder. Notice that no date and time stamp
appears at R. 596, to hide the fact that this was signed after the hearing.
17)The email from Judge Hilder was placed in the record after the minute entry
also without a date stamp and mailing certificate. R. 597.
18) Judge Hilder failed to produce any written order disposing of the affidavit
of bias. See Record Index P. 4, no order indexed.
19) Judge Lindberg produced an order, then an amended order, dismissing the
case with prejudice. This was the final order in the case. See R. 627-641.
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Statements of relevant facts.
20) Respondent violated the civil stalking injunction in case #050916389 on
January 3rd 2006 and on other occasions. See R. 1, R. 51-58.
21) Respondent has contacted Petitioner's employer no less than 5 current and
past employers with the intention of causing as much harm as possible. R. 2, also
R.28. Also R. 28.
22) Respondent distributed pictures of Petitioner with his testicles showing. R.
2 also R. 100.
23) Respondent was found to be "the more controlling and vindictive parent."
See R. 2 and R. 70, 72-73, Respondent was reported as more likely to lose her
temper with the children. R. 2 and R. 68.
24) On 7/17/2004 Respondent had her first incident of making numerous
phone calls without stopping, and admitted to doing so under oath in an affidavit.
R. 3 and R. 29.
25) Respondent made numerous contacts with Petitioner when ordered not to
by the Court from 7/17/2004 to 9/17/2005. See R. 4 also R. 21-27 and R. 14-16.
26) Respondent has spread false stories about Petitioner with the intention of
causing as much harm as possible. There is considerable proof that these stories
are false and made up. See R. 4 and R. 18-20, R. 29, R. 30-31.

27) Respondent began screaming at Petitioner in a church in the presence of
the Children. See R. 5 and R. 32-34.
28) Respondent removed the children from their school and traumatized them
by yelling at them in front of 4 police officers, shouting "you are not to travel
outside salt lake do you understand?" to the children. See R. 5, R. 35-37. Also R.
49.
29) Respondent admits that on 8/16/2004 she showed up outside the children's
school to observe Petitioner, and has done similar acts with the intention of
inflicting emotional distress. See R. 5 and R. 50.
30) Respondent has used the children as hostages, both threatening to take
them to Russia and also denying needed medical care. See R. 6 also R. 23, R. 4247. AlsoR. 16-17.
31) Respondent threatened to have a hit man come from Russia to kill
Petitioner. See R. 7, also R. 38-41, R. 20.
32) Respondent has a history of criminal behavior and is part of a crime
family. See R. 48.
33) Respondent's outrageous behavior was moderated by the obtaining of a
stalking injunction, this served a useful purpose in holding her accountable outside
a family law system where Judges like Leslie Lewis will never punish a woman.
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(8) Summary of arguments.
8.1 Does the Court of Appeals have to follow it's own precedent in Ellison v.
Stam9 136 P.3d 1242, 2006 UT App 150, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 148, 549 Utah
Adv. 24 (2006)?
In summary the respondent's conduct must be considered cumulatively in light of
all of the facts and circumstances of the case, not in the isolated way the Trial
Court made it's findings based upon individual allegations, not the totality of the
accusations. Simply making the ruling on this case unpublished in order to ignore
the law, would be an exercise injudicial tyranny that can only be explained by
men not having the same rights that women have in the Court of Appeals in the
State of Utah.
8.2 Did the Court abuse it's discretion by making an implied finding that case
#050916389 was dismissed with, rather than without prejudice?
If the prior case was dismissed without prejudice, the Trial Court errored in
not considering to totality of the conduct and only the events since January 4
2006. The bulk of the accusations were from prior to that time.

8.3 Did the Court make an error of law in finding that Petitioners Petitioner's Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Motion to Dissolve under 77-3A101(13) was frivolous?
A motion to dissolve under UCA 77-3A-101(13) can only be brought by
the Petitioner in an action not the respondent, yet when I pointed this out to the
Court I was told I was being frivolous.
8.4 Can the Court proceed to transfer and dismiss a case without an order
disposing of an affidavit of bias and motion to recuse?
The case in question was transferred to Judge Lindberg by Judge Dever
after an "off the record" conversation between them, and after I filed an affidavit
of bias against Judge Lindberg and objected to her hearing the case. Judge
Lindberg then met again secretly with Judge Hilder to dispose of the affidavit of
bias against her on the morning of the hearing of April 11th. Taken together thee
actions appear highly inappropriate and deny the possibility of judical review by
the Court of Appeals.
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8.5 Does Flipping off a father in the presence of his children rise to the level of
stalking? Must the Court enter findings on this issue?
There were no findings on this admitted incident, and the court should have
made a finding in the totality of the actions by Respondent.
8.6 Does respondents contact with Petitioner in clear violation of a no-contact
order constitute criminal stalking? Must the Court enter findings on this issue?
Respondent admits to several contacts in violation of the no-contact
provision of a prior stalking injunction. These actions alone rise to the level of
stalking under the statute. In addition Respondent has still not surrendered the
photographs she was ordered to turn over, which itself is a violation of the prior
stalking injunction.
8.7 Does the finding of the Court that a stalking injunction under §77-3a-101 does
not allow intentional infliction, rule 56 motions, or anything outside of the limited
scope of the stalking injunction fly in the face of the Court's use of a Guardian ad
Litem and consideration of custody issues and of "civility"?
The court found that Petitioner could not raise issues outside the limited
scope of a stalking injunction, yet the Court itself raised issues which were clearly
not allowed to be raised in such an action and allowed a Guardian ad Litem to

participate in clear violation of the law. The end result was that Respondent was
allowed to retain the offensive pictures while Petitioner is facing loss of his
children by a biased Judge.
8.8 Did the Court abuse it's discretion by finding that "Both parties are clearly
combative and highly inappropriate in their dealings with each other."?
The Court, without notice or ability to defend against the allegations,
turned a trial about Respondent into a trial about petitioner and made findings of
fact which were totally unsupported by the Record in this case. This is further
evidence that Judge Lindberg is incapable of acting as a fair and impartial Judge in
this case.
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(9) Argument.
9.1 Does the Court of Appeals have to follow it's own precedent in Ellison v.
Stam, 136 P.3d 1242, 2006 UT App 150, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 148, 549 Utah
Adv. 24 (2006)? This issue was not raised in the Trial Court, as it is only an issue
on appeal having to do with the constitutionality of unpublished opinions being
used to intentional discriminate against males by the Court of Appeals. To quote
from Ellison:
<f38 As discussed, the respondent's conduct must be considered
cumulatively in light of all of the facts and circumstances of
the case. We agree with Ellison that the trial court inappropriately
considered each incident separately, without weighing the effect of
the prior encounters between the parties. The failure to analyze the
entire course of conduct between the parties is also inappropriate in
determining whether Stam's conduct was "directed at" Ellison. Id. §
76-5-106.5(2)(a). Therefore, we reverse and remand.
This contrasts with the standard used by the Trial Court in this case found at R.
633 | 4 and footnote 2:
^[4 Based on the above findings regarding the specific allegations
offered by Petitioner in support of his Petition for a permanent civil
stalking injunction, the Court concludes that all these allegations are
insufficient, as a matter of law, to justify continuation of the ex parte
civil stalking injunction[fn2]
Fn[2] As noted supra, the only factually sustainable allegation of
impropriety by Respondent concerns her action in publishing the
objectionable photograph to the custody evaluator. While this action
was petty and appears to have been designed to embarrass Petitioner,

T)

it does not amount to a * course of conduct* that would support
issuance of a permanent civil stalking injunction.
It is clear that the trial court considered each finding on it's own merits. Two of
them in particular, the allegation of taking my children to Russia and the threat of
having a hired hit man from Russia come to the US to kill me, are given short
consideration as passport issues and a KGB friend. In Anastasoff v. UnitedStates
(8th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 898, the Court held that there was no authority of a court
to not follow an unpublished opinion. In this case, the converse, simply making
the ruling on this case unpublished in order to ignore the law, would be an exercise
injudicial tyranny that can only be explained by men not having the same rights
that women have in the Court of Appeals in the State of Utah. To further cite from
Ellison regarding the issue of repeated phone calls:
^[28 The legislature's use of the term "course of conduct," id.,
illustrates the essence of a stalking violation. Stalking, by
its very nature, is an offense of repetition. In relevant part,
the statute defines "[cjourse of conduct" as "repeatedly
maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person." Id.
§ 76-5-106.5(1 )(a). The conduct is rendered more offensive and
more threatening because it is repeated. To call someone on the
telephone and hang up late at night on one occasion may not rise
to the level of outrageous conduct. To do so every ten minutes
for a month, however, very well may. In essence, Stam would have
the trier of fact consider each telephone call in a vacuum,
without reference to the numerous calls that preceded it, to
determine whether the conduct is outrageous. We expressly reject
that interpretation as being inconsistent with the plain intent
of the stalking statute.

9.2 Did the Court abuse it's discretion by making an implied finding that case
#050916389 was dismissed with, rather than without prejudice?
This issue was preserved over and over again. I proceed to Marshal all evidence
in the record regarding dismissal. At R. 2-3 this issue was first raised in the
verified Petition for ex-parte stalking injunction:
What follows below is the chronology of events prior to September
19th 2005 which were used as the basis for the first stalking
injunction which was issued by Judge Quinn and dismissed without
prejudice (Exhibits P. 50-52 for signed stalking injunction, Exhibits
P. 54-56 for dismissal without prejudice)
At R. 63-65, a certified copy of the motion and order dismissing case #050916389
was provided for consideration of the Court. The words "without prejudice"
clearly appear. At R. 77, a certified copy of the case history of #050916389 is
provided clearly showing "CASE DISPOSITION 01/04/2006 Dismsd w/o
prejudice by Judge DENO HIMONAS" At R. 98 the docket from that case shows
"Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice, Disposition Judge is DENO
HIMONAS, 01-04-06" At R. 269 Petitioner makes the statement:
The 14th amendment and gender neutrality of law is explicitly
asserted. The prior dismissal of case #0509 16389 was without
prejudice so that additional behavior by Respondent could be
responded to by seeking another Injunction. Emily Smoak agreed on
the record to dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2)(i) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Assuming for the sake of argument
that the prior dismissal without prejudice was actually final

?4

adjudication, which it was not, the acts alleged after November 10th,
2006 are sufficient to issue another injunction.
At R. 411 a transcript of the dismissal of case #050916389 was made part of the
record. The transcript reads:
THE COURT: Let's go back on the record
in the matter of Roger Bryner v. Svetlana Bryner.
It's Case No. 05091639, and Case No. 044904103.
Will everybody enter their appearances please?
MS. ARNOVICK Kathleen Arnovick.
MS. SMOAK: Attorney Emily Sneak for the
Respondent, Lana Bryner.
MR. ERYNER: And Roger 2ryner, and I'm
representing myself in the divorce case and in the
stalking case. There's a motion of Kathleen
THE COURT: Okay. So, let's take what 1
Save in front of me one at a time. I have a
motion and order to dismiss filed by M s.
Amovick in the case ending 3gg# ts there any
reason why I shouldn't enter that motion?
MR. BRYNER; I see none.
MS. ARNOVICK: I don't see any, Your
Honor.
MS. SMOAK: I don't see any reason,
Judge.
THE COURT: Airight, then I'm signing
it.

Moving on to the transcript of the April 11 hearing, all instances of the word
"dismiss" or stemmed words were searched for electronically in the transcript and
reproduced below in context with highlights of the word found. The complete
transcripts are found at R. 653-717.

?s
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15
MS. SMOAK: Okay. Many of the
16 allegations in this stalking injunction were
17 allegations that were previously made in a
18 previous stalking injunction which Mr. Bryner
19 himself dismissed, without prejudice, on January
20 4th. So, what I'm wondering is, in terms of what
21 my client needs to testify about, does she need
22 to go back and testify about instances that
23 happened 24
THE COURT: Presumably, any matters
25 that were dismissed previously. All I am dealing
0010
1 with is any matters arising in connection with
2 this stalking injunction. And so, that's the
3 testimony that I would think is pertinent.
4
MS. SMOAK: Okay. Well, okay. I'm
5 going to ask her about everything. If you find
6 it's not to be relevant or, you know, too old,
7 you tell me, because some of these allegations are
8 from 2003, Your Honor, and were previously
9 dismissed.
0018
16
MS. SMOAK: March of 2005. And again,
17 just as a side note, this allegation was made
18 before as pan of the previous stalking
19 injunction, and it was dismissed. He has made
20 other allegations, and I'm going to ask you if
21 you think that they're relevant to the stalking.
22 He's made allegations of medical treatment and how
23 you dress the children.
0025
17 Q. Before November 10th? Okay. Have you
18 testified previously that we agreed that the
19 stalking injunction would be dismissed upon
20 signing a final settlement after November 10th?

21 A. Yes.
22
Q. Was that your testimony previous under
23 oath?
24
A. Yes. It was supposed to be dismissed.
25
Q. Have we signed the final settlement?
0026
1
A. No. We havenft signed it.
2
Q. Did you get a Court order saying that
3 that stalking injunction had been dismissed?
4
A. I believe your attorney filed, in
5 December, that it was going to be dismissed.
6
Q. A motion to dismiss? Do you know when
7 it was actually dismissed?
8
A. I believe it was January 4th.
9
Q. Okay. And the incident where you
10 called 15 times in a row was on January 3rd?
11 A. Yes.
0027
19
MS. SMOAK: Your Honor, I object to the
20 relevance of allegations made in a prior stalking
21 injunction that Mr. Bryner dismissed himself.
22 He's asking about 23
MR. BRYNER: The record shows it was
24 dismissed by stipulation, without prejudice, by
25 Emily Smoak. That's clear in the order of the
0028
1 Judge. That's clear in the transcripts. That's
2 clear from everything. It was not a clerical
3 error. It was a stipulation.
0032
7 A. I was -There was a Court order on this
8 issue. Like I mentioned, it was already heard by
9 the Judge, because I removed the children. You
10 already filed an order to show cause, which was
11 dismissed, I believe, in a previous hearing. The
12 Court order said not to remove the children for a

13 legitimate reason, and I removed the children to
14 take them to the guardian ad litem.
15
Q. Did you have an appointment with the
16 guardian ad litem?
17 A. I did not, but I had the circumstances
18 that I wanted to find out where my children would
19 be after you took them [inaudible] before.
20
Q. Did you dismiss the protective order?
21
A. Protective order? I think it was
22 dismissed at the end of the summer. No, in
23 March. In March.
24
Q. On destruction of property, did you
25 send a letter apologizing for the destruction of
0033
1 my father's property?
2
A. Yeah. That was in a different case. I
3 never mentioned it was not your father's property.
4 I said, I'm sorry for leaving your things outside.
5
Q. Okay, and that letter of apology
6 settled everything [inaudible], didn't it?
7
A. I'm sorry for everything. If you want
8 to dismiss it, you know? It's like9
Q. Was there an agreement that in exchange
10 for that letter of apology, I would dismiss that
11 case?
12 A. Yeah. You said if I write you another
13 letter for the lime when I flipped you off, then
14 you will dismiss the others, the stalking
15 injunctionThe remaining references on p. 45 1. 13, p. 54 1. 13, p. 58 1 14, p. 58 1. 16 and p. 63
1. 2 are all statements by the Court. In each case the words spoken are
"dismissed" not "dismissed with prejudice". There is absolutely nothing in the
record to suggest that the dismissal of case #050916389 was anything other than

without prejudice. In addition, Rule 41(a)(2) is unambiguous in support of
without prejudice:
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of
dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action may
only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order of the court based
either on:
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the action;
or
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him
of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for
independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.
9.3 Did the Court make an error of law in finding that Petitioners Petitioner's Rule
12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Motion to Dissolve under 77-3A101(13) was frivolous?
The issue was raised at R. 504 in Petitioner's motion objecting to the motion to
dissolve. The Ruling found at R. 636 states that this was a frivolous objection.
i

The exact language that UCA 77-3A-101(13) reads "(13) The ex parte civil
stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction may be dissolved at any time upon
application of the petitioner to the court which granted it." Clearly this section
only applies to a Petitioner, not a respondent. It is therefore the motion to dissolve
filed by Respondent which is frivolous, as the statute does not contemplate a

respondent unilaterally dismissing a stalking injunction. Clearly this is an error of
law, as the law simply does not support Respondent's motion.
9.4 Can the Court proceed to transfer and dismiss a case without an order
disposing of an affidavit of bias and motion to recuse?
Rule 63 clearly states:
(b)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed
shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion
or certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The
judge shall take no further action in the case until the motion is
decided. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct the
presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge,
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign another judge
to the action or hearing. The presiding judge of the court, any judge
of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the
presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing
judge.
This rule is unambiguous and clear, the word "shall" leaves no discretion for the
Court. The email of Judge Hilder at R. 597 is not sufficient to allow appeal of the
action. It raises more questions than it answers. Furthermore the R. 739 Judge
Lindberg admits to a "telephonic conference with Judge Hilder" and that there is
no tape of such a conference, nor does the email from Judge Hilder mention such a
telephonic conference. Had an official Court Record of such a conference existed,
it would have shed light on what information passed between Judge Hilder and
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Judge Lindberg allowing review by the Court of Appeals. In BARNARD v.
MURPHY, 852 P.2d 1023 (Utah App. 1993) the Utah Appeals Court stated:
The clear import of Rule 63(b) is that a judge against whom the
affidavit is directed must either recuse him or herself, or if he or she
questions the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, certify the matter to
another named judge for ruling its legal sufficient. The order of
February 9, 1993, went beyond the procedure outlined in Rule 63(b).
Accordingly, we order Judge Murphy to vacate the order of February
9, 1993 and to enter an order certifying the affidavit, without
comment, to a named judge.
In this case there is more cause for alarm, as the contents of the conversation
between Judge Hilder and Judge Lindberg are unknowable by any reviewing body
and the Court of Appeals. Fundamental to the 14th and 1st Amendments of the
Constitution is the right to a fair hearing on the issues raised and in Utah the right
to appeal. This has been denied in this case, and that error must be corrected.
Further there is no question that both Judge Dever and Judge Lindberg failed to
address the objection to assignment of Judge Lindberg at R.259-260. This clearly
was filed prior to the off the record conversation between Judge Lindberg and
Judge Dever admitted to at R. 739. Again the possibility of review of this record,
the discussion of an outstanding affidavit of bias against Judge Lindberg in case
#044904183, and any adjudication of the Objection are beyond review by the
Court of Appeals or anyone outside of the Star Chamber of Judge Lindberg.

n

9.5 Does Flipping off a father in the presence of his children rise to the level of
stalking? Must the Court enter findings on this issue?
There is no dispute that Petitioner's testimony that Respondent "flipped him off
on September 14th 2005 in the presence of his children is not refuted. See R. 7.
Indeed Respondent admitted to such behavior at Respondent admitted to flipping
off at transcripts p. 33 1. 12-p. 34 1. 8:
12 A. Yeah. You said if I write you another
13 letter for the time when I flipped you off, then
14 you will dismiss the others, the stalking
15 injunction16 Q. Did you flip me off when I went to drop
17 off the children?
18 A. When you were taking pictures of me?
19 Q. Okay. Do I videotape both my self and
20 you every time I drop off the children?
21
A. You take pictures of me every time that
22 you drop off the children. I don't know if you23
Q. And it wasn't you flipping me off
24 first, and then me taking a picture?
25
A. Well, that's the one occasion when you
0034
1 didn't have the lense off.
2
Q. Was I a half hour late that day,
3 because Alex had injured himself?
4
A. I can't remember.
5
Q. Were you mad that I was a half hour
6 late, because Alex had injured his knee?
7
A. I don't remember if Alex injured his
8 knee, and I don't remember-
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The ruling of Judge Lindberg at R. 627-641 is absolutely silent on this issue.
There is no finding regarding this event, and there can be little doubt that flipping
off a father in the presence of his 6 and 8 year old sons would be highly traumatic
from a stranger, let alone the children's mother. Such behavior clearly offends the
common standards of conduct, however as the Trial Court has not dealt with this
issue in the first instance the only clear solution is to remand for findings on this
event in the context of the other events alleged.
9.6 Does respondents contact with Petitioner in clear violation of a no-contact
order constitute criminal stalking? Must the Court enter findings on this issue?
Petitioner's undisputed testimony at R. 1 was that Respondent sent at least
2, and more likely 4 emails to Petitioner prior to the dismissal of the first ex-parte
civil stalking injunction on January 4th 2006 without prejudice. See R. 51, emails
on Dec. 30 2005, Jan 03 2005, and two emails on Jan 04 2005. Respondent at no
time testified to the content or purpose of the emails. The ruling of Judge
Lindberg at R. 627-641 is absolutely silent on this issue. The order found at R.
59-62 clearly states: "3. Respondent is restrained from contacting the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, through any form of communication including written, oral,
or electronic means." There can be no doubt that Respondent's documented
actions are in violation of the prior orders no-contact provision and is therefore

stalking under U.C.A.

76-5-106.5(3) which states: "(3) A person is also guilty

of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a stalking injunction issued
pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or intentionally or
knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to
this section." The further required language at R. 59 makes it very clear that an
order of the Court is the only thing that could remove this restriction: "Attention:
This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find you in
contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and
any other crime you may have committed in disobeying this order. This injunction
will be presumed valid until superseded by a Subsequent order." Respondent
admits to this action in the transcripts p. 27 1. 7-16.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

Q. Okay. So, did you also send e-mails to
me prior to January 4th? Between November 10th and
January 4th?
A. Yes. I needed a babysitter on the New
Year's nighc, and my attorney was not available.
I believe I sent an e-mail on December 29th,
asking Roger if he would like to watch the kids
for the New Year, and he responded back.
Q. Have you seen a list of all of them?

16 All eight or ten?
Furthermore Respondent was ordered to surrender the offensive photographs, but
refused to obey the order. The photographs were never returned, but a photocopy
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of it torn up was provided in a letter. Respondent has not surrendered any photos
to this date. See Transcripts starting at p. 28 1. 10 to p. 29 1. 19.
0028
10 Q. One of the things in that stalking
11 injunction say that you were to surrender all
12 photographs of me, and disclose who you gave them
13 to?
14 A. You are aware that I gave them to the
15 custody evaluators, [inaudible] documents.
16 Q. Did they order you to surrender them,
17 actually? Not disclose, surrender them.
18 A. The photographs that I have, I provided
19 copies of them to the custody evaluators. The
20 photographs- the family photographs, they belong
21 to the kids. I'm not going to give22
Q. Including the one with my balls
23 showing?
24
A. The one with the balls showing, it's
25 all on a disc. I'm not going to 0029
1
Q.
You're not going to surrender them,
2 even if there is a Court order saying that you
3 should surrender them?
4
A. They belong to my kids. I cannot
5 give—They should have a picture of their dad and
6 their mom. It's a family picture. It's not just
7 you.
8
Q. So, you assert that you should have the
9 right to keep a picture of me with my balls
10 hanging out you took without my knowledge?
11 A. I believe it was the kids who took the
12 photographs, because the height of it. I don't
13 know who took the picture. It's just that's the
14 picture.
15 Q. It was you. I'm testifying it was her.
16 So, you have not complied with that order.

17 A. The photographs belong to the children,
18 in my perspective. I cannot give you something
19 that does not belong to me.
9.7 Does the finding of the Court that a stalking injunction under §77-3a-101 does
not allow intentional infliction, rule 56 motions, or anything outside of the limited
scope of the stalking injunction fly in the face of the Court's use of a Guardian ad
Litem and consideration of custody issues and of "civility"?
The court found at R. 635 ]fB "This motion reflects a misunderstanding of
stalking injunctions. The stalking claim is controlled by Utah Code Ann. §77-3a101 which outlines the procedure for securing an injunction. It is plain from that
section that there is no room for summary judgment in the process for obtaining a
stalking injunction." The Court further found at R. 636 continues "The statute does
not allow Petitioner to raise other civil claims in connection with civil stalking
injunction. This type of petition is a particularized action with specific procedural
rules. It is not a general civil complaint, where a party is allowed to raise a number
of claims."
How then does the court proceed to appoint a Guardian ad Litem in such a
case? How then does the Court decide custody issues in such a case? Apparently
the rules and laws are only applicable to "little people" and males, females and the
Court is not bound by them. The Court goes on at R. 638 the Court states:
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Tf6 As a final matter, the Court believes it appropriate to inform the
parties that it is still working on its written findings and Order from
the February 28, 2006 hearing. As the parties are aware, at the
conclusion of that six hour hearing on February 28th the Court
entered an oral ruling finding that the parties had reached an
enforceable agreement to settle most of their issues, and that the
proposed Order submitted by Respondent—while not perfect—more
closely mirrored the substance of the agreement than the one
submitted by Petitioner. Nevertheless, given the continuing battles
between the parties, including Petitioner's failure to inform the
Court at the time of the hearing that on the day prior (February 2
7th) he had secured an ex parte civil stalking injunction against
Respondent, the Court is reconsidering whether or not enforcing the
agreement reached by the parties is in the children's best interests.
The Court is simply not hopeful that enforcing the agreement would
resolve the continuing acrimony that permeates nearly all of the
parties' dealings with each other. Many of the terms of the
agreement require the parties to exercise good faith in their dealings
with each other. Frankly, in light of developments (such as the
present ex parte stalking injunction), the Court is concerned that if
the negotiated agreement is enforced, instances of "warfare"
between the parties might actually increase rather than decrease, to
the children's detriment. In retrospect, the Court is concerned that at
the February 28 hearing it did not receive sufficient information
about how those negotiated terms might affect the children, to enable
it to determine if enforcement of the agreement is, in fact, in the
children's best interest. In light of these concerns, the Court is
requesting that each party, and the Guardian, file a supplemental
memorandum of law, not more than five (5) pages in length, setting
forth their respective positions on this issue. The supplemental
memoranda are to be filed by 5:00 p.m. Tuesday, April 18, 2006.
The Court will defer entering a final Order on the February 28
hearing until after it has had the opportunity to review and consider
that input.
If the Court is correct how can custody issues be addressed in a stalking
injunction? There is case law which argues that any participation by the Guardian

is clear. See State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33 paragraphs 33 and 34 and footnote
10(emphasis added), in which the Supreme Court Stated:
In sum, the circumstances under which an attorney guardian ad litem
is appointed are circumscribed by statute, and the role of an attorney
guardian ad litem in the litigation process is also limited because of the
nature of the duties and responsibilities set forth by these statutes.(10It is this same limited role that applies to the guardian ad litem
appointed by the district court in any district court proceeding.)
Consequently, the trial court's allowance of the guardian ad litem to sit
at counsel table with the prosecutor, to make objections, and to
examine witnesses, was error.
The second factor under the plain error analysis is whether the error
should have been obvious to the trial court. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). These errors, permitting the guardian ad
litem to sit at counsel table, to make objections, and to question
witnesses, should have been obvious to the trial court.
Furthermore the "testimony" of Ms. Luhn was objected to on April 11 2006 p. 23 1.
8 to p. 24 1. 5, reproduced below:
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

MR.BRYNER: Objection to Kim Luhn.
She has no appearance in this case. She has no
standing. Are you a witness? Because I would
like to cross-examine her.
THE COURT: Mr. BrynerMR. BRYNER: She was not here.
THE COURT: Mr. Bryner?
MS. LUHN: I believe, Your Honor, the
motion for restrictions is in the paternity
action.
MS. SMOAK: It's also in this action.
MS. LUHN: Both of them?
MS. SMOAK: Yes.
MS. LUHN: Then, I believe, at the very
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22 least, I've been appointed in the paternity
23 action.
24
MR.BRYNER: I dispute that.
25
THE COURT: Mr. Bryner, you may not
0024
1 speak up again, or you will be found in contempt.
2
MS. LUHN: Mr. Bryner is taking the
3 position that I'm a fraudulent guardian ad litem.
4 He has threatened to sue me, and I received e5 mail consistent with Ms. Smoak's statements.
While no law was mentioned at the time of the objection, the rule 603 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence clearly states "Before testifying, every witness shall be required
to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered
in a form calculated to awaken the witness1 conscience and impress the witness1
mind with the duty to do so." At no time was Ms. Luhn placed under oath, for her
statements regarding "civility" nor was Ms. Smoak ever placed under oath. The
statements of the attorney are simply not evidence, and the statements of Ms. Luhn
are at best those of a bystander in the Court. There is no dispute that Ms. Luhn was
not appointed in this case, there is a dispute to if any GAL has ever been properly
appointed in any case. In any event there is absolutely no order in the record
appointing Ms. Luhn. See R. 739 for statement from the Court:
See entry under exhibit A in paternity case. With respect to this case
(stalking injunction), Ms. Luhn was given notice to apear because she
has participated extensively in the other case involving the same
parties, and the court believed she could provide useful insights to the

TO

court on the effect of the parties ' actions on the children. No separate
appointment was made in the Stalking Injunction case.
For these reasons, any part of the order which does not specifically deal with the
stalking injunction should be vacated.
9.8 Did the Court abuse it's discretion by finding that "Both parties are clearly
combative and highly inappropriate in their dealings with each other."?
The Court went on in the very next sentence to state "However, the Court
find's Petitioner repeated ad hornnium attacks towards the Court and counsel to be
particularly offensive." Petitioner does not deny speaking the truth about the
Courts and Counsel, including that Counsel for Respondent regularly made
knowingly false statements. However there is absolutely nothing in the record to
support the fact that Petitioner has been "combative and highly inappropriate"
towards Respondent. Petitioner Marshels the evidence in the Record showing
what a bad guy I am:
At R. 441-447 Attorney Emily Smoak submitted an affidavit testifying to
what a bad guy Petitioner was. Judge Lindberg ruled at R. 636 ^(f that portions of
this affidavit which were hearsay were stricken. Reading this affidavit in such a
light, there is nothing to suggest that Petitioner has been "combative and highly
inappropriate" towards Respondent.
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At R. 491-503 largely the same affidavit as above was submitted in support
of a request for attorney's fees, which was denied. No direct testimony alleging
anything ""combative and highly inappropriate" done by Petitioner towards
Respondent was alleged.
Now looking thought the transcripts of the April 11th hearing for any
negative things said about Petitioner's actions, I quote below:
0010
13
MS. SMOAK: Alright. I'm going. Ms.
14 Bryner, Roger Bryner alleged in his stalking
15 injunction that there were some phone calls that
16 you made recently where you called a number of
17 times to talk to the children, and he has alleged
18 that in that manner, you were harassing him.
19 Would you please discuss with the Court those
20 calls that you made?
21 A. Well, the one that I believe he heard
22 too, was January 3rd, and that was my phone call
23 with the children. He provided the phone record.
24 He kept answering the phone and hanging up without
25 saying anything. So, I kept calling. At 7:00
0011
1 o'clock I was supposed to call the children for
2 the phone contact. He answered the phone finally
3 and said, we are going to call you back. He
4 called back in about three minutes and I talked
5 to the kids.
6
The following day, I got the call from
7 Midvale Police saying that I was harassing him,
8 and that I shouldn't do that anymore, but I'm
9 supposed to talk to the kids. So, I did call.
10 If you look at the log, I think all the calls
11 were made within a five minute period. If he

12 just answered the phone and said let us call you
13 back, that wouldn't be a problem. I just didn't
14 know what to expect.
15
The other phone call, in his log that
16 he provided, it has 942 number. That was made
17 January 15th. That's not my phone number. I
18 don't know what he is referring to.
19
The other times when he refers to the
20 continuous phone calls, that was done in July of
21 2004. He was supposed to return the kids. He
22 didn't return them. He called me back in the
23 morning saying that he's not going to bring the
24 kids back, because I had a trip planned for the
25 kids, and they are no longer at the apartment.
0012
1 And I just went to the apartment. The kids were
2 missing. I didn't know what to do. I just
3 started calling until he answered the phone and
4 allowed me to talk to the kids. It was about 15
5 times, and at that time, they were- the kids'
6 location was unknown for eight days, until they
7 were found by the police.
8
And so, that was only- there were two
9 instances when I called several times in a row.
0023
6
MS. SMOAK: Okay, and I think -Did you
7 bring an e-mail?
8
MR. BRYNER: Objection to Kim Luhn.
9 She has no appearance in this case. She has no
10 standing. Are you a witness? Because I would
11 like to cross-examine her.
12
THE COURT: Mr. Bryner13
MR. BRYNER: She was not here.
14
THE COURT: Mr. Bryner?
15
MS. LUHN: I believe, Your Honor, the
16 motion for restrictions is in the paternity
17 action.

18
MS. SMOAK: It's also in this action.
19
MS. LUHN: Both of them?
20
MS. SMOAK: Yes.
21
MS. LUHN: Then, I believe, at the very
22 least, I've been appointed in the paternity
23 action.
24
MR.BRYNER: I dispute that.
25
THE COURT: Mr. Bryner, you may not
0024
1 speak up again, or you will be found in contempt.
2
MS. LUHN: Mr. Bryner is taking the
3 position that I'm a fraudulent guardian ad litem.
4 He has threatened to sue me, and I received e5 mail consistent with Ms. Smoak's statements.
6
THE COURT: Alright. Now, Mr. Bryner,
7 you may answer.
8
MR. BRYNER: I may what?
9
THE COURT: You have your 20 minutes on
10 this matter, and you will have three more minutes
11 to answer this additional matter.
12
MR. BRYNER: On the filing
13 restrictions?
14
THE COURT: Yes.
15
MS. SMOAK: I also just had my motion
16 for attorneys' fees. Maybe I don't have time.
17
THE COURT: No.
18
MR. BRYNER: Alright. On the filing
19 restrictions20
THE COURT: No. You've got- First
21 address the civil stalking injunction, because
22 that's what we're here for.
23
MR. BRYNER: Okay.
24
THE COURT: And then, I will address
25 the filing restrictions.
0033
18 A.
19 Q.

When you were taking pictures of me?
Okay. Do I videotape both myself and

20 you every time I drop off the children?
21 A. You take pictures of me every time that
22 you drop off the children. I don't know if you23
Q. And it wasn't you flipping me off
24 first, and then me taking a picture?
25 A. Well, that's the one occasion when you
0034
I didn't have the lense off.
0035
24
Q. So, you have no objection to not doing
25 that. Do you think it would be appropriate if I
0036
1 contacted your employer?
2
A. You contacted my employer before. You
3 did the deposition of my supervisor.
4
Q. Outside of Court proceedings. I mean,
5 just let's say forwarding supervisor's information
6 from depositions and things like that? I mean,
7 that would not be appropriate on my part, would
8 it?
9
A. I'm not forwarding anything to your
10 supervisor.
II
Q. You said you had- gave some discs and
12 told a story about what they were, too.
13 A. The discs belonged to him. I did not
14 feel that 1 need-He was entitled. It was his
15 mortgage information and bank information. It was
16 his file, so I returned it.
17 Q. Okay. On-okay. Actually, I should
18 have gone first with my testimony, and then called
19 you second. I actually thought the petitioner
20 went first. So, is the Russian SLC website
21 public?
22
A. Yes.
23
Q. Is your website public?
24 A. Yes.
25
Q. Is there any restriction for me going

0037
1 to it?
2 A. Other than you don't speak any Russian,
3 to be wandering through the Russian SLC. No,
4 there is no restriction.
5
Q. Okay.
6
A. All the messages- most of the messages
7 are posted in Russian.
8
Q. Do you think I've looked through it
9 very often? I mean, is there any evidence that
10 I've been looking at it all the time?
11

A.

I don't know.

The remainder of the time is the Court talking. Clearly there is absolutely nothing
in the record of this case to show any instances of combative or inappropriate
behavior by Petitioner towards Respondent. While I have been, and continue to be
highly combative towards attorneys and in the Court room, this is not at all
inappropriate. If the Court thinks it is, the proper procedure is not a cowardly
tangential finding, but to issue an order to show cause and face the person you are
impugning. The 1st and 14th Amendments require notice and a hearing, and all
findings regarding Petitioner in this case should be voided.

(10) Relief Sought
10.1 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals follow it's ruling in Ellison v. Stam,
and remand this very similar case back for additional findings of fact with regards
to the pattern of behavior, the flipping off incident, the emails, phone calls, and the
threats against children and the life of Petitioner.
10.2 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals make clear that a dismissal without
prejudice does not make issues raised in a prior petition moot, and that those older
issues must also be considered as part of a pattern of conduct.
10.3 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals instruct the lower court to properly
transfer the issue of bias to the presiding Judge for a ruling prior to any hearing.
Should the case be reassigned the new Judge (or binding arbitrator, if the
agreement between the parties is enforceable) has discretion to rehear all or part of
the case.
10.4 Petitioner asks that all findings regarding Petitioner's alleged inappropriate actions
be stricken as being reached without jurisdiction and without notice or due process.
Should the Court wish to serve notice, I would be happy to defend myself.
Dated this

day of November, 2006

iS/ ^

/ .
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the 16 day of November, 2006,1 did cause to be delivered by
U.S. Mail postage prepaid and by hand delivery the forgoing document to the
following persons:
Emily BroadHead Smoat Et Al.
Kim Luhn
Cohne, Rappaport and Segal
68s. Main #800
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
SLC,UT 84101
Box 11008
By Email kim@jcw.com
SLC,UT 84147-0008
Court of Appeals
By Email emilyfficrslaw.com
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
By hand
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(11) Addendum to the brief
11.1) Applicable Law in full
The 1st Amendment of the Constitution
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
The 14th Amendment of the Constitution
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
of the LInited States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall
be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.

3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume
or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Anastasoff v. UnitedStates (8th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 898
See Exhibit A
BARNARD v. MURPHY, 852 P.2d 1023 (Utah App. 1993)
See Exhibit B
Ellison v. Stam, 136 P.3d 1242, 2006 UT App 150, 2006 Utah App. LEXIS 148,
549 Utah Adv. 24(2006)
See Exhibit C
Rule 12(b)(6)

(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief
in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or thirdparty claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if
one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with
one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or
motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the
adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that
claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6)
to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all
parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Rule 41(a)(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure
(a)(2) By order of court. Unless the plaintiff timely files a notice of
dismissal under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an
action may only be dismissed at the request of the plaintiff on order
of the court based either on:
(a)(2)(i) a stipulation of all of the parties who have appeared in the
action; or
(a)(2)(ii) upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.
If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall

not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by
the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
this paragraph is without prejudice.
Rule 63 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge.
(a) Substitute judge; Prior testimony. If the judge to whom an action
has been assigned is unable to perform the duties required of the
court under these rules, then any other judge of that district or any
judge assigned pursuant to Judicial Council rule is authorized to
perform those duties. The judge to whom the case is assigned may in
the exercise of discretion rehear the evidence or some part of it.
(b) Disqualification.
(b)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a
motion to disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a
certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be
supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias,
prejudice or conflict of interest.
(b)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the
action, but not later than 20 days after the last of the following:
(b)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge;
(b)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or
(b)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the
exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds
upon which the motion is based.
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the
motion shall be filed as soon as practicable.

(b)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate
under Rule 11 and subjects the party or attorney to the procedures
and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion to
disqualify in an action.
(b)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed
shall, without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or
certifying the motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge
shall take no further action in the case until the motion is decided. If
the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct the presiding judge
of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding
officer of the Judicial Council to assign another judge to the action
or hearing. The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the district,
any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of
the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge.
(b)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit
are timely filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the
reviewing judge shall assign another judge to the action or hearing or
request the presiding judge or the presiding officer of the Judicial
Council to do so.
(b)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge
may consider any part of the record of the action and may request of
the judge who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit
responsive to questions posed by the reviewing judge.
(b)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a
timely manner.
State v. Harrison, 2001 UT 33
See Exhibit D
UCA 76-5-106.5
76-5-106.5. Definitions - Stalking - Injunction - Hearing.

(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual
or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or
written threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination
thereof directed at or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent child, sibling,
or any other person who regularly resides in the household or who
regularly resided in the household within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his
immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific
person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself
or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate
family will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself
or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member
of his immediate family.
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or
Knowingly violates a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77,
Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or intentionally or knowingly
violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to
this section.
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor:
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant
to Title 77, Chapter 3 a, Stalking Injunctions.
(5) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;

(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that
is substantially similar to the offense of stalking;
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah
or of any crime in another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah
would be a felony, in which the victim of the stalking or a member
of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the previous
felony offense; or
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued
pursuant to Subsection (7).
(6) Stalking is a felony of the second degree if the offender:
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or
used other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury, in the commission of the crime of stalking;
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the
offense of stalking;
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction
or jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the
offense of stalking;
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination,
of offenses under
Subsection (5); or
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony
offenses in Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions
which, if committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim
of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony offenses.
(7) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and
held in abeyance for a period of time shall operate as an application
for a permanent criminal stalking injunction limiting the contact of
the defendant and the victim.
(a) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued
without a hearing unless the defendant requests a hearing at the time
of the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, plea
of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance. The court shall
give the defendant notice of his right to request a hearing.
(i) If the defendant requests a hearing, it shall be held at the
time of the verdict finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill,
plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance unless the
victim requests otherwise, or for good cause.

(ii) If the verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, guilty and mentally
ill, plea of no contest, or acceptance of plea in abeyance was entered
in a justice court, a certified copy of the judgment and conviction or
a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in abeyance
must be filed by the victim in the district court as an application and
request for hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction.
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the
following relief:
(i) an order restraining the defendant from entering the
residence, property, school, or place of employment of the victim
and requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim and
members of the victim's immediate family or household and to stay
away from any specified place that is named in the order and is
frequented regularly by the victim; and
(ii) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with
the victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from
personally or through an agent initiating any communication likely
to cause annoyance or alarm, including personal, written, or
telephone contact with the victim, the victim's employers,
employees, fellow workers, or others with whom communication
would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim.
(c) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved
upon application of the victim to the court which granted the order.
(d) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued
pursuant to this section shall be sent by the court to the statewide
warrants network or similar system.
(e) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to
this section shall be effective statewide
(f) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section
shall constitute an offense of stalking. Violations may be enforced
in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a criminal action
initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both.
(g) Nothing in this section shall preclude the filing of a criminal
information for stalking based on the same act which is the basis for
the violation of the stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77,
Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or permanent criminal stalking
injunction.

U.C.A.77-3(a)-101
77-3a-101. Civil stalking injunction - Petition — Ex parte
injunction.
(1) As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of
stalking as defined in Section 76-5-106.5. Stalking injunctions may
not be obtained against law enforcement officers, governmental
investigators, or licensed private investigators, acting in their official
capacity.
(2) Any person who believes that he or she is the victim of
stalking may file a verified written petition for a civil stalking
injunction against the alleged stalker with the district court in the
district in which the petitioner or respondent resides or in which any
of the events occurred. A minor with his or her parent or guardian
may file a petition on his or her own behalf, or a parent, guardian, or
custodian may file a petition on the minor's behalf.
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and
adopt uniform forms for petitions, ex parte civil stalking injunctions,
civil stalking injunctions, service and any other necessary forms in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter on or before July 1,
2001. The office shall provide the forms to the clerk of each district
court.
(a) All petitions, injunctions, ex parte injunctions, and any other
necessary forms shall be issued in the form adopted by the
Administrative Office of the Courts.
(b) The offices of the court clerk shall provide the forms to
persons seeking to proceed under this chapter.
(4) The petition for a civil stalking injunction shall include:
(a) the name of the petitioner; however, the petitioner's address
shall be disclosed to the court for purposes of service, but, on request
of the petitioner, the address may not be listed on the petition, and
shall be protected and maintained in a separate document or
automated database, not subject to release, disclosure, or any form of
public access except as ordered by the court for good cause shown;
(b) the name and address, if known, of the respondent;
(c) specific events and dates of the actions constituting the
alleged stalking;

(d) if there is a prior court order concerning the same conduct,
the name of the court in which the order was rendered; and
(e) corroborating evidence of stalking, which may be in the
form of a police report, affidavit, record, statement, item, letter, or
any other evidence which tends to prove the allegation of stalking.
(5) If the court determines that there is reason to believe that an
offense of stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction
may be issued by the court that includes any of the following:
(a) respondent may be enjoined from committing stalking;
(b) respondent may be restrained from coming near the
residence, place of employment, or school of the other party or
specifically designated locations or persons;
(c) respondent may be restrained from contacting, directly or
indirectly, the other party, including personal, written or telephone
contact with the other party, the other party's employers, employees,
fellow workers or others with whom communication would be likely
to cause annoyance or alarm to the other party; or
(d) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection of
the petitioner and other specifically designated persons under the
circumstances.
(6) Within ten days of service of the ex parte civil stalking
injunction, the respondent is entitled to request, in writing, an
evidentiary hearing on the civil stalking injunction.
(a) A hearing requested by the respondent shall be held within
ten days from the date the
request is filed with the court unless the court finds compelling
reasons to continue the hearing. The hearing shall then be held at
the earliest possible time The burden i? on the petitioner to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the
respondent has occurred.
(b) An ex parte civil stalking injunction issued under this
section shall state on its face:
(i) that the respondent is entitled to a hearing, upon written
request within ten days of the service of the order;
(ii) the name and address of the district court where the request
may be filed;
(iii) diat if the respondent fails to request a hearing within ten
days of service, the ex parte civil stalking injunction is automatically

modified to a civil stalking injunction without further notice to the
respondent and that the civil stalking injunction expires three years
after service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction; and
(iv) that if the respondent requests, in writing, a hearing after
the ten-day period after service, the court shall set a hearing within a
reasonable time from the date requested.
(7) At the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or continue
the injunction. The burden is on the petitioner to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the
respondent has occurred.
(8) The ex parte civil stalking injunction and civil stalking
injunction shall include the following statement: "Attention. This is
an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find
you in contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the
crime of stalking and any other crime you may have committed in
disobeying this order."
(9) The ex parte civil stalking injunction shall be served on the
respondent within 90 days from the date it is signed. An ex parte
civil stalking injunction is effective upon service. If no hearing is
requested in writing by the respondent within ten days of service of
the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the ex parte civil stalking
injunction automatically becomes a civil stalking injunction without
further notice to the respondent and expires three years from the date
of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction.
(10) If the respondent requests a hearing after the ten-day
period after service, the court shall set a hearing within a reasonable
time from the date requested. At the hearing, the burden is on the
respondent to show good cause why the civil stalking injunction
should be dissolved or modified.
(11) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service
has been returned, excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the
court from which the ex parte civil stalking injunction was issued
shall enter a copy of the ex parte civil stalking injunction and proof
of service or acceptance of service in the statewide network for
warrants or a similar system.
(a) The effectiveness of an ex parte civil stalking injunction or
civil stalking injunction shall not depend upon its entry in the
statewide system and, for enforcement purposes, a certified copy of

an ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction is
presumed to be a valid existing order of the court for a period of
three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking
injunction on the respondent.
(b) Any changes or modifications of the ex parte civil stalking
injunction are effective upon service on the respondent. The original
ex parte civil stalking injunction continues in effect until service of
the changed or modified civil stalking injunction on the respondent.
(12) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service
has been returned, excluding weekends and holidays, the clerk of the
court shall enter a copy of the changed or
modified civil stalking injunction and proof of service or acceptance
of service in the statewide network for warrants or a similar system.
(13) The ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking
injunction may be dissolved at any time upon application of the
petitioner to the court which granted it.
(14) The court clerk shall provide, without charge, to the
petitioner one certified copy of the injunction issued by the court and
one certified copy of the proof of service of the injunction on the
respondent. Charges may be imposed by the clerk's office for any
additional copies, certified or not certified in accordance with Rule
4-202.08 of the Code of Judicial Administration.
(15) The remedies provided in this chapter for enforcement of
the orders of the court are in addition to any other civil and criminal
remedies available. The district court shall hear and decide all
matters arising pursuant to this section.
(16) After a hearing with notice to the affected party, the court
may enter an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the action,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
(17) This chapter does not apply to protective orders or ex parte
protective orders issued pursuant to Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant
Abuse Act, or to preliminaiy injunctions issued pursuant to an action
for dissolution of marriage or legal separation.
Enacted by Chapter 276, 2001 General Session

11.2) Relevant Parts of the Record.
Attached after case law in order.
Transcript of April 11th 2006 hearing at R. 653-717
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant taxpayer challenged a decision of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which held that
the two-year statute of limitations in 26 U.S.C.S, §6511 (a) applied to bar her
claim for a tax refund.
OVERVIEW: Appellant taxpayer sought a refund of overpaid federal income
tax. After her request for a refund was denied by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), she initiated suit. The district court held that 26 U.S.C.S. §
7502, which held claims were received when they were postmarked, did not
apply to appellant's claim for a refund. Judgment for the IRS was granted.
On appeal, appellant argued that § 7 5 02 should apply whenever necessary to

fulfill its remedial purpose and that the statute should operate regardless
of r.he claim's timeliness under 26 U.S.C.S. §6511 (a) to save the claim under 26
U.S.C.S. §6511 (b) . Appellant also argued the court was not bound by a prior,
on point opinion because the opinion was unpublished and thus net a
precedent under Sth Cir. R. 2SA(i). The court reasoned that the portion of
8th Cir. R. 23A(i) relied upon by appellant was unconstitutional because it
extended the courts1 judicial power beyond that provided by U.S. Const, art.
III. Because appellant's argument was directly addressed and rejected m a
prior decision of the court, the court rejected the instant argument and
affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding that an
unpublished opinion which was on point operated to bar her claim; the court
also found that a court rule that did not allow courts to rely on
unpublished opinions as precedent was unconstitutional.
CORE TERMS: judicial power, framers, precedential, reporting, duty, judicial decision, authoritative, printed,
mailed, save, bind, refund claim, declaration, delegated, untimely, refund, decision-making, law-declaring,
expositon, declare, timely claim, rule of law, taxes paid, regulation, timeliness, three-year, systematic, manuscript,
overpaid, tyranny
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes • Hide Headnotes
Tax Law > Federal Tax Administration & Procedure > Tax Credits & Liabilities > Credits, Overassessments &
Refunds (IRC sees. 6401-6427) > General Overview
HNJ$26

U.S.C.S. §6511 (b) limits refunds to taxes paid in the three years prior
to the filing of a claim.

Tax Law > Federal Tax Administration & Procedure > Tax Credits & Liabilities > Credits, Overassessments &
Refunds (IRC sees. 6401-6427) > General Overview
HN2$The

"Mailbox Rule," 26 U.S.C.SJ* 750^ saves tax refund claims that would
have been timely if received when mailed; they are deemed received when
postmarked. But 26_.y_._S._C;S_._§J502 applies only to claims that are
untimely.

Tax Law > Federal Tax Administration & Procedure > Tax Credits & Liabilities > Credits, Overassessments &
Refunds (IRC sees. 6401-6427) > General Overview

H/V3^2j3_U.S.C.$. §6511 (a) provides that a claim must be submitted within two
years of overpayment if no return has yet been filed—not three years.
Constitutional Law > The Judiciary > General Overview
Governments > Courts > Authority to Adjudicate
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents
HN4^_The

portion of Sth Cir. R. 2 3A(i) that declares that unpublished
opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under U.S. Const, art.
Ill because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that
goes beyond the judicial.

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Preclusion & Effect of Judgments > Estoppel > Collateral Estoppel
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Preclusion & Effect of Judgments > Res Judicata
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents

HNS^ ^"k c * r * **• 28A(i) provides: Unpublished opinions are not precedent and
parties generally should not cite them, tfhen relevant to establishing
the doctrines cf res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case, however/ the parties may cite any unpublished opinion. Parties
may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has
persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this
or another court would serve as well.

Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents

HN6$ " n *" erent in- every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation
of a general principle or rule of law. This declaration of law is
authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be
applied m subsequent cases to similarly situated parties.
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HN8$^n c ^ e t e r m i r i i n 9 t ^ e l a w i n o n e c a s e , j u d g e s b i n d t h o s e in s u b s e q u e n t
cases because, although the judicial power requires judges to determine
law m each case, a judge is sworn to determine, not according to his
own judgements, but according to the known laws. Judges are not
delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old.
Governments > Courts > Authority to Adjudicate
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents
HNg$The

judicial power to determine law is a power only to determine what
the law is, not to invent it. Because precedents are the best and most
authoritative guide of what the law is, the judicial power is limited
by them.

Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents

H/VIO1^ if" the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or if other exigent
circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed. When this occurs,
there is a burden of justification.
Governments > Courts > Authority to Adjudicate
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents
HN1}^Federal

courts, in adopting rules of procedure, are not free to extend
the judicial power of the United States described m U.S. Const, art.
III. The judicial power of the United States is limited by the
doctrine of precedent.
CASE SUMMARY

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant taxpayer challenged a decision of the United
Stages District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, which held that
the two-year statute of limitations in 26 U.S.C.S. §6511(a) applied to bar her
claim for a tax refund.
OVERVIEW: Appellant taxpayer sought a refund of overpaid federal income
tax. After her request for a refund was denied by tne Internal Pevenue
Service (IRS), she initiated suit. The district court held that 26 U.S.C.S. §
7502, which held claims were received when they were postmarked, did not
apply to appellantfs claim for a refund. Judgment for the IRS was granted.
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on point opinion because the opinion was unpublished and tnus not a
precedent under 8th Cir. R. 28A(i). The court reasoned that the portion of

8th Cir. R. 28A(i) relied upon by appellant was unconstitutional because it
extended the courts' judicial power beyond that provided by U.S. Const, art.
III. Because appellant's argument was directly addressed and rejected in a
prior decision of the court, the court rejected the instant argument and
affirmed the ruling of the lower court:.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding that an
unpublished opinion which was on point operated to bar her claim; the court
also found that a court rule that did not allow courts to rely on
unpublished opinions as precedent vias unconstitutional.
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Cir. R. 28A(i) provides: Unpublished opinions are not precedent and
parties generally should not cite them. When relevant to establishing
the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case, however, the parties may cite any unpublished opinion. Parties
may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has
persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this
or another court would serve as well.

Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents

liflG^ Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation
of a general principle or rule of law. This declaration of law is
authoritative ro the extent necessary for the decision, and must be
applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties.
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HN8$In determining Lhe law in one case, judges bind those in subsequent
cases because, although the judicial power requires judges to determine
law in each case, a judge is sworn to determine, not according to his
own judgements, bur according to the known laws. Judges are not
delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old.
Governments > Courts > Authority to Adjudicate
Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents

HN9^^rie
Juc^cial power to determine law is a power only to determine what
'the law is, not to invent it. Because precedents are the best and most
authoritative guide of what the law is, the judicial power is limited
by them.

Governments > Courts > Judicial Precedents

HNIO^^^ t^ie r e a s o n i n ( ? °f a case is exposed as faulty, or if other exigent
"'''circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed. When this occurs,
there is a burden of justification.
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:
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HEANEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.
n1 The Hon. Paul A. Magnuson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, sitting by
designation.
OPINION BY: RICHARD S. ARNOLD
OPINION: [*899]
RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
Faye Anastasoff seeks a refund of overpaid federal income tax. On April 13, 1996, Ms. Anastasoff mailed her
refund claim to the Internal Revenue Service for taxes paid on April 15, 1993. The Service denied her claim under
H/Vi

^ 2 6 U.S.C. § 6511(b). which limits refunds to taxes paid in the three years prior to the filing of a claim.
Although her claim was mailed within this period, it was received and filed on April 16, 1996, three [**3] years and
one day after she overpaid her taxes, one day late, in many cases, ,HN2Tthe
Mailbox Rule," 26_U,,S,C, §J75G2L
saves claims like Ms. Anastasoffs that would have been timely if received when mailed; they are deemed received
when postmarked. But § 7502 applies only to claims that are untimely, and the parties agree that under 26.U,S.C. §
6511(a)- which measures the timeliness of the refund claim itseif, her claim was received on time. The issue then is

whether § 7502 can be applied, for the purposes of § 6511(b)'s three-year refund limitation, to a claim that was
timely under § 6511(a). The District Court n2 held that § 7502 could not apply to any part of a timely claim, and
granted judgment for the Service. On appeal, Ms. Anastasoff argues that § 7502 should apply whenever necessary
to fulfill its remedial purpose, i.e., to save taxpayers from the vagaries of the postal system, even when only part of
the claim is untimely. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Footnotes
n2 The Hon. Catherine D Perry, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.
End Footnotes

[**4]

I.
We rejected precisely the same legal argument in Christie v. United States. 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 38446, No. 912375 MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished). In Christie, as here, we considered a refund claim
mailed just prior to § 6511 (b)'s three-year bar and received just after. Like Ms. Anastasoff, the Christie taxpayers
argued that § 7502 should operate regardless of the claim's timeliness under § 6511(a) to save their claim under §
6511(b). We held that even if § 7502 could apply to a timely claim, it would not help in this situation: If § 7502 were
applied to the claim, it would be deemed received before the return. But HN3Y§ 6511(a) provides that a claim must
be submitted within two years of overpayment if no return has yet been filed-not three years. In other words, to save
the claim under § 6511(b) only makes it untimely under § 6511(a). Ms. Anastasoff does not attempt to distinguish
Christie. She does argue that a relevant regulation was not cited in Christie, but the reasoning of the Christie
opinion is squarely inconsistent [**5] with the effect taxpayer desires to attribute to the regulation.
Although it is our only case directly in point, Ms. Anastasoff contends that we are not bound by Christie because it
is an unpublished decision and thus not a precedent under 8th Circuit Rule 28A(i). We disagree. We hold t h a t H N 4
*the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under
Article III, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the "judicial."
HNS

$The Rule provides:
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not cite them. When relevant
to establishing the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the
parties may cite any unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this court
if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another
court would serve as well...

T*6] " ^ ^Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of
•aw. Marburv v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, J CranchJ 37^1.77-78^ f*9001 2 L Ed. 60(1803). This declaration of law is
authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated
parties. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544,115 L Ed. 2d 481,111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821). These principles, which form the doctrine
of precedent, were well established and well regarded at the time this nation was founded. The Framers of the
Constitution considered these principles to derive from the nature of judicial power, and intended that they would
limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by Article III of the Constitution. n3 Accordingly, we conclude that 8th
Circuit Rule 28A(i), insofar as it would allow us to avoid the precedential effect of our prior decisions, purports to
expand the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III, and [**7] is therefore unconstitutional. That rule does
not, therefore, free us from our duty to follow this Court's decision in Christie.
Footnotes

n3 " W 7 f "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const, art III, § 1, cl. L

End FootnotesII.
The doctrine of precedent was well-established by the time the Framers gathered in Philadelphia. Morton J.
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860 8-9 (1977); J H Baker, An Introduction to English Legal
History 227 (1990); Sir William Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 LQ.R. 180 (1934). See, e.g., 1 Sir William W.
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *69 (1765) ("it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents"). To the jurists of the late eighteenth century (and thus by and large to the Framers), n4 the doctrine
seemed not just well [**8] established but an immemorial custom, the way judging had always been carried out,
part of the course of the law. n5 In addition, the Framers had inherited a very favorable view of precedent from the
seventeenth century, especially through the writings and reports of Sir Edward Coke; the assertion of the authority
of precedent had been effective in past struggles of the English people against royal usurpations, and for the rule of
law against the arbitrary power of government. n6 In sum, the doctrine of precedent was not merely well
established; it was the historic method of judicial decision-making, and well regarded as a bulwark of judicial
independence in past struggles for liberty.
Footnotes
n4 Lawyers made up majorities of the Continental Congress, the signers of the Declaration of Independence, and
the Framers of the Constitution. Perry Miller. The Legal Mind in America 16 (1962).
n5 James Wison suggested that the doctrine of precedent was brought to England by the Romans. 1 The Works of
James Wilson 343 (1967). Chancellor Kent traced it "from the earliest periods of English history." James Kent,
Commentaries on American Law 473-78 (12th ed. 1873). Blackstone found it "even so early as the conquest." 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries *69. Before them, in Slade v. Morley, Sir Edward Coke suggested simply that
"precedents have always been respected ...." 4 Co. Rep. 91, 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B. 1602), reprinted in Sources
of English Legal History: Private Law to 1750 428 (1986). [**9J

n6 Coke's struggle against the tyranny of the Stuarts, which the Framers identified with their own against King
George, made him the legal authority most admired and most often cited by American patriots. Bernard Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 30 (1967). Coke used precedent, and emphasized it to a greater
degree than his predecessors, because it was his main weapon in the fight for the independence of the judiciary
and limits on the king's prerogative rights. See Harold J. Berman and Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of
English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone, 45 Emory LJ. 437. 450 (1996): J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient
Constitution and the Feudal Law 46 (1987). By contrast, the only criticism of the doctrine of precedent was
associated with Thomas Hobbes, who regarded the authority of precedent as an affront to the absolute power of
the Sovereign. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 323-26 (Penguin ed. 1985).
End Footnotes

[*901]

Modern legal scholars tend to justify the authority of precedents on equitable or prudential grounds. n7 By contrast,
[**10] on the eighteenth-century view (most influentiaily expounded by Blackstone), the judge's duty to follow
precedent derives from the nature of the judicial power itself. n8 As Blackstone defined it, each exercise of the
"judicial power" requires judges "to determine the law" arising upon the facts of the case. 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries *25. "To determine the law" meant not only choosing the appropriate legal principle but also
expounding and interpreting it, so that "the law in that case, being solemnly declared and determined, what before
was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent ruie ...." 1 Commentaries *69. n9 HN8f\n
determining the law in one case, judges bind those in subsequent cases because, although the judicial power
requires judges "to determine lav/' in each case, a judge is "sworn to determine, not according to his own
judgements,, but according to the known laws. [Judges are] not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain
and expound the old." Id. [**11] HN$iThe judicial power to determine law is a power only to determine what the
law is, not to invent it. Because precedents are the "best and most authoritative" guide of what the law is, the
judicial power is limited by them. Id. The derivation of precedential authority from the law-declaring nature of the
judicial power was also familiar to the Framers through the works of Sir Edward Coke and Sir Matthew Hale. See 4
E. Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 138 (1642) (a prior judicial decision on point is sufficient authority on a

question of law because "a judicial decision is to the same extent a declaration of the law."); 1 Coke, Institutes 51
(1642) ("it is the function of a judge not to make, but to declare the law, according to the golden mete-wand of the
law and not by the crooked cord of discretion "). Sir Matthew Hale, The History of The Common Law of England 4445 (Univ. of Chicago ed., 1971) (" Judicial Decisions [have thetr] Authority in Expounding, Declaring and Publishing
what the Law of this Kingdom is .. .").
-

-

Footnotes

--

n7 See, e g.( Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39_Stan. L Rev, 571, 595-602J1987) (noting that the authority of
precedent is commonly supported by arguments: (1) from fundamental fairness, i.e., that like cases should be
treated alike; (2) from the need for predictability; and (3) as an aid to judicial decision-making, to prevent
unnecessary reconsideration of established matters). [**12]

n8 Blackstone's great influence on the Framers' understanding of law is a familiar fact. See Schick v. United States,
196 UJL65, 6*L49 L_Ed..991 _24_S._Ct 826 (1904) ("At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, it
[Blackstone's work] had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work had
been sold in this country than in England; so that undoubtedly, the framers of the Constitution were familiar with
it."); Daniel Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of Law 265 (1941).
n9 This need not be done by way of a reported opinion. The record of the judicial proceedings and decision alone is
sufficient evidence of the legal principles necessary to support the decision to provide "light or assistance" when
"any critical question arises." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *69.
End Footnotes—
In addition to keeping the law stable, this doctrine is also essential, according to Blackstone, for the separation of
legislative and judicial power. In his discussion of the separation of governmental powers, Blackstone identifies this
limit on the "judicial [**13] power," i.e., that judges must observe established laws, as that which separates it from
the "legislative" power and in which "consists one main preservative of public liberty." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries
*258-59. If judges had the legislative power to "depart from" established legal principles, "the subject would be in
the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then regulated only by their own opinions ...." Id. at *259.
The Framers accepted this understanding of judicial power (sometimes referred to as the declaratory theory of
adjudication) and the doctrine of precedent implicit [*902] in it. n10 Hamilton, like Blackstone, recognized that a
court "pronounces the law" arising upon the facts of each case. n11 The Federalist No. 81, at 531 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Modern Library ed., 1938). He explained the law-declaring concept of judicial power in the term,
"jurisdiction": "This word is composed of JUS and DICTIO, juris dictio, or a speaking and pronouncing of the law,"
id., and concluded that the jurisdiction of appellate courts, as a law-declaring power, is not antagonistic to the factfinding role of juries. Id. Like Blackstone, he thought [**14] that "the courts must declare the sense of the law," and
that this fact means courts must exercise "judgment" about what the law is rather than "will" about what it should be.
The Federalist No. 78 507-08. Like Blackstone, he recognized that this limit on judicial decision-making is a crucial
sign of the separation of the legislative and judicial power. Id. at 508. Hamilton concludes that "to avoid an arbitrary
discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them ...." Id. at 510. n12
Footnotes
n10See Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25. 1831), reprinted in The Mind of the
Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison 390, 390-93 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981)
(describing the "authoritative force" of "judicial precedents" as stemming from the "obligations arising from judicial
expositions of the law on succeeding judges . ."); James Wilson. II The Works of James Wilson 502 (1967)
("Judicial decisions are the principal and most authentic" proof of what the law is and ..."every prudent and cautious
judge will appreciate them [because]. his duty and his business is not to make the law, but to interpret and apply
it." Id. See also Christopher Wolfe, The Rise of Modem Judicial Review; From Constitutional Interpretation to
Judge-Made Law 74 (1986); David M. O'Brien, Constitutional Law and Politics 73 (1995). [**15]

n11 James Wilson agreed: "judicium is quasi juris dictum . .a judgment is a declaration of the law." II The Works of
James Wilson 524 (1967).
n12 Other early authorities confirm the connection between the doctrine of precedent and the separation of powers.
See 1 Kent's Commentaries, Lect. XXI at 479: "Those nations, which have adopted the civil law as the main
foundation of their own [recognize precedent to a far less degree than our own]... With them the necessity of
judiciary independence upon the executive, is not so dearly acknowledged ... It has been shown already that this
independence requires, in a considerable degree, the acknowledgment of precedential authority."; William Cranchr
Preface, 1 Cranch iii (1804): "In a government which is emphatically styled a government of laws, the least possible
range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge ...perhaps nothing conduces more to that object than the
publication of reports. Every case decided is a check upon the judge. He can not decide a similar case differently,
without strong reasons, which, for his own justification, he will wish to make public."
...

End Footnotes-- -

[**16]

The Framers thought that, under the Constitution, judicial decisions would become binding precedents in
subsequent cases. Hamilton anticipated that the record of federal precedents "must unavoidably swell to a very
considerable bulk. ..." Id. But precedents were not to be recorded for their own sake. He expected judges to give
them "long and laborious study" and to have a "competent knowledge of them." Id. Likewise, Madison recognized
"the obligation arising from judicial expositions of the law on succeeding judges." Letter from James Madison to
Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in The Mind of the Founder; Sources of the Political Thought of
James Madison 390, 390-93 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981). Madison expected that the accumulation of
precedents would be beneficial: "among other difficulties, the exposition of the Constitution is frequently a copious
source, and must continue so until its meaning on all great points shall have been settled by precedents." Letter
from James Madison to Samuel Johnson (June 21, 1789), in 12 Papers of James Madison 250 (Robert A. Rutland
etal. eds.} 1977). Although they drew different conclusions from the fact, [**17] the Anti-Federalists also [*903]
assumed that federal judicial decisions would become authorities in subsequent cases. n13 Finally, early
Americans demonstrated the authority which they assigned to judicial decisions by rapidly establishing a reliable
system of American reporters in the years following the ratification of the Constitution. Grant Gilmore, The Ages of
American Law 23 (1977); Peter Karsten, Heart Versus Head: Judge-Made Law in Nineteenth-Century America 2832(1997).
.....

.

Footnotes

-

n13 See, e.g., Essays of Brutus, XV (Mar. 20, 1788) in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist, 441 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981): "one adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this to a following one. These cases will immediately
affect individuals only; so that a series of determinations will probably take place before even the people will be
informed of them." By contrast, the danger in the Federal Farmer's view was that the federal courts had "no
precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the
supreme court for many years will be mere discretion." Letters from The Federal Farmer No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2
The Complete Anti-Federalist at 244.
End Footnotes

[**18]

We do not mean to suggest that the Framers expected or intended the publication (in the sense of being printed in
a book) of all opinions. For the Framers, limited publication of judicial decisions was the rule, and they never drew
that practice into question. Before the ratification of the Constitution, there was almost no private reporting and no
official reporting at all in the American states. Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical
Years, 1800-1850, 3 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 28, 34 (1959) (reviewing the history of American reports). As we have seen,
however, the Framers did not regard this absence of a reporting system as an impediment to the precedential
authority of a judicial decision. Although they lamented the problems associated with the lack of a reporting system
and worked to assure more systematic reporting, judges and lawyers of the day recognized the authority of
unpublished decisions even when they were established only by memory or by a lawyer's unpublished
memorandum. Karsten, Heart Versus Head 30; Jesse Root, The Origin of Government and Laws in Connecticut
(1798), reprinted in The Legal Mind in American 38-39 (Perry [**19] Miller ed., 1962). n14
—

Footnotes

n14 In this, they were following the common-law view, which considered entry on the official court record sufficient

to give a decision precedential authority whether or not the decision was subsequently reported. See, e.g., Coke, 2
Institutes, Proeme, last paragraph (stating that judicial decisions are reliable authority whether they are published,
i.e., ''related and reported m our Bookes," or only uextant in judicial Records ..."). This remained true even after
reporting became more systematic. See James Ram, Science of Legal Judgement (1834) (" A manuscript note of a
case is authority. It may be more full, or accurate, than a printed report of the same case. The existence of such
manuscript may be little known. When cited by a party in a cause ...it may be 'an authority precisely applicable' (18
Ves. 347); but the opposite party, or the Court, may never have heard of it before; it may then come as a great
surprise upon both.").
- - - End Footnotes
To summarize, in the late eighteenth [**20] century, the doctrine of precedent was well-established in legal practice
(despite the absence of a reporting system), regarded as an immemorial custom, and valued for its role in past
struggles for liberty. The duty of courts to follow their prior decisions was understood to derive from the nature of
the judicial power itself and to separate it from a dangerous union with the legislative power. The statements of the
Framers indicate an understanding and acceptance of these principles. We conclude therefore that, as the Framers
intended, the doctrine of precedent limits the "judicial power" delegated to the courts in Article III. No less an
authority than Justice (Professor) Joseph Story is in accord. See his Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States §§ 377-78 (1833):
The case is not alone considered as decided and settled; but the principles of the decision are held,
as precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the [*904] same nature. This is the constant
practice under our whole system of jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when they
first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always has been considered, as the great
security [**21] of our rights, our liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law is justly
deemed certain, and founded in permanent principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of
judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, than that it was
at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference to the
settled course of antecedent principles.
This known course of proceeding, this settled habit of thinking, this conclusive effect of judicial
adjudications, was in the full view of the framers of the constitution. It was required, and enforced in
every state in the Union; and a departure from it would have been justly deemed an approach to
tyranny and arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of all the
just checks upon judicial authority.

III.
Before concluding, we wish to indicate what this case is not about. It is not about whether opinions should be
published, whether that means printed in a book or available in some other accessible form to the public in general.
Courts may decide, for one reason or another, that some of their cases are not important [**22] enough to take up
pages in a printed report. Such decisions may be eminently practical and defensible, but in our view they have
nothing to do with the authoritative effect of any court decision. The question presented here is not whether
opinions ought to be published, but whether they ought to have precedential effect, whether published or not. We
point out, in addition, that "unpublished" in this context has never meant "secret." So far as we are aware, every
opinion and every order of any court in this country, at least of any appellate court, is available to the public. You
may have to walk into a clerk's office and pay a per-page fee, but you can get the opinion if you want it. Indeed,
most appellate courts now make their opinions, whether labeled "published" or not, available to anyone on line. This
is true of our Court,
Another point about the practicalities of the matter needs to be made. It is often said among judges that the volume
of appeals is so high that it is simply unrealistic to ascribe precedential value to every decision. We do not have
time to do a decent enough job, the argument runs, when put in piain language, to justify treating every opinion as a
precedent. [**23] if this is true, the judicial system is indeed in serious trouble, but the remedy is not to create an
underground body of law good for one place and time only. The remedy, instead, is to create enough judgeships to
handle the volume, or, if that is not practical, for each judge to take enough time to do a competent job with each
case, if this means that backlogs will grow, the price must still be paid. At bottom, rules like our Rule 28A(i) assert
that courts have the following power: to choose for themselves, from among ail the cases thev decide, those that
they will follow in the Mure, and those that they need not indeed, some forms of the non-publication rule even
forbid citation. Those courts are saying to the bar: "We may have decided this question the opposite way yesterday,

but this does not bind us today, and, what's more, you cannot even teil us what we did yesterday." As we have tried
to explain in this opinion, such a statement exceeds the judicial power, which is based on reason, not fiat.
Finally, lest we be misunderstood, we stress that we are not here creating some rigid doctrine of eternal adherence
to precedents. Cases can be overruled. Sometimes they should [**24] be. On our Court, this function can be
performed by the en banc Court, but not by a single panel. w / V J 0 T [ f the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty,
or [*905] if other exigent circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed. When this occurs, however, there is
a burden of justification. The precedent from which we are departing should be stated, and our reasons for rejecting
it should be made convincingly dear, in this way, the law grows and changes, but it does so incrementally, in
response to the dictates of reason, and not because judges have simply changed their minds.
IV.
For these reasons, we must reject Ms. Anastasoff's argument that, under 8th Cir. R. 28A(i), we may ignore our prior
decision in Christie. HN11TFederal
courts, in adopting rules, are not free to extend the judicial power of the United
States described in Article III of the Constitution. Willy v Coastal Corp.. 503 U.S. 131. 135. 117 L Ed. 2d 280. 112
S. Ct. 1076 (1992). The judicial power of the [**25] United States is limited by the doctrine of precedent. Rule 28A
(i) allows courts to ignore this limit. If we mark an opinion as unpublished, Rule 28A(i) provides that is not
precedent Though prior decisions may be well-considered and directly on point, Rule 28A(i) allows us to depart
from the law set out in such prior decisions without any reason to differentiate the cases. This discretion is
completely inconsistent with the doctrine of precedent; even in constitutional cases, courts "have always required a
departure from precedent to be supported by some 'special justification.'" United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 517 U S . 843, 856. 116 S. Ct. 1793, 135 L Ed. 2d 124 (1996). quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808,842, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring). Rule 28A(i) expands the judicial
power beyond the limits set by Article III by allowing us complete discretion to determine which judicial decisions
will bind us and which will not. Insofar as it limits the precedential effect of our prior decisions, the Rule is therefore
unconstitutional.
Ms. Anastasoffs interpretation of § 7502 was directly [**26] addressed and rejected in Christie. n15 Eighth Cir. R.
28A(i) does not free us from our obligation to follow that decision. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
-

Footnotes

n15 On July 28, 2000, the Second Circuit decided Weisbart v. United States Dept of Treasury. 222 F.3d 93. 2000
WL 1041231 (2d Cir. 2000). Weisbart appears to conflict with Christie. We express no view on whether we would
follow Weisbart if it were not for the conclusive effect of Christie.

End Footnotes

--

CONCUR BY: HEANEY
CONCUR: HEANEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I agree fully with Judge Arnold's opinion. He has done the public, the court, and the bar a great service by writing so
fully and cogently on the precedential effect of unpublished opinions. I write separately only to state that in my view,
this is a case which should be heard en banc in order to reconsider our holding in Christie, and thus resolve an
important issue.
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CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Pursuant to Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner litigant filed affidavits alleging prejudice and bias by
defendant presiding judge in seven cases pending before him. The litigant
filed a petition for an extraordinary writ m the nature of mandamus to
compel the judge's compliance with Rule 63(b). The issue was whether the
judge complied with the procedures mandated by Rule 63(b) in his treatment
of the affidavits.
OVERVIEW: The judge entered an order, which incorrectly characterized a
Rule 63(b) affidavit as a motion to disqualify; the order incorporated by
reference his decisions on motions to disqualify m two other cases, and
then denied the motion. The order certified the matter to another judge to
pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. The other judge,
apparently as a result of the presiding judge's reference to his decisions
in the other cases, directed the litigant to file a memorandum of law
regarding his request for the presiding judge to recuse himself. The
litigant contended that the presiding judge failed to comply with Rule 63(b)
by characterizing and ruling on the affidavit as if it were a motion and by
making reference to his decisions in other cases, which risked improperly
influencing a review by the other judge. The court agreed. The clear import
of Rule 63(b) was that a judge against whom the affidavit was directed had
to either recuse himself or, if he questioned the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit, certify the matter to another named judge. The order of the
presiding judge improperly went beyond the Rule 63(b) procedure.

OUTCOME: The court ordered the presiding judge to vacate his order and to
enter an order certifying the affidavit, without comment, to another judge.
The court ordered the presiding judge to immediately act upon the remaining
Rule 63(b) affidavits by making a determination as to whether or not he
questioned the legal sufficiency of the affidavits, and on that basis,
either recuse himself or certify the affidavits to another judge.
CORE TERMS: legal sufficiency, notice, bias, recusal, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, matter in question, petitioner
filed, certifying, directing assigned, naming, hear
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63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, clearly states the options
available to a trial judge in response to the filing of an affidavit
alleging bias or prejudice. If the judge against whom the affidavit is
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall enter an
order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another
judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like
jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit. In the alternative, if the judge does not question the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit, a substitute judge must be called
m to try the case or determine the matter m question. The rule
further provides that upon receipt of the affidavit, the judge against
whom it is directed shall proceed no further therein, except to call m
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
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clear import of Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is that
a judge against whom the affidavit is directed must either recuse himor herself, or if he or she questions the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit, certify the matter to another named judge for a ruling on
its legal sufficiency.
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procedure set out in Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
contemplates expeditious action to minimize delay m adjudication and
disposition of pending cases.
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OPINION BY: PER CURIAM
OPINION: [*1024] OPINION

(For Publication)
PER CURIAM
This matter is before the court on a petition for extraordinary writ in the nature of mandamus to compel compliance
with Rule 63(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Pursuant to Rule 63(b), petitioner filed affidavits alleging prejudice and bias by Judge Michael Murphy in seven
cases pending in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County Those cases are
1 Montgomery v Montgomery, Case No 90-490-3394 DA affidavit filed - December 7, 1992 notice
to submit filed - January 19, 1993
2 State v Blood & Phillips, Case No 92-090-0397 DA affidavit filed - December 7, 1992 notice to
submit filed - January 19, 1993
3 Morris v Morris, Case No 89-490-3019 [**2] DA affidavit filed - January 5, 1993 notice to submit
filed-January 19, 1993
4 Shelley (Brand) v Shelley, Case No 90-490-1380 DA affidavit filed - January 5, 1993 notice to
submit filed - January 19, 1993
5 Jensen v Frasier (Jensen), Case No 91-490-3233 DA affidavit filed - March 24, 1993 notice to
submit filed - March 24, 1993
6 In Re Adoption of J J R , Case No 93-290-0103 AD affidavit filed - March 24 1993 notice to
submit filed - March 24, 1993
7 In Re Name Change of Richard Anthony Carroll, Case No 93-390-0296 NC affidavit filed March 24, 1993 notice to submit filed - March 24, 1993

The sole issue before this court is whether Judge Murphy complied with the procedures mandated by Rule 63(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in his treatment of the affidavits n1 Rule 63(b) provides
HN1

TWhenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney shall make and
file an affidavit that the judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a
bias or prejudice either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the
suit, such judge shall proceed no further [**3] therein, except to call in another judge to hear and
determine the matter
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice
exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the case has been assigned or such bias or
prejudice is known If the judge against whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the
affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge
(naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the
legal sufficiency of the affidavit If the judge against whom the affidavit is directed does not question
the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds that it is
legally sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the case or determine the matter in question
No party shall be entitled in any case to file more than one affidavit, and no such affidavit shall be
filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are
in good faith

Footnotes

n1 In State v Blood & Phillips, Case No 92-090-0397 DA, petitioner filed a motion for recusal, which was denied by
the trial court, prior to filing a Rule 63(b) affidavit No issues pertaining to the motion for recusal are before this
court
End Footnotes

[*M]

In Montgomery v Montgomery, Judge Murphy entered an order on February 9, 1993, which incorrectly
characterized a [*1025] Rule 63(b) affidavit as a motion to disqualify, incorporated by reference his decisions on
motions to disqualify in two other cases, including State v Blood & Phillips, and ultimately denied the motion The
order also certified the matter to Judge Noel "in accordance with Rule 63(b)
to pass upon the legal sufficiency of
the affidavit" Judge Noel subsequently directed petitioner to file a memorandum of law "addressing whether or not
counsel's lawsuit against the assigned Judge necessitates per se recusal," apparently as a result of a reference in
Judge Murphy's February 9, 1993 order to his decision on a motion for recusal in State v Blood & Phillips
Petitioner contends that Judge Murphy failed to comply with Rule 63(b) by characterizing and ruling on the affidavit
as if it were a motion, and by making reference to his decisions in other cases, which risked improperly influencing
the review by Judge Noel after certification We agree
63(b) clearly states the options available to a trial judge in response to the filing of an affidavit
alleging [**5] bias or prejudice "If the judge against whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the
affidavit, he shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of
the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit" In the alternative, if the judge does not question the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, a substitute judge
"must be called in to try the case or determine the matter in question " The rule further provides that upon receipt of
the affidavit, the judge against whom it is directed "shall proceed no further therein, except to call in another judge
to hear and determine the matter"
clear import of Rule 63(b) is that a judge against whom the affidavit is directed must either recuse himor herself, or if he or she questions the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, certify the matter to another named judge
for a ruling on its legal sufficiency The order of February 9, 1993, went beyond the procedure outlined in Rule 63
(b) Accordingly, we order Judge Murphy to vacate the order of February 9, 1993 and to enter an order certifying
the [**6] affidavit, without comment, to a named judge n2 The memorandum of law on the issue of per se recusal
suggested by Judge Murphy and requested by Judge Noel is not germane to the issue of disqualification for bias or
prejudice under Rule 63(b)
Footnotes
n2 Both parties conceded at oral argument that the judge to whom a Rule 63(b) affidavit is certified may request
supporting legal memoranda
End Footnotes
Petitioner's further contention is that Judge Murphy has improperly delayed action on the affidavits filed in the other
six identified cases We agree that H N 4 t t h e procedure set out in Rule 63(b) contemplates expeditious action to
minimize delay in adjudication and disposition of pending cases Therefore, we further order Judge Murphy to
immediately act upon the Rule 63(b) affidavits filed in the remaining six cases identified herein by making a
determination whether or not he questions the legal sufficiency of the affidavits, and on that basis, either recusing
himself or certifying the affidavits to a named judge
Russell W Bench, Judge [**7]
Judith M Billings, Judge
Leonard H Russon, Judge
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Before Judges Greenwood, McHugh, and Orme.
McHUGH, Judge:
fl
Kimber Lee Ellison appeals the trial court's order granting
Joshua D. Stam's motion to dismiss1 and revoking an ex parte
civil stalking injunction issued against Stam. Stam cross^1though Stam's motion was actually one for a directed
verdict,
a motion for a directed verdict . . .
contemplates only jury trials. In the
context of a bench trial, the directed
verdict's procedural counterpart is a motion
for involuntary dismissal under rule 41(b) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, because this case was tried by the
court without a jury, we treat LStam] *s
motion for a directed verdict as one for an
involuntary dismissal pursuant to rule 41(b).
Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C., 2001 UT 20,fl0, 20 P.3d 388
{citations omitted). Accordingly, we will refer to Stam's motion
as a motion to dismiss throughout this opinion.

appeals the trial court's denial of his request for attorney
fees. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
%2
In 2004, Ellison and Stam were both students at the College
of Eastern Utah (CEU) in Price, Utah. In response to a petition
filed by Ellison, the trial court entered an ex parte civil
stalking injunction, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-3a-101 to -103
(2003), against Stam on October 5, 2004, which enjoined Stam from
stalking Ellison and from engaging in other specified conduct.
As required by the statute governing civil stalking injunctions,
the trial court, upon Stam's request, held an evidentiary hearing
on the injunction. See id. § 77-3a-101(6) (providing that
"[w]ithin ten days of service of the ex parte civil stalking
injunction, the respondent is entitled to request, in writing, an
evidentiary hearing on the civil stalking injunction").
f3
At the evidentiary hearing, Ellison presented evidence that
Stam had sexually assaulted her on August 25, 2004.2 Ellison
also presented evidence of eight alleged incidents of stalking
that occurred after August 25, 2004 (the eight incidents). The
dates and facts of the eight incidents, as well as the entry of
the ex parte civil stalking injunction, are summarized below.
August 30, 2004
f4
Ellison was working at the cash register in the CEU
cafeteria, and Stam was across the hall from her. Each time
Ellison looked at Stam, Stam was glaring at her. As a result of
this, Ellison switched to a different cash register.

Concerning this incident, the trial court stated in its
written ruling:
For purposes of this motion only, the court
finds that the evidence presented by
[Ellison] shows that on August 25, 2004, she
was sexually assaulted by [Stam] in Pioneer
Park, in Price, Utah, when he laid on top of
her, lifted up her shirt and touched her
breasts against her will and without her
consent, and bit her in several places [,]
including her arm, chest, and neck, resulting
in bruises that developed shortly thereafter.
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September 3, 2004
<|5
Ellison and her friend were in a parking lot near Ellison's
dormitory building. While in the parking lot, Ellison saw Stam
and his friend in the same parking lot. When Ellison noticed
Stam looking at her, she went back inside her dormitory room and
waited for Stam to leave. When she returned to the parking lot,
Ellison saw Stam and his friend sitting in Stam's car, and Stam
was staring at her. After several minutes, Stam's car sped out
of the parking lot.
September 14, 2004
If 6
Ellison was returning to her dormitory room in the evening.
Ellison and Stam lived in the same dormitory building, with
Ellison living on the third floor and Stam living on the second
floor. As Ellison climbed the stairs to the third floor, she
passed the second floor, where she saw Stam begin to climb the
stairs behind her. Once she arrived at the door to her room on
the third floor, Ellison saw Stam staring at her from the end of
the hallway. Stam then went into another person's room on the
third floor.
CEU Activity (no specific date)
%1 On this evening, Ellison attended a CEU campus activity with
some friends, but only after she was told that Stam had already
left the same activity. Before she and her friends arrived at
the activity, Ellison saw Stam approaching them on his
skateboard. After sending another of her friends to distract
Stam and prevent him from coming closer to her, Ellison and one
of her friends ran to another student's dormitory room and waited
for Stam to leave the area. Ellison testified that, as a result
of this incident, she suffered a panic attack.
October 5, 2004
%8

Stam was served with the ex parte civil stalking injunction.
November 5, 2 004

f9
Both Ellison and Stam attended a CEU "Bingo Night" activity,
along with about 100 other people. Stam took a seat one table
away from Ellison, and Ellison could see Stam looking at her.
Ellison reported Stam's presence to a CEU police officer. That
officer urged Ellison to switch seats, which she did. Ellison
testified that, as a result of this incident, she was crying and
shaking.
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November 11, 2004
flO Both Ellison and Stam attended "Club Competition Night" at
CEU, where the students in attendance played games against each
other. Ellison testified that while at this event, Stam kept
"creeping closer and closer" to her. This caused Ellison to
become very upset, and tears were running down her cheeks. She
reported Stam's conduct to a CEU administrator, who was present
at the event as an advisor. That administrator stayed with
Ellison, and he tried to stay between Ellison and Stam. While
the administrator was with Ellison, Stam got within ten yards of
Ellison on two or three occasions. At some point, the
administrator told Stam that he was in violation of the ex parte
civil stalking injunction. In response, Stam denied that he was
violating the injunction. Stam did not leave and continued to
play games that brought him within close proximity of Ellison,
November 19, 2 004
fll Ellison attended a CEU basketball game with friends. Stam
also attended the game, but entered the venue after Ellison.
Several minutes after Ellison and her friends sat down, Stam took
a seat two rows behind them. This caused Ellison to become
upset, and she had one of her friends report Stam's presence to a
CEU police officer. When Ellison's friend asked the officer if
he could do anything about Stam's proximity to Ellison, the
officer said that he could ask Stam to move to a different seat.
Ellison testified that, after Stam spoke with the officer, he
found a new seat farther away from Ellison. Ellison also
testified that after the basketball game, she attended a CEU
movie night activity with a friend and that halfway through the
movie, Stam entered and took a seat directly behind her.
November 2 0, 2 004
fl2 Ellison attended the CEU "Fall Ball" with a date. Stam also
attended this event. Ellison testified that Stam stared at,
continually followed, and repeatedly moved within ten to fifteen
feet of her and her date throughout the event. Ellison's date
testified that he tried to place himself between Ellison and Stam
and that he felt Stam "was close and . . . knew he was close."
Ellison and her date both testified that Ellison became very
nervous as a result of Stam's presence.
fl3 At the conclusion of Ellison's case, Stam moved to dismiss
Ellison's petition and revoke the ex parte civil stalking
injunction. After hearing arguments from counsel, the court took
the matter under advisement and subsequently issued a written
ruling. In this ruling, after making factual findings recounting
the events of each of the eight incidents, the trial court
stated:
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Although the court finds that the conduct of
[Stam] on August 25, 2004 in [the park] was
outrageous and intolerable, in that it
offends the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality, the court cannot find
that [Stam's] behavior in any of the . . .
eight incidents rose to the level of
"outrageous and intolerable." While his
presence on those occasions may have caused
[Ellison] to be anxious, scared, or to suffer
a panic attack, and may have been
insensitive, ungentlemanly, and
inconsiderate, given [Stam's] outrageous and
intolerable conduct in [the park], it was not
"outrageous and intolerable" [during the
eight incidents] because his presence and
conduct on those occasions did not offend
generally accepted standards of decency and
morality.
Accordingly, the trial court granted Stam's motion to dismiss and
revoked the ex parte civil stalking injunction.
fl4 Thereafter, Stam requested an award of attorney fees
pursuant to the statute governing civil stalking injunctions.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16) (providing that in the context
of civil stalking injunctions, " [a]fter a hearing with notice to
the affected party, the court may enter an order requiring any
party to pay the costs of the action, including reasonable
attorney[] fees"). The trial court instead considered Stam's fee
request under the general statutory provision mandating that fees
be awarded when claims are brought without merit and in bad
faith. See id. § 78-27-56 (2002). Finding that Ellison had not
brought the action in bad faith, the trial court denied the fee
petition.
fl5 Ellison appeals the trial court's grant of Stam's motion to
dismiss and revocation of the ex parte civil stalking injunction,
and Stam cross-appeals the trial court's denial of his request
for attorney fees.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
fl6 Ellison argues that the trial court made several errors in
its interpretation and application of the relevant statutory
provisions. See id. §§ 76-5-106.5, 77-3a-101 to -103 (2003).
Ellison asserts that the definition of "emotional distress," id.
§ 76-5-106.5(2) (a) (ii), (b) (ii), (c) (ii), used by the trial court
is inapplicable in the context of civil stalking injunctions. _n
addition, Ellison maintains that the trial court improperly
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applied section 76-5-106.5 because it failed to consider whether
the cumulative effect of the eight incidents constituted "a
course of conduct." Id. § 76-5-106.5 (2) (a) . Ellison also claims
that the trial court erred by failing to determine that Stam
violated the ex parte civil stalking injunction and that, under
the language of the relevant statutory provisions, see id. §§ 765-106.5, 77-3a-101 to -103, the trial court erred by failing to
enter a permanent stalking injunction based on those violations.
"The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law which we review for correctness, affording no
deference to the district court's legal conclusion[sj ."
Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998).
fl7 Ellison also challenges the trial court's findings of fact
indicating that Stam's conduct was not "directed at" Ellison.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2) (a). "[W]e review the trial
court's findings of fact for clear error, reversing only where
[a] finding is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we
otherwise reach a firm conviction that a mistake has been made."
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
fl8 In his cross-appeal, Stam argues that the trial court erred
by failing to grant his petition for attorney fees. "Whether
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law,
which we review for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe
Trust, 2004 UT 85,122, 100 P.3d 1200 (quotations and citation
omitted).
ANALYSIS
I.

Civil Stalking Injunctions

fl9 Utah Code section 77-3a-101 sets forth the procedure a
petitioner must follow to obtain an ex parte civil stalking
injunction against a respondent. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101.
Section 77-3a-101 does not define stalking itself, but instead
states that "[a] s used in this chapter, 'stalking' means the
crime of stalking as defined in [s]ection 76-5-106.5." Id, § 773a-101(l). In relevant part, section 76-5-106.5 provides:
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages
in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person that would cause a
reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to
himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
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(ii) to suffer emotional distress
to himself or a member of his
immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have
knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable
fear of bodily injury to himself or
a member of his immediate family;
or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress
or a member of his immediate family
will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific
person of bodily injury to himself
or a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in
the specific person or a member of
his immediate family.
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who
intentionally or knowingly violates a
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title
77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or
intentionally or knowingly violates a
permanent criminal stalking injunction issued
pursuant to this section.
Id, § 76-5-106.5(2)-(3).
K2 0 Once a proper petition is filed, and the trial court
"determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of
stalking has occurred" under section 76-5-106.5, "an ex parte
civil stalking injunction may be issued by the court." Id. § 773a-101(5); see id. § 77-3a-101(1). However, "[w]ithin ten days
of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the
respondent is entitled to request, in writing, an evidentiary
hearing on the civil stalking injunction." Id. § 77-3a-101(6).
"At the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or continue the
injunction," and "[t]he burden is on the petitioner to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by
the respondent has occurred." Id. § 77-3a-101(7). In other
words, to avoid having the injunction revoked, the petitioner
must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
respondent's conduct satisfies the elements of section 76-5106.5. See id. § 77-3a-101(1), (7).
A.

Emotional Distress

f21 In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App.
1997), this court clarified the definition of "emotional
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distress" for purposes of section 76-5-106.5. See id. at 1264.
In Lopez, the appellant claimed that because section 76-5-106.5
did not contain a definition for emotional distress, it was
unconstitutionally vague. See id. The court rejected this
claim, stating that "the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is well established in this state," and
therefore "emotional distress is well defined in this state."
Id. at 1264-65; see also State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14, 19-20
{Mont. 1995) (holding that use of the phrase "substantial
emotional distress" did not render the relevant statute
unconstitutionally vague where that phrase was defined by prior
tort law); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447 S.E.2d 530, 533-36 (Va.
Ct. App. 1994) (same, but with use of the phrase "emotional
distress"). The Lopez court went on to state that "[e]motional
distress results from conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable
in that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality.'" Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1264 (quoting Russell v.
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992)).
122 Ellison argues, for several different reasons, that the
definition of emotional distress set forth in Lopez is
inapplicable in the context of civil stalking injunctions.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101. We will address each of her
arguments in turn.
1.

Criminal-Civil Distinction

f23 Ellison contends that because Lopez dealt with a criminal
conviction for stalking under section 76-5-106.5, its definition
of emotional distress is inapplicable in the present civil
stalking case. This argument is unpersuasive in light of the
legislature's express instruction that both criminal and civil
stalking be proved by the same elements. Indeed, section 77-3a101, which governs civil stalking injunctions, merely
incorporates by reference the definition of criminal stalking,
stating that "[a]s used in this chapter, 'stalking' means the
crime of stalking as defined in [sjection 76-5-106.5." Id. § 773a-101(l). Thus, we conclude that there is nothing inappropriate
in following the precedent announced in Lopez in the context of
an allegation of civil stalking,
f24 In a related argument, Ellison maintains that by applying
the Lopez definition of emotional distress, the trial court erred
by "tacitly" requiring Ellison "to provfe] her case 'beyond a
reasonable doubt'" as is required in criminal cases, "despite the
fact that it was a civil stalking case." We are unable to find,
however, and Ellison has not pointed us to, anything in the trial
court's ruling indicating that it applied an incorrect burden of
proof. We therefore reject Ellison's argument that simply
because the trial court followed this court's decision in Lopez
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to establish the definition of emotional distress, it must have
also adopted the criminal standard of proof applicable in Lopez.
2.

Trial Court's Application of Lopez

125 Ellison further contends that the trial court erred in its
application of the Lopez definition of emotional distress.
First, Ellison argues that the trial court "completely
disregard[ed] the 'reasonable person' standard set forth in
[section 76-5-106.5]." See id. § 76-5-106.5(2} (a) (i)-(ii)
(requiring the offending conduct to be of the type "that would
cause a reasonable person" to experience the "fear" or "emotional
distress" set forth in the statute).
f26 Second, Ellison asserts that the trial court improperly
applied section 76-5-106.5 because it failed to consider whether
the cumulative effect of the eight incidents constituted "a
course of conduct." IcL. § 76-5-106.5 (2) (a) (stating that "[a]
person is guilty of stalking who . . . intentionally or knowingly
engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person") .
In contrast, Stam maintains that each of the eight alleged
encounters must be examined independently of any other incident
to determine whether it constituted the type of outrageous
conduct that could be found actionable. Because we believe these
points are related, we deal with them together.
f27 We agree with Ellison that the tort definition of emotional
distress must be applied in the context of the other elements of
a civil stalking claim. The stalking statute expressly
incorporates the reasonable person standard, by defining stalking
as "intentionally or knowingly engag[ing] in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable
person . . . to suffer emotional distress." Id. § 76-5-106.5
(2)(a)(ii) (emphasis added). We further agree that any
evaluation of a defendant's conduct must be considered in the
context of all of the facts and circumstances existing in the
case.
1f28 The legislature's use of the term "course of conduct," id. ,
illustrates the essence of a stalking violation. Stalking, by
its very nature, is an offense of repetition. In relevant part,
the statute defines "[c]ourse of conduct" as "repeatedly
maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person." Id.
§ 76-5-106.5(1)(a). The conduct is rendered more offensive and
more threatening because it is repeated. To call someone on the
telephone and hang up late at night on one occasion may not rise
to the level of outrageous conduct. To do so every ten minutes
for a month, however, very well may. In essence, Stam would have
the trier of fact consider each telephone call in a vacuum,
without reference to the numerous calls that preceded it, to
determine whether the conduct is outrageous. We expressly reject
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that interpretation as being inconsistent with the plain intent
of the stalking statute.
f29 In addition to a defendant's course of conduct, the statute
requires the trier of fact to consider whether a reasonable
person would have suffered emotional distress. See id. § 76-5106.5(2)(a)(ii). The merging of the concepts of emotional
distress and a reasonable reaction to it, is also present in this
state's jurisprudence regarding tort claims based on emotional
distress. In Lopez, this court stated that "[e]motional distress
results from conduct that is 'outrageous and intolerable in that
it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and
morality.1" Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842
P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992)). Nothing in that decision suggests,
nor do we adopt, a limitation on the scope of the analysis that
would require the trier of fact to consider each act separately,
without reference to other incidents that may have preceded it.
Rather, the consideration of whether a defendant has acted
outrageously must be undertaken in light of all of the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. Contrary to Stam's
assertions, this approach is consistent with existing Utah tort
law.
f30 In Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center, 962 P.2d
67 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court explained that "the
emotional distress suffered must be severe; it must be such that
a reasonable [person,] normally constituted, would be unable to
adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the
circumstances of the case." Id. at 70 (alteration in original)
(emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted) (addressing
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress); see also
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply, 858 P.2d 970, 975 (Utah 1993)
(same).
131 In the tort context, a defendant's knowledge is also
relevant to the question of whether the conduct is extreme and
outrageous.
The extreme and outrageous character of the
conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge
that the other is peculiarly susceptible to
emotional distress, by reason of some
physical or mental condition or peculiarity.
The conduct may become heartless, flagrant,
and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the
face of such knowledge, where it would not be
so if he did not know.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. f (1965). While the
Restatement goes on to reiterate that the conduct must be
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objectively outrageous, it clearly recognizes that the character
of the conduct should be considered in the context of the facts
and circumstances of the individual case. See id.
<l32 Thus, both the plain language of the statute and accepted
concepts of tort law reveal that the phrases "emotional distress"
and "reasonable person" are not exclusive concepts, but must be
considered together to evaluate whether a defendant has violated
the civil stalking statute. Therefore, the trial court should
have applied the definition of emotional distress set forth in
Lopez from the perspective of a reasonable person under all the
circumstances of the case. Our review of the trial court's
written ruling and the record before us suggests that the court
did not do so.
f33 Those circumstances include Stam's knowledge. Stam knew he
had sexually assaulted Ellison shortly before the eight
incidents/ In addition, with each subsequent encounter, he
acquired additional information about Ellison's reaction to his
presence. Yet, even after he was served with the ex parte
injunction and asked by campus officials to keep his distance,
Stam continued to place himself in close proximity to Ellison.
While it may be simply "ungentlemanly" for a man to glare at a
woman and place himself in close physical proximity to her when
he has no prior history with her, to do the same shortly after
making her the "victim of a vicious sexual assault"4 may indeed
be outrageous under generally accepted standards of decency and
morality. Because we believe the trial court inappropriately
limited its analysis in a way that negated the cumulative effect
of the alleged conduct, we reverse and remand.
3.

Imposition of Other Tort Elements

f34 Ellison also asserts that the trial court erred by requiring
her to prove emotional distress in accordance with the civil,
tort law definition set forth in Lopez because that was
"tantamount to requiring [her] to prove . . . the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress [,] in addition to

3

A1though Stam denies the assault allegations, we must
accept them and all other assertions by Ellison as true as for
purposes of this appeal. See Russell Packard Dev. , Inc. v.
Carson, 2005 UT 14,^3, 108 P.3d 741.
4

In its ruling on Stam's petition for attorney fees, the
trial court stated: "Th[is] court previously found that
[Ellison] had been the victim of a vicious sexual assault
committed by [Stam] resulting in [Ellison] experiencing anxiety
and panic when she was arcund [Stam] subsequent to the assault."
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proving that [Stam] was guilty of stalking under [section] 76-5106.5."" We disagree.
K3 5 While the Lopez court borrowed the definition of emotional
distress from Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896,
905 (Utah 1992), for purposes of section 76-5-106.5, see Salt
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the
Lopez court did not borrow, or even reference, the remaining
elements required to prove a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. There is likewise nothing in the written
decision of the trial court here to suggest that its decision was
based on the other elements of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. And, Ellison has not demonstrated how the
use of the Lopez definition of emotional distress also somehow
incorporated the remaining elements of the tort claim.
B.

Course of Conduct Directed at Ellison

f36 Ellison also challenges several of the trial court's factual
findings that indicate that Stam's conduct during the eight
incidents was not "directed at" Ellison. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5106.5(2)(a).
%31 For a person to be guilty of stalking, he or she must, among
other things, engage in a "course of conduct" that is "directed
at a specific person." Id. In its written ruling, the trial
court considered the events that occurred on each of the eight
incidents. The trial court then concluded that
[m]ost of [the] eight incidents involved
innocent encounters on a small campus where
students are likely to come in contact with
each other incidentally as a result of normal
college classes and activities. Other than
being present on the campus and at certain
college[-]sponsored events where [Ellison]
was present, no evidence was presented from
"The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
requires proof of three distinct elements. See Russell v.
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992) ("To
prove [a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress],
a plaintiff must show (a) that the defendant intentionally
engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff considered
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality (b) with the purpose
of inflicting emotional distress or where any reasonable person
would have known that such would result, and (c) that severe
emotional distress resulted as a direct result of the defendant's
conduct.").
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which the court could find that [Stam]
engaged in conduct directed at [Ellison] that
would have caused a reasonable person to
suffer emotional distress, which is defined
as outrageous and intolerable behavior. It
is not outrageous or intolerable to be at
college []activities or on the campus as a
student. Further [,] it does not appear that
[Stam's] conduct on those eight occasions was
"directed at" causing emotional distress to
[Ellison].
f38 As discussed, the respondent's conduct must be considered
cumulatively in light of all of the facts and circumstances of
the case. We agree with Ellison that the trial court
inappropriately considered each incident separately, without
weighing the effect of the prior encounters between the parties.
The failure to analyze the entire course of conduct between the
parties is also inappropriate in determining whether Stam's
conduct was "directed at" Ellison. Id. § 76-5-106.5 (2) (a) .
Therefore, we reverse and remand.
C.

Permanent Stalking Injunction

f39 Finally, Ellison maintains that the trial court erred by
failing to determine that Stam violated the ex parte civil
stalking injunction and that, under the language of the relevant
statutory provisions, see id. §§ 76-5-106.5, 77-3a-101 to -103,
the trial court was required to enter a permanent stalking
injunction based on those violations.
f40 According to the terms of the ex parte civil stalking
injunction, Stam was prohibited from (1) stalking Ellison as
defined by the criminal statute, see id. § 76-5-106,. 5; (2) going
near Aaron Jones Residence Hall, including the parking lot, and
the CEU cafeteria, when Ellison was at the cafeteria; (3)
contacting Ellison or three other named individuals directly or
indirectly; and (4) residing in the same dormitory complex as
Ellison. Stam was served with the ex parte injunction on October
5, 2004. Thus, any alleged knowing violation of the terms of
that injunction must have occurred after October 5, 2004.
f41 Ellison asserts that four of the eight incidents occurred
after the entry of the ex parte civil stalking injunction. These
incidents include the November 5, 2004 "Bingo Night" encounter;
the November 11, 2004 "Club Competition Night" encounter; the
November 19, 2004 basketball game and movie encounter; and the
November 20, 2004 "Fall Ball" encounter.
f42 Ellison does not allege that Stam's conduct on any of these
occasions violated the terms of the injunction that prohibited
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Stam from going near Aaron Jones Residence Hall or the CEU
cafeteria, contacting Ellison or her specified friends, or
residing in her dormitory complex. Instead, she claims that the
four incidents that occurred after the ex parte injunction was
issued violated its prohibition against stalking. The ex parte
injunction set forth the definition of stalking contained in
section 76-5-106.5, see id., and enjoined Stam from engaging in
such conduct. Thus, to establish that Stam violated the stalking
prohibition in the ex parte injunction, Ellison must prove on
remand that Stam is in violation of the stalking statute. See
id. § 77-3a-101(7) (providing that at the evidentiary hearing,
"[t]he burden is on the petitioner to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent
has occurred"). If Ellison meets that burden, the trial court
may modify or continue the civil stalking injunction. See id.
Until the trial court reaches a decision on that issue, however,
Ellison's argument that a permanent civil injunction is mandated
is premature and we do not address it.
II.

Attorney Fees

^43 In his cross-appeal, Stam argues that the trial court erred
by failing to grant his petition for attorney fees. Although we
reverse the decision of the trial court, we address this
ancillary issue in the hopes that it will be helpful on remand.
See Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14,138, 70 P.3d
35 (addressing certain issues raised by the appellant even though
it was not required because "in the interest of judicial economy,
a brief discussion of [those] issues [was] appropriate as
guidance for the trial court on remand" (quotations and citation
omitted)); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107,136,
37 P.3d 1130 (same).
%44 Stam contends that the trial court erred by applying the
requirements of Utah Code section 78-27-56, see Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (2002), to determine whether he was entitled to
attorney fees because his request for attorney fees was based
only upon Utah Code section 77-3a-101(16), see id. § 77-3a101(16). Stam asserts that the standards set forth in these two
statutes for awarding attorney fees are mutually exclusive, and
therefore, the trial court erred by applying the more general
statute, section 78-27-56, instead of the more specific statute,
section 77-3a-101(16). We need not address whether the statutes
are mutually exclusive because we hold that only section 77-3a101(16) should have been considered in this case.
1J45 Section 77-3a-101 (16) provides that in the context of civil
stalking injunctions, " [a]fter a hearing with notice to the
affected party, the court may enter an order requiring any party
to pay the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney[]
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fees." Id. § 77~3a-101(16) (emphasis added).
section 78-27-56 provides:

-n contrast,

(1) In civil actions, the court shall award
reasonable attorney[] fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action
or defense to the action was without merit
and not brought or asserted in good faith,
except under Subsection (2) .
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award
no fees or limited fees against a party under
Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an
affidavit of impecuniosity in the action
before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the
reason for not awarding fees under the
provisions of Subsection (1).
Id. § 78-27-56 (emphasis added).
146 Contrary to Statu's assertion, the fact that section 77-3a101(16) is more specific because it applies only to civil
stalking injunctions is not necessarily determinative of whether
it conflicts with section 78-27-56. Although section 77-3a101(16) applies only in the context of civil stalking, it is
permissive in nature, providing the trial court with the
discretion to determine whether to award attorney fees. See id.
§ 77-3a-101(16) (providing that the trial court "may" award
attorney fees to a party). Section 78-27-56, on the other hand,
applies to all "civil actions," id. § 78-27-56(1), which would
include a civil stalking injunction proceeding, and is mandatory.
It dictates the circumstances under which a trial court is
required to award attorney fees to a prevailing party. See id.
§ 78-27-56(1) (providing that the trial court "shall" award fees
if it makes the appropriate determinations); Watkiss & Campbell
v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991) ("If the court
finds both elements of [section 78-27-56], then it has no
discretion and must award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.").
^47 Here, Stam only requested fees under the discretionary
provision of the civil stalking statute. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-3a-101(16). Even if the mandatory fee provision found in
section 78-27-56 was properly considered and rejected by the
trial court absent a request from Stam, the court's inquiry was
not complete. It should have then considered whether to award
fees under the discretion provided by the stalking statute
itself. Despite its conclusion that the action brought by
Ellison had merit and v/as not brought in bad faith, the court was
permitted to award fees under section 77-3a-101(16) and should
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have indicated whether it was inclined to make such an award.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's denial of Stam's
request for attorney fees and instruct the trial court to
consider it on remand under section 77-3a-101(16). Of course,
depending on the outcome on remand, it is possible the court will
need to consider an award of fees in favor of Ellison.
CONCLUSION
f48 The trial court erred in its interpretation and application
of the statutory provisions governing civil stalking injunctions.
See id. §§ 76-5-106.5, 77-3a-101 to -103. In addition, the trial
court erred by failing to address section 77-3a-101(16) in its
ruling on Stam's request for attorney fees. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand. If the trial judge who heard the evidence
already presented by Ellison is also the trial judge on remand,
the case may proceed with Stam's presentation of evidence, unless
the judge believes he or she must rehear the entire case due to
the passage of time or otherwise in the interest of fairness. If
a new judge will be presiding, then justice requires a new trial
be held on all issues.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

f49

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

Gregory K. Orme, Judge
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WILKINS, Justice:
fl1 A jury found defendant Flint Wayne Harrison guilty of first degree rape and second degree
forcible sexual abuse, violations of sections 76-5-402 and 76-5-404 of the Utah Code. Defendant
appeals, arguing that procedures that occurred at trial deprived him of his constitutional right to a
fair trial. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND^
fl2 Defendant and the victim, A.G., both attended a party. The victim, a seventeen-year-old girl,
testified that she became intoxicated at the party and passed out on the bathroom floor where she
was raped by defendant. Defendant admitted that he and the victim engaged in sexual
intercourse, but he insisted that the victim consented.
P Prior to trial, the trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent the victim because she
was a minor. During the trial, the court also permitted a victim's advocate to sit near the victim

while she testified. In addition, the court permitted the guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table with
the prosecutor, to question witnesses, and to make objections during the trial. In particular, the
court permitted the guardian ad litem to ask follow-up questions of the State's witnesses, to object
to defense counsel's questions on cross-examination, and to follow-up on the cross-examination
of an expert witness called by defendant. However, the court expressly refused to permit the
guardian ad litem to give an opening statement or closing argument. On one occasion, defense
counsel objected to a question by the guardian ad litem of an expert witness, and the trial court
sustained the objection, but the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard the guardian ad
litem's question.
fl4 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree felony rape and second degree forcible sexual
abuse.
ANALYSIS
1J5 The crux of defendant's claim on appeal is that his constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial
was violated because the trial court permitted the victim's advocate to sit near the victim while she
testified, permitted the guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table with the State and to question
witnesses, and failed to issue a curative instruction regarding the guardian ad litem's alleged
improper question. Defendant further contends that if these errors standing alone did not deprive
him of his right to a fair trial, the cumulative effect of the errors did.
1J6 The trial judge has broad latitude to control and manage the proceedings and preserve the
integrity of the trial process. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275,1282 (Utah 1989). However, when a
courtroom action or arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial, as it is here, we consider
whether the practice presents an unacceptable risk of bringing into play impermissible factors
which might erode the presumption of innocence. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570
(1986); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505 (1976). If the challenged practice is not inherently
prejudicial, or the defendant fails to show actual prejudice, the judgment of the trial court will be
affirmed. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 572.

I. THE VICTIM'S ADVOCATE
1J7 It is established law in Utah that a witness of tender years may be accompanied by an adult to
ease the emotional turmoil of testifying in court. See State v. Keeley, 8 Utah 2d 70, 71-72, 328
P.2d 724, 725 (1958). This practice is one legitimately within the trial court's inherent powers.
Neither party has identified, nor do we find express authority for or limitation of, this practice either
(2)

in statute or in court rule.^
1|8 In this case, the victim was within a month of her eighteenth birthday at the time of trial. The
prosecutor asked the trial court for permission to have the victim's advocate sit near A.G. at the
time of her testimony to give her a sense of comfort. Defendant objected, arguing that A.G.'s
birthday was only two weeks away, that there had been no showing of necessity for the presence
of the victim's advocate, and that the requested arrangement presented the possibility of
"non-verbal communication" between the advocate and the victim. In response, the prosecutor
said that he had talked with A.G. and that she did not "particularly care either way" about having

the victim's advocate sit near her during her testimony.
fl9 The trial court overruled defendant's objection, because it determined that it was common
practice to have a victim's advocate sit with a minor called to testify "if they choose," so long as
the adult did not prompt testimony in any way. The trial court further indicated that because of the
physical arrangement of the courtroom, any inappropriate behavior by the victim's advocate would
be obvious to the court, and would be dealt with appropriately. Consequently, the trial court
exercised its inherent powers to control and manage the trial process and allowed the victim's
advocate to sit near A.G. as she testified.
fl10 Defendant now argues that the very presence of the victim's advocate creates an improper
and impermissible suggestion to the jury that A.G.'s testimony was more truthful than it would
otherwise have been perceived by the jury without the victim's advocate present. However,
defendant alleges no inappropriate behavior by the victim's advocate during A.G.'s testimony, nor
is any revealed by our review of the trial record. As a result, we find no error in permitting the
victim's advocate to sit near A.G. during her testimony. The practice of allowing a victim's
advocate to accompany and sit near a minor victim during trial testimony is not inherently
prejudicial to defendant, and defendant has made no showing of actual prejudice.
fl11 However, where A.G. apparently did not particularly care about having the victim's advocate
nearby, and where A.G. was within two weeks of majority, the presence of the victim's advocate
appears to have served little purpose. Although permitting the victim's advocate to sit nearby was
clearly within the broad discretion afforded the trial court in managing the proceedings, any
presumption that allowing such an advocate to accompany A.G. under these circumstances was
required would be in error. The trial court just as easily could have denied the request of the
prosecutor under these circumstances without committing error.
1f12 Clearly, the need for a victim's advocate or other support person to accompany a witness
while testifying decreases with the increasing maturity of the witness. However, absent a showing
of prejudice, the matter is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court after taking into
consideration the age, maturity, emotional stability, and rigors facing a particular child witness,
among other factors. These must be weighed against any appearance of inappropriate bolstering
of the testimony by the presence of the support person, and any likelihood of interference with the
testimony. While A.G. may not have been a witness of "tender years" entitled to, or needing, the
support of another nearby while testifying, the record discloses no factors other than her
chronological age upon which we may independently review the propriety of the court's decision.
As such, we defer to the trial court, assuming other factors were evident upon which it relied. We
decline defendant's invitation to say that being nearly eighteen years old excludes A.G. from this
category as a matter of law.
II. EXTENT OF TRIAL PARTICIPATION OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
fl13 The defendant next claims that the extent of the guardian ad litem's participation in the
criminal trial exceeded any statutory authority, and that it implicated his constitutional right to due
process and a fair trial. Specifically, defendant insists that the trial court erred in permitting the
guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table with the prosecutor, to make objections, and to question
witnesses during the trial. The State responds that the role played by the guardian ad litem at trial
was nearly trivial, involving only three witnesses, and that the guardian ad litem's questions
revealed no new evidence. As a result, the State contends that any error associated with the
guardian ad litem's role in the criminal trial is without legal consequence and is therefore

harmless.
A. Standard of Review
1J14 The State initially insists that the defendant should be precluded from presenting on appeal
issues relating to the guardian ad litem's participation at trial because they were not raised before
the trial court. Defendant counters that he objected to the guardian ad litem's questioning of
witnesses at the pretrial conference. However, a transcript of the pretrial conference does not
exist. In fact, we cannot identify any evidence in the record indicating that defense counsel
preserved this issue for appeal by asking the trial court to rule on it. Nevertheless, claims not
raised before the trial court may be raised on appeal where, as the defendant argues here, the
trial court committed plain error. Consequently, we review the extent of the guardian ad litem's
participation for plain error.
*fl 15 To establish the existence of plain enoi a defendant must demonstrate that "(i) [a]n error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208-09 (Utah 1993).
B. The Guardian Ad Litem's Erroneous Participation
1. The Role of the Guardian Ad Litem
fl16 In order to determine whether the trial court erred in permitting the guardian ad litem dui ing
the trial to sit at counsel table, make objections, and question witnesses, we look to the sections of
the Utah Code governing the role of the guardian ad litem. At the outset, we note that it is
universally accepted that the role of a guardian ad litem is to represent the best interests of those
not legally competent to represent themselves, primarily children, and that the Utah Code allows a
guardian ad litem to be appointed in a variety of proceedings where a child's well-being or legal
interests are directly impacted.^ That said, the role and extent to which a guardian ad litem may
participate in these legal proceedings is controlled by the statutory guidelines under which the
guardian ad litem is appointed
1J17 In this criminal case, an attorney^ guardian ad litem was appointed by the district court
pursuant to sections 78-7-9, 78-3a-911, and 78-3a-912 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code Ann. §§
78-7-9, 78-3a-911, 78-3a-912 (Supp. 2000). Two of the sections, 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912, are
not part of the criminal code, but are part of the Juvenile Courts Act. Hence, these two sections
were promulgated with juvenile procedures and issues in mind and were meant to apply to the
juvenile context. Section 78-7-9, however, is not so limited
U18 On its own motion, the court appointed the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem to represent the
interests of A.G.
The record does nut indicjte -Jut niutivjteij thv, LUUII to do t— r h Q order, in pertinent part, reads.
In the interest of justice, and pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-7-9, in accordance with U C.A.
§§78-3a-911 and 912, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the: Office of the Guardian ad
Litem, 523 Heritage Blvd., Suite 2, Layton, Utah 84041 is HEREBY APPOINTED to
represent the best interests of A G the minor alleged wictim in this case The State

of Utah is to cooperate in making available to the Office of the Guardian ad Litem all
information necessary to protecting and representing A.G.'s interests. Further, the
Court grants the Office of the Guardian ad Litem the authority to utilize additional
resources available to the Office of the Guardian ad Litem in its representation of
A.G.'s interests.
(Emphasis added.)
1119 Although the district court's order appointing a guardian ad litem has not been challenged, we
take this opportunity to address the decision to appoint a guardian ad litem in a criminal case. The
interplay of sections 78-7-9, 78-3a-911, and 78-3a-912 limits when a guardian ad litem may be
appointed and the extent of the guardian ad litem's role.
fl20 Under section 78-7-9, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem if "child abuse, child sexual
abuse, or neglect is alleged in any proceeding in any state court," and the appointment must also
be "in accordance with Sections 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912" of the Juvenile Court Act. Utah Code
Ann. §78-7-9(1) & (3).
fl21 At first glance, by its plain language, the appointment authority of section 78-7-9 appears to
limit the appointment of a guardian ad litem to only those cases in which child abuse, child sexual
abuse, or neglect is alleged. However, while the terms "child abuse" and "child sexual abuse" are
the titles of specific criminal violations, "neglect" is not. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109 (Supp.
2000) (child abuse); Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-404.1 (1993) (sexual abuse of a child). It appears
obvious that in using these terms, the legislature was referring to those terms as used in the
Juvenile Court Act and did not require a specific criminal charge by that name to be alleged.
1T22 In this case, defendant was charged with one count of rape in violation of section 76-5-402,
one count of forcible sexual abuse in violation of section 76-5-404, and two counts of unlawful
(5)

sexual conduct with a sixteen or seventeen year old, violations of section 76-5-401 (2)~ Because
we do not read section 78-7-9 to limit the appointment of a guardian ad litem to only those cases
where the specific crimes of child abuse or child sexual abuse have been charged, the district
court in this case had the authority to appoint a guardian ad litem. However, as stated above,
there is no indication in the record as to what concern motivated the court to do so. Moreover, the
role of the guardian ad litem is still circumscribed by the language of sections 78-3a-911 and -912
of the Juvenile Court Act.
fl23 We turn now to sections 78-3a-911 and 78-3a-912 to determine how the authority and
responsibilities given to the guardian ad litem in the Juvenile Court Act apply in the criminal
context. Section 78-3a-911 provides for the creation of the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem
Director under the direct supervision of the Judicial Council, the governing body of the state
courts. This section enumerates criteria for the hiring and supervision of the director and duties to
be performed. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-911(2) & (3). The Director's duties encompass
development, management, and implementation of selection, training, and supervision
procedures for guardians ad litem. Id. Section 78-3a-911 contains no grant of authority for a
guardian ad litem to participate in anyway in a criminal trial, however.
1J24 Section 78-3a-912 provides, among other things, for the appointment of a guardian ad litem
and lists the duties and responsibilities of a guardian ad litem. Subsection (1) authorizes the
Juvenile Court to "appoint an attorney guardian ad litem to represent the best interest of a minor
involved in any case before the [Juvenile] court," and subsection (2) directs the guardian ad litem

to represent the best interests of "each minor who may become the subject of a [Juvenile Court]
petition alleging abuse, neglect, or dependency," in a case. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-912(1) & (2);
see also § 78-3a-103(1)(g) (Supp. 2000) (defining "court" as the Juvenile Court when read in
chapter 3a).
1125 Other subsections of section 78-3a-912 address the funding of the guardians ad litem, provide
that guardians ad litem are state employees for purposes of indemnification, protect the records of
the guardian ad litem from disclosure, and waive some of the restrictions imposed on attorneys in
order to facilitate the parens patriae role of the guardian ad litem. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §
78-3a-912(6), (7), & (11)(a)-(d). These subsections, although not directly related to the
participation of the guardian ad litem in the trial below, suggest the tone and attitude of the
legislature in adopting the provisions: Under the supervision of the Judicial Council, a guardian ad
litem is an employee of the courts whose role is to protect and act in the best interests of children
who are the subjects of abuse, neglect, or dependency. 1 ^
1126 Subsection (3) of section 78-3a-912 is of more direct concern to our analysis of whether the
trial court erred in allowing the guardian ad litem to participate at the level he did in defendant's
trial. Subparts (a) through (x) of subsection (3) detail specific duties and responsibilities of the
guardians ad litem appointed pursuant to the statute. Only t h r e e ^ bear on our inquiry:
(3) Each attorney guardian ad litem shall:
(i) file written motions, responses, or objections at all stages of a
proceeding when necessary to protect the best interests of a minor;

(I) personally attend all court hearings, and participate in all telephone
conferences with the court unless the court waives that appearance or
participation;

(o) present witnesses and exhibits when necessary to protect the best
interest of the minor;
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-912. Standing alone, the language of these three subparts would appear
to authorize, indeed mandate, the participation of the guardian ad litem in the trial of defendant.
However, reading the statute as a whole, giving appropriate consideration to the expressions of
purpose and overall scheme of the sections, it becomes clear that no such participation is either
intended or authorized.
1J27 Section 78-3a-912 describes the duties and responsibilities of the guardian ad litem when
appointed to represent the best interests of a child in a proceeding in Juvenile Court. The purpose
of such a Juvenile Court proceeding is to alleviate conditions that result in the abuse, neglect, or
dependency of the child. The proceedings described relate, without exception, to determining what
corrective actions are in the best interests of the child, not what punishment is appropriate for
adult perpetrators of actions resulting in abuse, neglect, or dependency. Punishment of the

perpetrators, if appropriate, is reserved for the criminal system, not the civil Juvenile Court
system. Therefore, the policy behind the guardian ad litem's participation in juvenile proceedings
does not apply to the same extent in the context of a criminal trial.
2. The Guardian Ad Litem's Participation Was Error
fl28 If the guardian ad litem were to have a role of any kind in the prosecution of defendant in the
case before us, it would be peripheral, and strictly limited to matters relating specifically to the
treatment of the child victim, such as assuring that the victim received notice and opportunity to be
present and heard as mandated by the victims' rights statutes.^ Nothing in the statutory authority
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, or the duties and responsibilities of the Office of the
Guardian Ad Litem Director or the individual guardians ad litem under its direction, authorizes the
guardian ad litem to act as co-prosecutor, as happened here.
fl29 Permitting the guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table was error. To permit the guardian ad
litem to sit at counsel table in a criminal trial and act like a second prosecutor, wearing the cloak of
authority of an employee of the courts, having been appointed by the trial court to the role,
dangerously erodes the defendant's presumption of innocence. The guardian ad litem's role does
not extend to this degree of "protecting" the interests of the child by assisting in the punishment of
the alleged perpetrator of the crime against the child victim. Given the consequences of improper
interference in the criminal process, namely reversal or retrial, participation in this criminal trial by
the guardian ad litem was of no service to the child, or the court.
fl30 Allowing the guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table with the prosecution is inconsistent with
the independent nature and role of the guardian ad litem. The interests of a child victim are not
always the same as the interests of the parties to a criminal case: the defendant and the State.
Consequently, because the victim was not an interested party, her court-appointed representative,
the guardian ad litem, should not have been permitted to sit at counsel table, either with the State
or with defendant. It was error to allow it.
fl31 Permitting the guardian ad litem to question witnesses and make objections was also error.
Because a guardian ad litem does not represent an interested party in a criminal trial, the guardian
ad litem is not permitted to further the interests of either the State or the defendant in a criminal
case. Victims' rights legislation entitles victims to, among other things, be notified of criminal or
juvenile justice proceedings, and be present and heard at important hearings. See, e.g., Utah
Code Ann. § 77-37-3; Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-38-3 & -4. However, the right to be notified and
present at trial does not include the right to be heard during the guilt phase of the proceedings.
Seeid. § 77-38-2(5); § 77-38-3; § 77-38-4(1) & (2) (stating that "[the Rights of Crime Victims Act]
shall not confer any right to the victim of a crime to be heard: (a) at any criminal t r i a l . . . unless
called as a witness"). In this case, however, the guardian ad litem insisted that he had the right, on
behalf of A.G., to object to questions asked by defense counsel, and on more than one occasion,
to ask follow-up questions to those of the prosecutor. To the contrary, the guardian ad litem's
participation may not include objecting to questions and questioning witnesses in a criminal trial.
The role of the guardian ad litem is not to act as an advocate either for the State's position or for
the defendant's position in a criminal trial.
1132 Nothing in the statutes under which a guardian ad litem may be appointed by the district court
authorizes the guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table with the prosecutor in the criminal action, to
object to questions or proceedings during trial, or to question or call witnesses. As the trial court
here correctly concluded, there is also no authority for granting the guardian ad litem's request to

make opening and closing statements to the jury in the criminal case. The role of the guardian ad
litem in the criminal context involving a child victim is as limited as that enjoyed by the child's
parent or other legal guardian.1-1
tf33 In sum, the circumstances under which an attorney guardian ad litem is appointed are
circumscribed by statute, and the role of an attorney guardian ad litem in the litigation process is
also limited because of the nature of the duties and responsibilities set forth by these statutes.'—*
Consequently, the trial court's allowance of the guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table with the
prosecutor, to make objections, and to examine witnesses, was error.
C. The Error Should Have Been Obvious to the Trial Court
1134 The second factor under the plain error analysis is whether the error should have been
obvious to the trial court. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). These errors,
permitting the guardian ad litem to sit at counsel table, to make objections, and to question
witnesses, should have been obvious to the trial court.
1J35 In fact, the record indicates that the court was conscious that the guardian ad litem's desired
level of participation was inappropriate. On one occasion, in sustaining an objection to questioning
of an expert witness by the guardian ad litem, the trial judge said, addressing the guardian ad
litem, "You are here as the victim's advocate basically in this case, and there's not going to be two
bites of the apple for examination.... [S]o you and [the prosecutor] can coordinate that together.
I'm not going to have two things going from the same side of the case." Following further colloquy
with the guardian ad litem, the trial court again said, "I'll tell you what my concern is. My concern is
that there shouldn't be any reason that there should be two times prosecution versus one time
defense and you and [the prosecutor] can coordinate that." The guardian ad litem responded,
[Y]our honor, you indicated that we can coordinate with the prosecutor. I can state to
the court that by statute[] we're supposed to be independent and there are times
when we are even in opposition to the prosecutor's position. We do not coordinate as
being the same case because we-our job as mandated is to be inside. I think we
ought to be given an inside rather than having to be coordinated with the prosecutor
or the attorney[s] generalfl.
TF36 The trial court did not permit the guardian ad litem to give an opening statement or
summation. Indeed, the trial court explained that to permit the guardian ad litem to become too
involved at trial would invite error. At the end of trial, in ruling on the guardian ad litem's request to
make a closing statement, the trial court correctly described the law, saying: "[T]here's nothing [in]
any statute that I know of that allows the guardian ad litem to come in here and basically redo the
prosecution. Your statute, 78-3a-912, as far as I can read, does not apply to a first degree criminal
rape c a s e . " ^
fl37 As a result, the second element of the plain error analysis is satisfied: The error should have
been obvious to the trial court.
D. The Error Was Prejudicial
1J38 The third factor under the plain error analysis is whether the defendant was harmed or
prejudiced at trial. In other words, absent the error, whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a

more favorable outcome for the appellant; or, phrased differently, whether our confidence in the
verdict is undermined. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). We are satisfied that
the "team prosecution" appearance presented by allowing the guardian ad litem to sit with the
prosecutor, make objections, question witnesses, and generally act as a co-prosecutor and
advocate for the conviction of the defendant was prejudicial to defendant under the Dunn plain
error standard. Our confidence in the verdict of the jury is thereby undermined. As such, the failure
of the defendant to object on the record to the participation of the guardian ad litem is not fatal to
his appeal. Allowing the guardian ad litem to participate as he did in this case was error.
Moreover, it should have been obvious to the trial court, and it was harmful, in that, absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant.
III. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PARTICIPATION INHERENTLY PREJUDICIAL
1f39 In addition to concluding that the trial court committed plain error under our Dunn standard by
allowing the guardian ad litem to participate as he did in this case, we also conclude that the
extent of the guardian ad litem's participation was in violation of the standard set forth in Holbrook
v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986) (stating courts must consider whether a practice presents an
unacceptable risk of bringing into play impermissible factors which might erode the presumption
of innocence). We agree with defendant that allowing the guardian ad litem, appointed only to
protect the interests of A.G. as a child victim, to sit at counsel table with the State, examine
witnesses, and make objections, is inherently prejudicial. The practice presents an unacceptable
risk of bringing into play impermissible factors which might erode the presumption of innocence to
which the defendant is entitled as a matter of constitutional right. The activities of the guardian ad
litem in the course of defendant's trial violated defendant's right to due process of law, as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by article 1,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution. The trial court erred in allowing it.*—L
IV. DEFENDANT'S OTHER ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
fl40 Because our holding with respect to the participation of the guardian ad litem in the trial
results in reversal, we need not reach defendant's other assignments of error.
^41 Reversed and remanded.

1J42 Chief Justice Howe and Justice Durham concur in Justice Wilkins' opinion.

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice, concurring:
1J43 I concur. I write only to express my concern about the statutory scheme that places the office
of the guardian ad litem director within the judicial branch of government under the direct
supervision of the Judicial Council, the governing body of the state courts. While the said office is
of the utmost importance for the protection and well-being of children, its placement within the
judicial branch of government is directly contrary to the role of the judiciary in our society. Its
placement should be within the executive branch of government.
1J44 Courts must maintain absolute neutrality and be free from bias or prejudice, or even the

appearance of such, in the conducting of judicial trials. Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct
requires judges to "exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary." Canon 2A.
1145 Furthermore, the said Code requires:
A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to judicial direction and
control to observe the standards of fidelity and diligence that apply to the judge and to
refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of their official duties.
1J46 The purpose of the above requirement is for the establishment and maintenance of public
confidence in the judiciary. Every party appearing before a court has an absolute right to feel
confident that the court will be impartial and free from bias or prejudice. If a trial judge in a criminal
case is allowed to appoint an employee of the courts to act as guardian ad litem and allow such
person to actively participate in the trial as an adversary of the defendant and/or cooperate with
the prosecutor in prosecuting the defendant, the confidence of the defendant, and consequently
the public, in our judicial system is endangered.

1J47 Justice Durrant concurs in Associate Chief Justice Russon's concurring opinion.
1. On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.
E.g., State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 2, 10 P.3d 346.
2. Defendant suggests and attempts to rebut the notion that the practice of allowing a support
person to accompany a child witness or victim when testifying may arise from section 77-37-1(2)
of the Victims' Rights Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-37-1 to -5 (1999 & Supp. 2000). We find no
provision in the Victims' Rights Act that applies to assistance in testifying at trial.
3. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-11.2 (1998) (indicating that counsel may be appointed in a
matter involving the custody or support of a child); id. § 30-6-2(4)(declaring that the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of a minor in protective proceedings);
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-403(4) & (5) (Supp. 2000) (stating that, in probate matters, the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of a minor, incapacitated, or unborn person,
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent several persons or interests and may
approve an agreement on behalf of a minor); id. § 78-3a-314(5)(stating that in every abuse,
neglect, or dependency proceeding under the Juvenile Courts chapter of the Code, the court shall,
in accordance with section 78-3a-912, order that a child be represented by a guardian ad litem
who shall represent the best interest of the child).
4. We note here that the duties and responsibilities of a guardian ad litem are not always
coextensive with those of an attorney representing a party in an action. While the term guardian
ad litem is often used as a general term to mean attorney guardian ad litem, a guardian ad litem in
the general sense need not be an attorney.
5. The two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a sixteen or seventeen year old were later
dismissed.
6. The terms "child abuse" and "child sexual abuse" used in section 78-7-9 are both included in

the broad "abuse" category specified in section 78-3a-912.
7. Subpart (p) also requires the attorney guardian ad litem to participate in all appeals unless
excused by order of the court. At defendant's trial, the guardian ad litem indicated to the court that
he did not plan to appeal, whatever the verdict. The guardian ad litem neither participates in this
appeal, nor has he sought relief of that obligation from the court, actions that would have been
required under the guardian ad litem's proffered interpretation of his role in defendant's criminal
trial. Clearly, no such participation by the guardian ad litem would be proper, or permitted, in this
case, given our holding described hereafter.
8. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-37-1 to -5, 77-38-1 to -14 (1999).
9. Indeed, in a case such as this, where the child victim is nearly eighteen years old, expresses no
need for appointment of a guardian ad litem, and the record suggests no other particular
justification for such an appointment, the practice of appointing an attorney guardian ad litem was
not only wasteful, but counterproductive in terms of the criminal proceeding.
10. It is this same limited role that applies to the guardian ad litem appointed by the district court in
any district court proceeding.
11. In response, the guardian ad litem reiterated his belief in the applicability of the requirements
of subsections 78-3a-912 (I) and (o) to attend all hearings and to present witnesses and exhibits
when necessary to protect the best interests of the child. However, he also expressed a degree of
uncertainty, saying: "I think if there's a court ruling on it, [in] whichever way, then perhaps we can[]
try to have some clarification as to what our role is, because really it is something that we are
struggling with with various prosecutors and various courts."
The trial court replied that he was aware of the concern because he had been in attendance at a
new judges' orientation at which, as court staff, the Director of the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem
spoke and took questions, indicating that the Office took the position that the provisions of section
78-3a-912 authorized the guardians ad litem to participate fully in criminal trials, including opening
and closing statements, calling and examining witnesses, and introducing exhibits.
While we do not address the propriety of the training mentioned, we do note with concern the
apparent desire and effort of the Office of the Guardian Ad Litem to be both an arm of the court,
and an advocate before it, a situation fraught with ethical an6 legal difficulties.
12. We are also mindful that, through no fault of her own, the victim in this case may be required
to relive painful events she thought resolved, and face testifying once again. However, where the
conduct of the guardian ad litem in this matter appears to be the result of a concerted effort by the
Office of the Guardian Ad Litem to participate in criminal trials involving children as victims, and
where such a practice would remain unchallenged without appeal by one convicted under such
circumstances, we see no alternative to reversing defendant's conviction in this case. Hopefully, to
do so now will prevent improper involvement in other trials yet to occur and remove at least one
element of doubt from the process by which justice is sought in our courts.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PETITION FOR CIVIL
ROGER BRYNER
STALKING INJUNCTION
Petitioner,
vs.
SVETLANA BRYNER

Judge

JUDGE LEON A. DEVER

Respondent.
The Petitioner alleges against the Respondent and states as follows:
1. Petitioner is a victim of stalking.
2. Petitioner believes that Respondent is the stalker.

3. Both Petitioner and Respondent reside in Salt Lake County, and the acts alleged occurred in
Salt Lake County.
4. The specific acts supporting this allegation are as follows:
Respondent violated the civil stalking injunction in case #050916389 on January 3rd
2006 and on other occasions. Violations include the 8 emails shown Exhibit p. 42,
numerous phone calls, spying on Petitioner, and two new incidents of telephone harassment
where Respondent called Petitioner 15 times in a row. As seen by one of the emails attached
as Exhibit p. 43, Respondent admits to calling 15 times in a row. Telephone logs in
Exhibit p. 44 show these calls. As documented in the police report attached as Exhibit p.
45-49, Respondent admitted this act to a police officer.

Respondent has contacted Roger's no less than 5 current and past employers with the
intention of causing as much harm as possible. Exhibits P. 19, additional evidence
available. At the time of filing of the original petition on September 19th, 2005, only 3 cases
were known* The additional two incidents were just discovered, along with Respondent's
failure to respond honestly to a discovery request asking for this information.
In addition to distributing threatening images, Respondent has distributed
embarrassing photographs of Respondent with malice and the intent to cause emotional
distress* such a the image in Exhibit p. 91. For this reason Respondent should surrender all
photographs of Roger in her possession. Also, Respondent has distributed pornographic
images of a young male boy on her web site along with other nude images of adults and
an image of animals having sex. See Exhibits p. 92-102.
On February 23rd, 2003, Respondent interfered with telephone visitation with the
children again. This intentional denial of telephone visitation is consistent with the
psychological profile of Respondent. According to Kim Peterson uLanat however, appears to
be the more controlling and vindictive parent." Exhibits p. 61 Also, "Lana has been
harboring a considerable amount of anger towards Roger and she appears rigid and
vindictive in how she deals with him. Her behavior in that regard, has interfered with her
ability to parent." Exhibits p. 63-64. Also "the children report she is the parent who is more
likely to get angry or yell at them:" Exhibits p. 59
What follows below is the chronology of events prior to September 19th 2005 which
were used as the basis for the first stalking injunction which was issued by Judge Quinn and

dismissed without prejudice (Exhibits P, 50-52 for signed stalking injunction, Exhibits P.
54-56 for dismissal without prejudice)
In July 2004 Petitioner told Respondent to no longer contact or call him and stated
"you need to talk to my attorney for anything more" before cutting off direct contact.
Respondent admits under oath to making over 15 unanswered phone calls in a row on
7/17/2004 shortly after Petitioner notified her not to call him. This is an admission under oath
to telephone harassment. See Exhibit p. 20 excerpts of Respondents written statement
under oath. Respondent has come to Petitioner's place of work at eagle plaza and disrupted
and intimidated coworkers. Respondent has contacted Petitioner's supervisor by telephone
and harmed my reputation at work See Exhibit p, 19 affidavit of Petitioner's supervisor.
These actions caused Petitioner fear and emotional distress.
Respondent was mutually restrained from all contact on any subject including the
children with Petitioner on February 24th 2005 and an order stating all communication must
go through attorneys was made. Petitioner has not violated this order. Immediately after this
order was made Respondent began to answer for the children on the regular weekly telephone
calls, even though she was ordered not to disrupt them at the same hearing. These actions
caused Petitioner fear and emotional distress.
Respondent has repeatedly telephoned, faxed, and through electronic means
communicated directly with Petitioner. Respondent has answered the phone instead of the
children, and harassed both Petitioner and his children when they have their court ordered
phone calls 3 times a week. While this conduct is in open contempt of this order, it is also
behavior that would cause emotional distress in a reasonahlv nersrm Th^ Hates of occurrence

are 9/17/2005,9/13/2005,8/23/2005,8/17/2005, 8/2/2005,7/10/2005, 5/31/2005, 5/15/2005,
5/1/2005,3/17/2005, 3/10/2005, 3/3/2005, 3/1/2005,2/17/2005,12/9/2004,12/2/2004,
11/23/2004,11/18/2004,11/16/2004,11/13/2004,11/8/2004,11/4/2004,11/2/2004,
10/26/2004,10/19/2004,10/16/2004,10/15/2004,10/12/2004,10/5/2004,10/1/2004,
9/12/2004,9/9/2004,9/2/2004, 8/26/2004, 8/24/2004, 8/21/2004, 8/19/2004, 8/12/2004, and
7/17/2004. See contact log, Exhibit p. 12-18, also Police Report, p. 1-4, and printouts of
threatening email p. 5-7 These actions caused Petitioner fear and emotional distress.
Respondent has made false claims of child abuse and violent behavior at DCFS
(Exhibit p. 21-22) that were not only not true and not substantiated, but have documentary
evidence from a witness that Respondent witness tampered and attempted to fabricate a story
about Petitioner holding a gun to a 3rd party's head. See affidavit from supposed victims
Exhibit p. 9-11. Respondent repeated this lie about guns and Petitioner in her application for
protective order on July 20th 2005 Exhibit p. 20. These actions caused Petitioner fear and
emotional distress.
Petitioner and Respondent are separated and undergoing a custody battle. Respondent
has repeatedly stalked Petitioner trying to find something to use against Petitioner in their
ongoing divorce/custody case. On at least 3-4 occasions Respondent has been outside
Petitioner's residence at the Springs of country woods even though she has no reason to be
there. Petitioner showed up at famous Dave's near Respondent's house where he was
dining and began taking camera phone pictures of him dining as soon as she came in.
Petitioner interrupted his dinner and left even though he was there first Respondent has
attempted to photograph Petitioner on numerous occasions when Petitioner was not violating

any court orders and when Respondent had no business being near Respondent. Petitioner's
care was vandalized with the word "Pig" scratched on it when at Dans foods. This required
repainting of the car. These actions caused Petitioner fear and emotional distress.
On September 13th 2005 at approximately 7:40p.m. Respondent began screaming
irrationally at Petitioner in the Church at middle of a children's event. See letter to opposing
counsel in Exhibit p. 23-25. Also a witness and other evidence are available. On March
25th at 3:30p.m. Respondent removed the children form school, then came back to their school
with 4 police officers even though it was Petitioner's day to pick up the children for spring
break.l During this exchange with Police officers present she yelled at the children and
Petitioner and acted irrationally to harass and cause emotional distress. See police report in
Exhibit p. 26-28 also witnesses and other evidence are available at hearing and Exhibit
p. 40 admission under oath. In response to 3 occasions where Respondent showed up at the
children's school right before scheduled visitation with Petitioner to remove the children for
"appointments'*, the court ordered a prohibition on the removal of the children without a 3rd
party requesting it. Also, Respondent showed up numerous additional times at the children's
School right before or after Petitioner's scheduled pickup of the children to harass him, and
admitted under oath to elements of physical stalking starting on 8/16/2004. See Exhibit p. 41
for verified statement. Petitioner would like to reserve the right to present additional
evidence on the other 3 occasions at the hearing. These actions caused Petitioner fear and
emotional distress.
Respondent demanded that Petitioner not travel with the children as a ruse to deny visitation. Petitioner
complied with the demand not to travel even though no court order was in place prohibiting travel. Respondent

Respondent has harassed petitioner about taking the children to a doctor for
Antibiotics for strep throat, stating that he should know his role as temporary non-custodial
parent and not do anything to help the children medically. Respondent has dressed the parties
minor child in sandals in the middle of winter resulting in persistent cases of athletes foot,
then complained when medical treatment including a prescription for Lamisil AT was sought
by Petitioner that the condition was genetic. Respondent and Petitioner have an ongoing
financial and property dispute. Respondent has stated that unless she gets everything she
wantsfinancially,she will not give custody of the children and made false accusations of
violence and abuse to enforce her threat. See contact log in Exhibits p. 14 10/15/2004 entryRespondent's contempt in denial of surrogate care was certified before Commissioner
Bradford on February 24th 2005. Supplemental order Exhibit p. 33-38, see p. 37 fS4.
Respondent threatened Petitioner with taking the children to Russia on May 9th 2004 and
deciding there if she would or not to return the children to Petitioner. An ex-parte restraining
order was needed to force the surrender of the children's passports and is attached as Exhibit
p. 7-8, Using children as hostages and demanding that a parent not give them needed medical
care, these actions caused Petitioner fear of bodily injury of his minor children and emotional
distress.
Respondent, who is a native of Russia and has what she describes as "ex KGB
friends", has made threats of violence involving a hired Russian Criminal with no fingerprint
record in the US coming to the US to commit any crime including murder and then return to

knew Petitioner had complied through 2 sources, Kim Peterson and a letterfromcounsel which can be provided
if the argument arises. Even if the ruse were true, the excuse is not valid for stalking or denial of visitation.

Russia without fear of discovery or repercussion. See Exhibit p. 29-32 deposition of
Respondent Bryner on 1/17/2005 p. 95 L 21 to p. 96 L 20 and Exhibit p. 11 Affidavit.
Petitioner has learned that Respondent has participated personally and in conjunction with
others in what may be insurance fraud including the intentional flooding of a residence owned
by her parents on Glendale ave in Salt Lake. The threats, stalking, and extensive criminal and
other illegal activities of Respondent and her Russian connections would cause a reasonable
person fear for their life or safety and emotional distress. These actions have caused
Petitioner fear of bodily injury and emotional distress.
Respondent has misused county property to run her personal business and to make
inappropriate and threatening postings to internet. Respondent has intentionally destroyed
property of her tenants, and property of Petitioner belonging both to him and his family
(personal effects of his deceased father). See affidavit in Exhibit p. 39 Petitioner's family
members have testified under oath that Respondents action caused them emotional distress.
Respondent has exited her residence during drop offs of the children on numerous occasions,
most recently on September 14th 2005 when she "flipped off Petitioner as he dropped of the
children. These actions caused Petitioner fear including of bodily injury distress.
Rather than abating with time, stalking behavior is escalating in frequency and open
defiance of orders in place.
5. The acts described above are corroborated by the evidence attached to this petition as
outlined above. This includes court orders.
6. Check One:
[X] A prior court order concerning the same conduct was issued:

A Stalking Injunctions was granted by Judge Quinn on incidents in this petition which
occurred before September 19th 2005, thereby adjudicating that that there is reason to believe
that an offense of stalking has occurred pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 77-3a-101 (5). See
Exhibit p. 50-52. No evidence contradicting this position was presented.
The stalking Injunction was dismissed without prejudice on January 4th 2006, pursuant
to a motion filed on December 19th 2005. See Exhibits p. 54-56, also p. 68. This dismissal
without prejudice was filed as an act of good faith and upon the assumption that Respondent
would correct her behavior before the additional violations documented above. All orders
signed in the prior stalking case are attached as Exhibits p. 69-82. The Docket is
attached as Exhibits p. 83-90. As can be seen, the dismissal without prejudice is the last and
final adjudication in this case and no prior order dismissed or mitigated the force of the
original order.
Supplemental order in Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake, Utah, Exhibit p. 33-38
Respondent's contempt for pig statements and denial of after school care was certified, Phone
calls with the children 3 times a week without Respondent distracting, no communication.
Ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order in Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake, State of
Utah Exhibit p. 7-8 ordering surrender of children's passports to prevent Russian travel.
7. The current address of the Respondent is: 6751 south 2300 east Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Petitioner requests an ex parte stalking injunction which would include the following:
1. Enjoin the Respondent from stalking the Petitioner.
2. Enjoin the Respondent from coming near the following addressesfrequentedby
Petitioner:

Residence: Springs of Country Woods, Watercress Lane, Midvale UT 84047.
Work: Eagle Gate Plaza in Salt Lake; 4505 Wasatch Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT.
School: St. Sophia School at 5341 Highland Dr Salt Lake City, UT,
Other places frequented by Petitioner (describe): NA
3. Restrain the Respondent from contacting Petitioner either directly or indirectly,
through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic, and restrain the
Respondent from contacting the following persons: Any Current of Former employer.
4. Order additional relief as follows:
a) Respondent will not harass Petitioner's through his work.
b) Respondent will surrender all photographs of Petitioner and identify who she has
distributed these photographs to.
5. Issue an ex parte civil stalking injunction, with or without hearing, as appropriate.
DATED this^/day of February 2006.

Petitioner
Subscribed and sworn to hjjtoTe p a f i . ^ ^ t ^ / L d a y of February 2006.
Court Clerk
Serve Respondent at: 6 7 5 ^ ^ f f l . ^ f t Lake City, UT 84121
Petitioner's Name
Address (may be omitted for privacy)
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Midvale Police Department
LAW Incident Table:
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ase Number: 05B005422
":ure: Threats
Other Number:
Image:
\ddr 1037 E WATERCRESS LN; 6995 S; APT X2
Area:
MVPD7
Midvale
Area 7
City: MIDVALE
St: UT
uui
ux Zip: 84047
Contact: BRENNER, ROGER
Complainant: 01-26282
Lst: Bryner
Fst: Roger
Mid: S.
DOB:
_- 05/30/67
, ~,
SSN: 528-41-7656 Adr 1037 E WATERCRESS LN; 6945 S; #2x
->Rac: W Sx: M Tel: (801)255-7729 Cty: Midvale
St: UT Zip: 84047
Offense Codes: THRE
Reported:
Observed: THRE
Circumstances: LT20
~*pndg Officers: ROXBURGH, ROCK
.pnsbl Officer: ROXBURGH, ROCK
Agency: MVPD
CAD Call ID: C1891808
Received By: GONZALES, N
Last
RadLog:
09:45:54
08/17/05
24
""* How Received: 9 911 Line
Clearance:
When Reported: 08:37:09 08/17/05
Disposition: INA Disp Date: 08/17/05
>ccurrd between: 07:30:00 08/17/05
NIBRS done by:
and: 07:30:00 08/17/05
Approved by:
3:
Synopsis: (See below)
arrative: (See below)

NVOLVEMENTS:
Type Record #
Date
_NM
01-26282
/ /
NM
01-26282
/ /
CA
C1891808 08/17/05

Description
Bryner, Roger S.
Bryner, Roger S.
08:37 08/17/05 PHONE HARASS
-AW Incident Offenses Detail:
Offense Codes
Seg Code
Amount
- 1 THRE Threats
0.00

Relationship
*Complainant
Victim
initiating Call

_LAW Incident Circumstances:
""*
Contributing Circumstances
5eg Code
Comments
1 LT20 Residence/Home
LAW
Seq
1

Incident Responders Detail
Responding Officers
Name
Unit
ROXBURGH, ROCK 2P13

E*0[

Wl
.n Radio Log Table:
me/Date
Typ
U45:54 08/17/05
1
: 11:20 08/17/05
1
,:51:54 08/17/05
1
!_:44:55 08/17/05
1

Unit
2P13
2P13
2P13
2P13

Code Zone Agnc Description
24
MVE
MVPD incid#=05B005422 Assignment Co
PH
MVE
MVPD incid#=05B005<i?2 Mstina Teleoh
PH
MVE
MVPD
ENRT MVE
MVPD ER call=2691

II

inative:
reats made to complainant over the phone.
: Start 08/17/2005 09:23:31]
rECC End 08/17/2005 09:23:31]
CC Start 08/17/2005 09:58:02]
nature: Threats
not overwritten by : PHONE HARASS
locatn: MVPD7 not overwritten by : MID
ocurdtl: 07:30:00 08/17/05
not overwritten by : 08:35:15 08/17/05
ocurdt2: 07:30:00 08/17/05
not overwritten by : 08:35:21 08/17/05
dispos: ACT not overwritten by : LF
*ECC End 08/17/2005 09:58:02]

\T

Supplemental Narrative:
Supplemental Narratives
Same
Date
Narrative
Roxburgh, Rock 09:27:45 08/17/05
sporting Officer:R. Roxburgh
Midvale Police Department
Supplemental Report
Case Number 05B005422

,

—

I was dispatched on a Threats detail where the complainant, Roger
Jryner wanted phone contact. I called and spoke with Roger. Roger said that he
in the process of getting a divorce with his wife Lana Bryner. They have 2
ildren together and she has a Protective Order out on him.
This morning Roger received a phone call from an unknown party. He said
iat the voice was a females voice and it sounded as if the party was trying to
aa.sguise her voice. Roger said that it did not sound like his wife, Lana.
The caller told Roger that if he was worried about his kids going to^
assia he should be more worried about what was coming from Russia. Roger said
bhat Lana is from Russia. The caller then told Roger to go to web site
^-ussiaslc.com and search for "kitchen". Roger asked several times who the
aller was but she would not say and hung up.
Roger then used *69 on his phone and found that the call had been made
rom phone number 255-8083. Roger does not recognize this number. He tried to
jair back but received no answer.
Roger then went to the web site and did a search on kitchen. He located
i picture that showed a set of knives in a knife holder in the shape of a man.
Roger took this as a threat. Roger then went to Lana's web site at
utahdiscoveryrealty.com. He said that Lana is a Real Estate agent and this is
her web site. He located the same picture on this web site. I looked at the web
site and the picture. The picture is of a set of knives in a holder shaped like
a man. I made a copy of the photo.
6

*
1 called the phone number 255-8083. A person answered and I asked who I
was speaking with. I was then hung up on. I tried to call back but received
what sounded like a fax machine•
7.
I placed a copy of the picture in the approved box with this case
.number on it. I could not locate an address or name for the phone number. Case
should remain active for possible detective follow-up on the suspect phone
number.

Date, Time and Reporting Officer
Wed Aug 17 09:49:22 MDT 2005
Rock Roxburgh
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Affordable Legal Advocates, P.C.
Steven C. Russell #6791
Attorney for Petitioner
Westgate Business Center
180 South 300 West Suite 170
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801)532-5100
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
Roger Bryner,

EX PARTE TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER

Petitioner,

vs.

civil no. 044904183

Lana Bryner,

Commissioner Susan Bradford

Respondent.

Judge Leslie A. Lewis
The Court has reviewed Roger Bryner's motion for an ex parte temporary restraining

order andfindsthat should this order not enter, irreparable harm would likely result. Therefore,
the Court orders the following:
1. Respondent is temporarily restrainedfromremoving the parties* childrenfromthe State of
Utah.
2. That Lana Bryner is ordered to surrender the children's passports and birth certificates to the
Court.
3. That Lana Bryner is restrainedfromobtaining new passports for theparjies^ehiitlrai!
4. The parties are ordered to appear on the zJ&j

of I X^Jf^^lOOA,

before Judge Lo3far

A. Lcwtfin room ^ * of the Third District Court, 450 S State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah,

! ( /

^

IU MIUW cause

as 10 wny uus oraer snouJd not remain in effect until the matter can be heard by

the Commissioner.
Dated this J^QJay of
At the hour of:

District Court Judge

JTUAJ

^^><^^^r >
^
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Affidavit

Linda Bryner
4333 S2900E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124

July 29, 2004
To Whom It May Concern:
I have read Lana's petition of July 20, 2004 in which she has claimed that
Roger had talked to me about putting a gun to my head. This is totally false
and Lana is lying and is smearing Roger's character in what I read. When
Roger brought the kids by they where justfineand happy and wanted to be
with their father. Roger is a very good father and loves those kids dearly.
My family spends a lot of time with Roger and the kids and we would have
noticed if the kids had been abused in any way. My fear with Lana is that
she would use the children as a weapon in the divorce rather then being a
good Mother. I would hope she would not intentionally harm them.
After reading her statement again I believe her statement "I am afraid that he
is not in a very stable state of mind and if he is talking about putting guns to
people head, he might really hurt the kids if he loses it11 is a lie. Lana was
angry with Roger and wanted her kids back. She never thought he would
hurt his kids. She come to see me several times and had called me several
times before Tuesday. Monday she had called asking for an affidavit saying
Roger had threatened me and I told her I wouldn't do it because it wasn't
true.
I swear what I have written is true.
Linda Bryner
Date y/^LfloH

k^L
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this

0-°^

-

day of

NOTMIV PUBUC - STATE OFUTAH

Gxjlca H*2^1
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Affidavit

KarlBryner
4333 S2900E
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124

July 29, 2004
To Whom It May Concern:
My Wife Linda and myself have been close to Lana and Alex and Andy
since they were born and were present in the hospital when Andy was born
to babysit Alex while Roger was with Lana. Our son Zachary often babysat
and our young daughter Lexie is the same age as Alex. We have spent
countless hours with the children and with Roger and Lana. On May 9 Lana
called me frantically saying that Roger was being arrested and that it looked
like he was being hurt by the police and that I needed to come over
immediately. When I arrived I was outside with Roger until he was
removed then went inside to talk to Lana. The children were crying and
worried that their dad was hurt and that he would not come back. 1 calmed
everyone down and set Lana down and asked her what happened. Her reply
was that Roger and her had been arguing and that Roger had been drinking
and that they had-been pushing each others buttons and making each other
angry when she went to her room and Roger the door to get in and then she
called the police. She said the argument started because Roger would not go
out to get cigarettes and that Roger and the children wanted her to quit. It
got more and more heated until her statement that she was going to Russia
with or without Roger and was taking the children and that Roger didn't
have a say in it We talked for at least an hour before she asked me to go to
the Jail and take clothes and find out what was necessary to get Roger out of
Jail.
Lana had got passports and decided to take the children to Russia. Roger
told Linda that he filed for divorce and tried to protect his children from
going to Russia. Lana came to our home after she talked to Roger 5 or 6
times and also walked to our cabin twice. She expressed that she wanted to
see her kids. We told her that her kids were fine and all she had to do was
provide some kind assurance she would not flee to country. We offered to
hold the passports or do whatever it took and she refused. Lana was very
angry that she could not travel to Russia and was angry that someone wanted
the passports that she worked so hard to get.

She asked for support by way of affidavit that Roger Was Violent and when
we refused she said she was looking for a gun to take care of things her self.
She said that she had plenty of Russian friends that could help her take care
of any problem.
When I found out that Lana said that Roger hit Andy and gave him a black
eye I could not believe it because I have never seen Roger be violent
towards anyone let alone his children. In the hundreds of time I have seen
Roger discipline his children I have never seen more than a light swat on the
butt. Lana has never disciplined the children when she was with me. It was
obvious that Roger was the disciplinarian, instructor, and hygienist of the
family and that the children had a good communication with him. After
reviewing her statement on Roger's abuse it became obvious to me that
something was wrong as on day's leading up to the concrete show on March
4 my son Brandon's concrete company was working on Roger's safe room
and several people were there daily and the children needed to be shooed
away from the construction often. None of them noticed any abuse or were
told of any.
I swear what I have written is true.
Karl Bryner
Date

Subscribed and sworn to before me on this

i[A\

Q ^ °

day of

Notary public
My commission expires: ii jit J 2CD KJ)

ARfflCA MASON

ttftfUff PUBUC-1TATE OgWiH
2157 UNOOLH STREET
SWJtAKEOTY, UT 8410*
MyCbmm>&p>ll/lV2006

9/17/200S 7:38 a.m. threatening phone call
I got two phone calls in a row from 801-255-8083. Nothing was said, there was just quit and breathing
sounds. Both times the person hung up. I called back after the 2nd time with *69 and got a computer noise.
I called the police shortly after and verified this was the same phone number that called me on August 17 .
The police office was not able to tell me if they tracked down who the number belongs to.
9/13/2005 7:00p.m parent teacher conterence
At the children's back to school night, there was a scene with Svetlana and the religion teacher. The main
event in the auditorium had been dismissed, and the children were instructed to go to their rooms. Svetlana
stayed with the Religion teacher discussing something in the Auditorium, and 1 stayed with the children
there too until they went up to their rooms. I was with the children about 20 feet away from Svetlana and I
could not really hear what was being said, and was trying not to be intrusive but it was a public place with
many parents present. Halfway through her conversation Svetlana turned directly to me and said "Can I
have some privacy please" in a loud angry voice. I apologized to the teacher and walked further away and
turned my back. She shouted "out the door" but I ignored her as I was about 50 feet away in a public place
that I was personally invited to be in by the principal. She calmed down and continued her discussion
while 1 hung out with the kids When the children went to their rooms Svetlana went with Alex, and I took
Andy to his room.
I am s u r e that the children saw and heard this event, and were affected by their Mothers behavior. Andy
even said to his teacher shortly after "1 wish my dad could come more, but my mom does not want him to
be here" at which point I cut him off and told him that we don't talk about things like that with teachers and
that dad would be there tomorrow for a visit. It deeply saddens me that the children were apologizing for
their mothers behavior, and I can only hope her behavior does not permanently damage her relationship
with them. If she needs to tell someone off it can be done outside earshot of the children.
9/13/2005 7:00p.m. phone call to Children
Tonight at 6:30p.m. I dialed 944-3308, it was busy. Called 556-0065 and Svetlana answered, saying
"hello" I said "I am calling to talk to the kids", she hung up on me. I waited a few minutes and tried again
on 944 only. The phone was busy again. I waited until 6:45 and tried again, this time there was no answer.
The reason 1 \*as calling early is that at 7:00 there was a parent teacher night. 1 didn't know at the time the
children would be there, and thought that they would be babysat with their grandmother. Many other
children were not there and only the parents showed up.
8/23/200S 7:00p.m. phone call to Children.
Dialed 801-944-3308, busy off hook despite the fact that nobody but Alex, And\, and Svetlana were home.
Dialed 801-556-0065, rang, Svetlana answered and 1 said "I am callin to talk to Alex and Andy". Svetlana
told me that she would not let me talk to them because it was her uninterrupted vacation time. I just
repeated that I was calling for Alex and \r\dy and didn't talk to tier about anything. She hung up on me.
8/17/2005 7:10a.m. threatening phone call
On August 17th at 7:10 a.m. a phone call was made to my residence. I can not conclusively say it was not
from Svetlana. The muffled female voice on the other end said that I should be worried about what was
coming from Russia, and I interpreted this to be a threat to obtain a Russian thug to perform some
unspecified act of violence. I called the police and they said they are investigating what other information
identifying the caller can be obtained. Investigation of the web site referred to a threatening picture posted
on Svetlana's web site, and many public posts that appear to befromher including a threatening one. I am
sure that the web site postings were from Svetlana, but can't say conclusively that the phone call was.
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8/2/2005 7:00p.m. phone call to children
1 had difficulty calling the children as they were distracted. I called Kim Peterson, and he called Svetlana.
Svetlana admitted that she denied visitation because I called before 7:00 and her cell phone was free after
7:00 but never told me the rule I was supposed to follow of never calling early. Kim also stated that she
admitted denying telephone visitation 5-10% of the time.
7/10/200S 7:00 p.m. phone call to children
On another note, Svetlana had the children call my house from her cell phone yesterday on their Sunday
phone visit The water park the children were at was so noisy that I could not hear anything. The call was
lost after 1 minute. Does calling from a water park with a lot of noise in the background count as
distracting the children? It is ok to call after they get home.
5/31/2005 7:00 p.m. phone call to children
I called 801-944-3308 prior to 7:00, at 7:00, and a reasonable time after 7:00. The children were not there.
1 got them briefly at 7:00 at 556-0065 while they were at dinner at a restaurant. I could not really talk to
them due to the excessive noise and they could not hear me and seemed very distracted by the restaurant.
The call there lasted only a couple minutes, compared to the typical 10-15 minutes.
5/15/2005 6:55 p.m. phone call to children
J called the children at 6:55 p.m, on Sunday, and started to have a discussion with Alex, when he stated
"Mom, Andy has used up all of our ammunition" and then I heard Svetlana yell something at Andy.
Firstly, 1 thought that they children would not play video games during my calls per the court order.
Secondly, Andy and Alex were fighting over something that should not be a fight. You should be able to
set up the video game so that Andy plays a separate game, which he can save under his own name, and
Alex should have his own too. This would help Andy to not cry during my calls about how he can't play as
good as Alex and Mommy.
5/1/2005 6:50PM call to children
1 called the children at 6:50p.m. on Sunday May 1st 2005. When I called Alex answered, and we talked a
little but he was distracted by the Video game his mother was playing and talked about her getting "gold
nuggets" and gave her advice. Andy was distracted to the point of not talking at all by his mother's actions.
Her voice was audible in the background asking him what she should do on the video game.
This is not as bad as it used to be, but still quite intentional and disruptive. I hope that Svetlana will admit
the truth, that this did occur, and simply pause the video ^am? and leave the room in the future, I did as
much for her when she called.
3/17/2005 6:58PM call to children
The call was cut short, only 3 minutes long. I didn't call back.
3/10/2005 6:58PM call to children.
1 called and talked to Alex but when he was done the phone went dead but didn't hang up for 2 minutes. I
hung up, and called back but it was busy. I tried several times at 801-556-0065 and 801-944-3308 without
success, finally Svetlana picked up on 801 -556-0065 and said uhe is trying to call on the other line" then
hung up. I didn't get a call but called back 60 seconds later and he picked up and we talked.
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3/3/2005 7:00PM call to children.
I called 801-944-2208, it rang 10 times or so and was not picked up, I !ef1 a message and immediately
called 556-0065, Svetlana picked up and said ltthe other phone is not working? Wait a second I will check
it" then hung up. I didn't even get to say anything. I waited a minute and called back on 944, it was busy.
I waited another minute and called back again. Alex answered and said "I am sorry I didn't get it in time"
tike he was being scolded, I told him it was fine and he didn't need to apologize. He was doing good, we
talked about the Lincoln log fort and how big it was, and about what he could buy mom with his bank of
dad money and if he wanted to go in with Andy
3/1/2005 6:50PM call to chtldieii.
Jim Tucker was listening on the line to witness the call. From my perspective it went very well, the kids
were happy and Alex pulled the old uthis is Melvin, Alex is not here" act with me that was very funny, we
had a lot of fun with it. Andy was very excited for tomorrow and said that he wanted to be with me for 30
days. Jim commented after that Alex said that he "got a new lnw^ CT" and it seemed a little weird for a child
to say
10/15/2004 8:13AM call to Svetlana
As I was leaving to drop off my car, I called to see if I needed to pick up Andy, and Svetlana said no Andy
was ok. We talked about Andy's health and the flu, and about the children at length. She said there was
one other thing that she wanted to talk about and that was her terms for settling the divorce. I stayed on the
phone and listened, she went on for a long time about how she would win, and subpoena all my fhends and
jail records, and subpoena my coworkers and how I had no idea how bad it could get, then she said that if I
didn't release the leans on the properties 1 would never get joint custody and I could never get full custody
because of the protective order. She also said that the child support was $10,000 a year for over 10 years,
and if I thought I had more equity than that I could go for it. Finally when it seemed like it would not be
rude or a rejection of what she was saying I said I had to go and hung up to go talk to m> lawyer,
I was both fearful and positive about the offer, but had a hi of reservations. I called Karl and Mary \nm
and talked to them. First of all the money for the children was not really an issue as it would in all
probability have to be spent on the children, and not on making Svetlana a bigger slum lord, so the
SI OK/year is peanuts on a forward looking basis and the S200K in the house I wanted to go into the
irrevocable trust for the children. The bigger issue is will Svetlana, even with joint custody, go back to
court for further game playing with the children? Will she continue to distract them on calls? Will she
continue to try and decide things in the code that are my decision even down to which day of the week I
can see them? Will she always push things in her favor including after school visits and such? And she
still has a protective order, and I don't trust that she will not play games with this or that I could be on the
receiving end of verbal threats on the phone forever and not say something back and nVn wind tip in mP
[ «\ ent to the lawyers office before going to drop off the car, but Steve was not there. The secretary said he
might be able to da a call at J0:30. When I did talk to him he said that 1 should have hung up on her and
said 1 could not talk because of the protective order, and that 1 was not to even listen as she talked about
anything other than the ihildien.
1 spent the rest of the clay m a huge funk sad that she would use the children as hostages like that, threaten
me over the phone, and that I was worried that I would go to Jail as a result of her bringing up non-child
issues in a call To top it all off if I call her on the threat she will freak out again and withhold the children
from me, if I don't comply with her threat she still might with time take the same action, and if I comply
with it she could still come back in 6 months and try to get me thrown in jail again and to never see the
children again as she threatened before.
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2/17/2005 8:50PM call to children
There was only light background noise from Jakers. Alex complained about too much background noise
and was having a hard time hearing.
12/9/2004 8:51PM call to children*
I called and Alex answered. He sounded very soft, and sad5 like he was sick or sad or being verbally
abused. I asked if everything is ok and he said yes, but didn*t want to talk to me. He gave the phone to
Andy. When Andy answered he would not talk to me but instead said "look at me mommy" over and over
again. I hung up after trying for 60 seconds or so to say 4tAndy, hello Andy51. Without him saying anything
other than what he was saying to Mommy. 1 called back in a second and Alex answered, he was crying and
said "did you hang up on Andy". I said "yes, he was not talking to me it seems like mommy is talking to
him". He said "you are making me cry" and I told him that I was sorry and that I would see him on
Monday and 1 loved him. I was hung up on. About 9:00 they called back, and seemed to be better it was
like a new call. Alex was very said still but talked* and there was no distraction. I stayed up until 3:00 AM
and could not sleep. The thought of Alex and Andy in pain really hurts me, but there is nothing I can do.
12/2/2004 8:54PM call to children
Andy answered, ok caJJ but stiiJ distracted,
11/23/2004 8:56PM call to children
Called, Alex answered. He said Andy was supposed to go first, and went to give Andy the phone, but it
hung up. It is unclear why. 8:59 I called again, but they called back. I was on for 2 minutes till 8:01 but
got hung up again. I called right back and talked to Alex some more. By 8:05 I could talk to Andy.
11/18/2004 8:55PM phone call to children
Alex answered, and we talked for a while without problem. Andy would not talk to me, Alex said he was
busy with mommy.
11/16/2004 8:55PM call to children
Called and got Alex, he was distracted and the TV was on loudly. Svetlana was talking to him in the
background and he told her to be quite twice. I got hung up on shortly after Alex told her to be quit the
second time. I called back twice, and on the 3rd time he picked up again and sounded sad. I asked him if
mommy hung up and he said yes. I finished up my call with him and then talked to Andy. Andy was
distracted too and I could not talk very much.
11/13/2004 8:54PM call to children.
Andy was very distracted again, watching dragon tales. Al^x answered the phone first.
11/8/2004 8:57 Call to Children
Andy picked up, didn't want to talk and was distracted by n^om talking,
11/4/2004 8:55PM phone call to children.
Called 801-944-3308. Andy was very distracted and didn't want to talk, he was watching TV. Alex talked
and talked and talked, asked a couple times for Momy to turn down the TV but she would not, he went in
his room to talk. Lasted to 8:18PM. Great call with Alex.
11/2/2004 8:45PM phone call to the children
Called 944-3308, the answering machine came on then clicked off. I called again and there was no answer.
9:47, again to 556-0065, left message saying I was calling to talk to the children and would call back later.
9:54, another try, got cut off mid at 9:59, called right back *md got them again, the call went ok otherwise.
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10/26/2004 9:0OPIVi note
Tried to call but was not allowed to.
10/19/2004 g;50PM call to children
I called 10 minutes early, Svetlana was talking in the background again, and Andy became distracted
eventually. Alex came on and said he wanted to get back to his game At least there was 110 TV
10/16/2004 8:00PM call to children
I called and said "This is Roger, Roger, would you like me to move the calls forward to 8:00 or should i
call back later?". Respondent replied "9:00" and hung up. So much for going to bed earlier and calling
earlier than 9.
10/12/2004 8:30PM call to children.
J called, they were watching Jakers and distracted, but we had a quick talk about Halloween and car y \iw,
pumpkins. Andy said he liked Jakers.
10/5/04 8:30PM call to children
Svetlana picked up, 1 said "it is Roger and 1 would like to talk to the children11 and she put Andy on. He
was very cheerful and we had a good conversation. Alex seemed sad, and got mad an Andy for
interrupting his game. He was very distant on the call and it seemed like something was wrong to me and
Marry Anne, who listened in on the call.
10/1/04 6:13PM phone call from the Bo\s
Alex called, I had no idea that he would at this time and luckily I was able to take the call. We talked for
about 5 minutes, but the reception cut in and out with the cell phone while they were driving Andy and I
talked but I couldn't understand what he was saying very well but tried as best as I could.
1 no call at the court ordered time of 9:00p.m. was allowed)
10/1/04 9:24AM email from Svetlana
Subject:
RE: Talking to Alex on 9/30
Date:
Fri% 01 Oct 2004 09:24:58 -0600
hrom
Luna Bryner * LBryner{a)slco.org>
Andy told you that Alex H as asleep and I did not have anything to add u > that I don'i think it
is such a big deal as Alex called you today in the morning As it is getting dark earlier now, I
would like to move the calling time to 8:00 in the morning on Tuesday and Thursday and 9:00 am
on Saturday. If you want to stick with the evenings, we might be in bed some of the days when you
call and the kids will have to call you the following morning anyway I ft me know what you want
to do.
t0/l/04 7:52AM phone call from Alex
Alex called and sounded very sleepy, I asked him if he was ok and he said his throat was hurting, and he
thought it was from the syrup (he has been coughing for quite a while). I then asked him if he was going to
school today and he said yes. I told him to drink lots and get good food. The call only lasted between 1 and
2 minutes before it was cut off.
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9/12/2004 7:05 PM got call from Svetlana
Got numerous phone calls from 801-944-3308, 1 left message for 21 seconds at 7:05PM according to voice
mail log, Andy said "that one is really chewed up, look how much it's chewed up, who did this you, who
did this?" Then Alex broke in saying "Dad, Dad's not there" and hung up. I felt bad that 1 had missed the
children's call.
9/9/2004 8:56 call to children
Andy answered, and was playing a Gameboy while talking. The dog then started barking. He was very
distracted. I asked him and the TV was on, the Gameboy being played, and the dog and mom were present.
Alex said his hand was hurting and he could not hold the phone any more, and seemed very sad when he
was talking.
9/2/2004 8:57 PM Call to children
Called the kids, Andy answered almost yelling he was so excited about Yugio cards, Alex had to get on the
line just to describe the new cards they got. Andy talked for 5-6 minutes, that is about the longest I have
ever heard him talk nonstop on the phone and he really surprised me with a great long conversation. Alex
would not come off the computer game at first, but finally did and then seemed a little distant and sad, not
much talking but said 1 would see him tomorrow. Towards the end Andy started crying in the background
for some reason.
8/26/2004 9:00 PM called the children
The dog was barking the whole time and Svetlana was talking and Alex eventually stopped talking and said
he was watching a video game on the computer(more distractions). This has got to stop.
8/24/2004 9:00 PM call with children
Called the children, they seemed very distracted and the call was very short. Andy just kept saying "I love
you".
8/21/2004 8:50 PM phone calf to children
8:50 called 944-3308 and 556-0065, Lana answered the cell and said call back at exactly 9:00 and hung up.
1 called back at 9:00, Alex answered, and we had a good conversation. And was distracted again and stuff
was going on in the background.
8/19/2004 9:00 PM phone call to chUdren
had to call 2 times, once at 8:45 once at 9:00. When I called at 9:00 both the game boy and the TV were on
loud and distracting the children, and the puppy and mommy were playing and talking also. 1 asked Lana
to turn off the game and TV but she said I should ask the Children to. I told her I expected her to.
8/12/2004. 8:50 PM Call with children
Called 801-944-3308 from Maryanne Tuckers house. She listened in on the phone call and witnessed my
statements. It was brief, Alex first, then Andy. They seemed excited about the weekend but also distracted
by video games playing in the background. We talked about swimming and seeing Lady (a dog) and going
to the springs of country woods. Alex was especially distracted while Andy was animated. I said "1 love
you" and "big hug big kiss" and then goodbye. Lana was talking in the background, 1 don't know about
what,

I Roger Bryner, swear that the foregoing record of events is a true and testimony of what
transpired and that the notes were made shortly after the time and date indicated on the

Contact Log Excerpts Page 6 of 6

note in each case. In some cases additional evidence in the.
>rd
a 3 party by facsimile, or in notarized affidavit form exists
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Petitioner
Subscribed and sworn before me this ____ _ day ol
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XBirm. Inc.
3100 logic Drive
Longmart, Gotoiado 80503

HXILINX

®

May 5,2005
Dear Sir or Madam:
On May 10,2004,1 received a call at my home office. The caller identified herself as the wife of Roger
Bfyner, Svetiana Bryner. Svetiana told me that Roger had been in an accident, hefeuoff the root, and
was in the hospital a couple of days so would not be working.
Later in 2004, in the early FaH, Svetiana again called me on my home office number. She again
identified herself as Roger's wife and mentioned that there were marital troubles and a divorce. She
tried to ask me questions about Roger's employment and his travel schedule. I replied to her that this"
was not appropriate and these questions would have to be directed to Xi'lintf corporate legal
department.

Sincerely,

Greg Brown
Sr. Manager

1
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3100 Logic Drive • I ongrnont, Colorado 80503
Telephone: 72G-652-3600 - FAX: 720 652 3663 • VVebtwvw.xilinvcom

Verified Petition for Child Protective OrderfiledJuly 20th 2004
Case 044904240CA Third District Juvenile Court, Salt Lake, Utah
JUL 21 m
*AtTU«COUKT<f

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COIRXSALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
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Being sworn, 1 state that I am the Petitioner; that I have read this Petition and the .
statements in it are true and correct to the best of my knowledge that I believe I am entitled to
the relief requested, and thai this Petition is not being used tojifewss ortosbusc process.

Petition©

Subscribed and sworn to before me on
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Referral Number

1238316

Intake Worker:

Maybee.Margerita H

Referral Start D/T:

20Jul041501.39

Region:

SL Valley

Disposition D/T:

20Jul04 15:27:28

Office:

Salt Lake Valley - Admin

Person Section:
Name: Last, First Mi
Bryner, Roger
Bryner, Svetlana
Bryner, Alexander
Bryner, Andrew

Client ID

DOB

Role

Age

Alleged Perpetrator
49Apr97

'HH^eVi

7|AHeged Victim
Mteged Victim

Relation to Primary
Parent's Paramour
Mother
Pnmary
Brother

Gender
Male
Unknown
Male
Unknown

1

In Home
Mo
yes

i
i

No

I

No

I

Family Address

Unaccepted CANR April 2002

11Feb2005 8.15 AM
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Narrative Section
Narratfve:fJPBaid that on 579/04, Mom's boyfriend, Roger became upset because the kids were taking too long to brush their teath. Dad screamed at the
kids, and broke their toothbrushes. Mom was locked in her room, and Dad knocked the door down. LE Case # 04-47815. {intake had not received the
base, but requested it on 7/20.)
Dn July 13, 2004, Dad pleaded no contest to Domestic Violence. He went to jail, and Mom bailed htm out, Rogei drinks a lot When he got out of jail.
bad said he would not drink anymore. Mom allowed him to take the k»ds on Friday 7/16/04. On Friday. Dad would not answer the phone. On Saturday,
pad said he would allow a conference call between Mom and the kids on Sunday. On Sunday, Mom heard the kids over the phone. The oldest (Alex)
(answered every question yes or no. The youngest, Andrew, cried the whole time they were on the phone. The children said they wanted Mom.
Allegedly, Dad moved out of his apartment He had stayed with the kids in a Motel 6 for a few days. When he took the kids to his relatives house, Rogei
took out a gun. He threatened a sister-in-law with the gun.
pad is currently driving a rental car with license plate 190 MRW. It ts unknown where Dad and the kids are. Thus, this case win not be opened at this ttrnej
\r\ March 2004, Mom's boyfriend (Roger) hit one of the kick wh*n he was drunk Ont child was tell with a black eye. The police were not catted,
according to A H f
Query;
Safe: no priors

PACMIS. no open services
sex offender list: no match

Actions Taken by OrvCaJI/CPS
Condition of Home:
pV Database:
PACMIS:
Policy Report:

Precautions:
Primary Victim*
Prior History in SAFE
Referent Source of Information
Referent Would Like Caseworke to Call.
Sex Offender Database:
Bile/Date of Occurrence:
Special Conditions:
Time/Place to See Child(ren)[Time/Race to See Parents):

Referent information
Name: m H H H H s V
Street Address:
City:
^

Unaccepted CANR April 2002

I delation to Primary*

^ ^ H H H L V
Phone: (

_

| State:
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Steven C. Russell, Esq.
(SOI) 332-5100

Westgate Business Center
180 Sou* 3O0 West Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Fax (SOI) 532-537*

September 13th 2005

David S Dolowitz
Cohne. Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
Box 11008
SLC,UT 84147-0008
Delivered via Fax to 355-1813

Re: Svetlana Bryner
Dear Sandy,
Attached please find Roger's Report concerning his telephone visit Please address the issues
Roger raises with Svetlana.

Cordially,

Steven C. Russell

B9/14/B5 1B:3B:11 ET TO:

B77S193413 FBOtt:

87751^<:3

Roger Bryoer
Phone: 801-255-7720 Fax: 877-519-3413
PO Box 712153, Salt Lake City, Utah 84171
Tuesday, September 13th, 2005
To:'

Steve Russell

Re:

Denial of Telephone visitalic-

Dear Steve:
'I omght at 6:30p.m. I dialed 944-3308, it was busy. Called 556-0065 and Svetlana
answered, saying <chello" I said "I am calling to talk to the kids", she hung up on me. I
waited a few minutes and tried again on 944 only. The phone was busy again. I waited
until 6:45 and tried again, this time there was no answer. The reason I was calling early
is that at 7:00 there was a parent teacher night, I didn't know at the time the children
would be there, and thought that they would be babysat with their grandmother. Many
other children were not there and only the parents showed up.
At the children's back to school night, there was a scene with Svetlana and the religion
teacher. The main event in the auditorium had been dismissed, and the children were
instructed to go to their rooms. Svetlana stayed with the Religion teacher discussing
something in the Auditorium, and I stayed with the children there too until they went up
to their rooms. I was with the children about 20 feet away from Svetlana and 1 could not
really hear what was being said, and was trying not to be intrusive but it was a public
place with many parents present. Halfway through her conversation Svetlana turned
directly to me and said "Can I have some privacy please" in a loud angry voice. I
apologized to the teacher and walked further away and turned my back. She shouted "out
the door" but I ignored her as I was about 50 feet away in a public place that I was
personally invited to be in by the principal She calmed down and continued her
discussion while I hung out with the kids. When the children went to their rooms
Svetlana went with Alex, and I took Andy to his room.
I am sure that the children saw and heard this event, and were affected by their Mothers
behavior. Andy even said to his teacher shortly after "I wish my dad could come more,
but my mom does not want him to be here" at which point I cut him off and told him that
we don't talk about things like that with teachers and that dad would be there tomorrow
for a visit. It deeply saddens me that the children were apologizing far their mothers
behavior, and I can only hope her behavior does not permanently damage her relationship
with them. If she needs to tell someone off it can be done outside earshot of the children.
Regards,

Roger.
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EX7

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
i
RELEASE TO PRIVATE ENTITY - INDIVIDUAL
GO SL 200S-48990 (OPEN/ACTIVE)
„ ,
7399 - 3 PUB ORD-CIV1L C \S I bj
General Offense Information
Operational stains : OPEN/ACT! V E
Reported on Mar-25-2005 (Fri.) 1518
Occurred on Mar-25-20Q5 (FrL) 1518
Approved on Mar-25-2005 (Fri.) by F85 - Hill, Michael E
Report submitted by H60 - Lundgreo, John L
Org unit: liberty Patrol/B/Dav
1 .ocatedatl325SMAINST "
Municipality: Salt Lake City Proper County : Cnci Dtsi 2
District: 2 Beat: 231 Grid : PEF

1

Offenses (Completed/Attempted)
Offense : #1 7399 - 3 PUB ORB-CIVIL CASES - COMPLETED
Location: School/College
Suspect used : Not Applicable

General Off en HI Iiil-.ni mution (cont'd)
Bias : None (no bias)
Family violence: NO
1BR Clearance status : Not Applicable

Ki'luturi fe,\e11!|s>
I I't1" ih'Wi
I :OM PLAINT' INFORMATION
I n c i d e n t Location
Address :1325S MAIN ST
District: 2 Beat: 231 Grid: PEF

General Infor mation
Case type: STANDBY ASSIST Priority: 3
TIME -Disp : 15:27:01 Earoutc ; 15;27;01 At Scene : 15:33:04 Clrd : 17:02:13
How call received: TELEPHONE

Complainant Information
Name: BRYNER LANA
Home Telephone: 801
Remarks I

STW AT 2ND ADDRESS/MAVER1K...NEED5 TO DROP OFF
KIDS...DRIVING WHT MITS MIRAGE
2^B PARTY—ROGER BRYNER IN WHITE HYtTV SONATA ., HE WILL
BE WAITING AT CHALLENGER SCHOOL
ROGER HAS COURT P4PER5 WITH HIM
CELL:
CORR....ROGER WILL BE WAITING INSIDE THE SCHOOL OFFICE
For: BB7124 Monday March 28, 2005

'

.

Page: 1 of 3

SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
RELEASE TO PRIVATE ENTITY - INDIVIDUAL
CO SL 3005-48990 (OPEN/ACTIVE)
7399 - 3 PUB ORP-CIV1L CASES
R0GER3RYNER CALLING SAID THE OFCRS KEED TO TALK TO HOLLY
AT CHALLENGER SCHOOL

Clearance Information
Final Case type: PUB ORD - POLICE ASSISTANCE
Report expected: NO Founded: YES
Cleared by : NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED (LOG REPORT)
Reporting Officer I: H60 - Lundgren, John L
Related Person(s)
Case Specific t Complainant - 01 BRYNER, LANA Z
Caucasian/White FEMALE
Bom on Jun-04-1970

Reference Master Name Index

Linkage factors
Resident status: Non-Resident
Case Specific: Involved - 01 BRYNER, ROGER SCOTT
Caucasian/White MALE
Bom on May-30-1967
Residing at 1037 WATER CREST LN 2X, SALT LAKE CITY t Utah 84047*
Phone Numbers
Home : <801)25S-7729 Business : (883)842-9487
Bom in Utah
Occupation: ENGINEER
Employed by ALT AHA 6751 S 2300 S SLC UT
Driver's license:
5*11 in height, Weighing 260 lbs
Hair color: Brown
Eye color: Brown
T .en* type • TInk Type
Reference Master Name Index
BRYNER, ROGER SCOTT
Caucasian/White MALE
Ethnicity: Unknown
Bom cm May-30-1967
Linkage factors
Resident status; Non-Resident

For: BB7124 Monday March 28,200$
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SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT
RELEASE TO PRIVATE ENTITY - LNDMDUAL
GO SL 2005-48990 (OPEN/ACTIVE)

_

_ '

_

7399 - 3 PUB ORP-CIVIL i v

Related text page(s)
Document: INITIAL R/O
Author: MSA - Schofiald, Ravin
Subject: CIVIL STANDBY
Related date/time: Max-25-2005 1607
I Responded to Challenger School, 1270 S. Mara **:.rr.re I \:*~ with Lana
Bryner. Lana states that her two childien had been talk^iy about going to
St. George with their father, Roger Bryner. Lana states that she had not
received an itinerary about the trip within the two week allotted time and
had told Roger that they could not go. Lana was still concerned they were
still going because the kids were still talking about it.
Roger states that he did have plans to go but, since Lana objected to him
taking the kids since he did not have the" itinerary to Lana in time he had
cancelled the trip. Roger stated that he would be at home with the kids
for the weekend. Roger then took the kids and we left the school,
Roger and Lana both wanted the this documented.

End of Report
** END OF HARDCOPY **

Fori BB7124 Monday March 23,2005
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,
Commissioner Bradford
Petitioner,

vs.

Judge Lewis

SVETLANA BRYNER,

Civil No. 044904183

Respondent.

DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF:
SVETLANA BRYNER

TAKEN AT:

180 South 300 West, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah

DATE:

January 17, 2005

REPORTED BY:

Wendy S. Alcock, RPR

tmJtLMS
REPORTING

SERVICES.

INC.

3*

E

1

j Canada and did not succeed.

They did not let him cross

2

the border.

3

Q

Do you know if Roger has relatives in Canada?

4

A

I don't know.

5

Q

Does it sound reasonable to you that Roger

6

would leave his job and family and home in Utah and go to

7

Canada?

8

A

He works from his house.

He can work from

9

anywhere. Alex said that they tried to go to Canada.

10

Roger asked me for my permission to sign that I would

11

allow my children to go visit Canada, so I gave him that

12

permission.

13

Q

Right.

14

A

And it led me to believe that, yeah, if he

15

tried to take the kids across border without the

16

passports, they didn't allow him to take them.

17

Q

Alex has also said that you refer to Roger as a

18

pig.

Is that true?

19

the kids?

Did you call Roger a pig in front of

20

A

No.

21

Q

Do you refer to Roger as a pig?

22

A

In my mind, yes.

23

Q

In you mind, but you never uttered the words?

24

A

No.

25

Q

Did you ever explain to Roger that it would be

I refer lots of things to him.

WENDY ALCOCK - DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC

yi

£x3D

1

very easy to get somebody to come over from Russia, who

2

had no fingerprint record, to kill someone and go back to

3

Russia and never face justice?

4

A

No.

5

Q

You don't remember telling him that, huh?

6

A

No.

7

Q

Do you know any ex-military or KGB personnel

8
9

living in Russia currently?
A

Yes, my best girlfriend from high school.

10

got the job in —

11

It's a secret.

I believe it's the KGB, I'm not sure.

12

Q

When was the last time you talked to her?

13

A

I talked to her when I found out that Roger

14

took the kids and that I'm not coming to Russia.

15

was waiting anxiously for me to —

16

Q

Did you talk to her about Roger?

17

A

That he took the kids.

18

Q

What did you tell her, do you remember?

19

A

That he took the kids.

20
21
22

She

And she

Want the rest of the

I beautiful language that went with it?
MR. RUSSELL:
questions.

I don't have any further

Do you have any redirect, Sandy?

23

MR. DOLOWITZ:

I have no questions.

24

MR. RUSSELL:

25

(The deposition concluded at 2:18 p.m.)

That will do it for today.

WENDY ALCOCK - DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC
96

1

C E R T I F I C A T E

2
3
4
5

[ STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of SVETLANA

6

BRYNER, the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was

7

taken before me, WENDY ALCOCK, a Registered Professional

8

Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,

9

residing at Salt Lake City, Utah.

That the said witness,

10

was by me, before examination, duly sworn to testify the

11

truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth in said

12

cause.

13

That the testimony of said witness was reported by me in

14

Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed

15

into typewriting, and that a full, true and correct

16

transcription of said testimony so taken and transcribed,

17

is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from 3 to 96,

18

inclusive.

19

I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise

20

associated with any of the parties to said cause of

21

action, and that I am not interested in the event thereof.

22
23

24
25

WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 24th day of January, 2005

-(iJwMw' (Ml
m

R
*y^!W*
'F
l ^ f S ^ ^WENOY ALCOCK I
Y&1
2)

333RJoGamdt,dtrt*F
Stir Ufa* Oty.Utth 84101
My OmnwiiluM gjipinm

.
I

WENDY ALCOCK - lES2£a JiSfd^jKfe, LL(J
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FILES BISTBICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL 2 2 2005
Affordable Legal Advocates, P.C.
Steven C. Russell #6791
Attorney for Petitioner
Westgate Business Center
180 South 300 West Suite 170
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801)532-5100

P flSALT LAKE COUNTY
v

deputy Clerk ~

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROGER BRYNER,
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDERS
Petitioner,

civil no. 044904183

vs.

Commissioner Bradford

SVETLANA BRYNER,

Judge Himonas

Respondent.
This matter came before the Court for hearing on Febrary 24,2005.
Commissioner Susan Bradford, presiding for consideration of Petitioner's Amended
Motion for Further Orders and Order to show Cause; Petitioner's Verified Motion for
Restraining Forensic Evaluator; Respondents verified Motion for Order to Show Cause;
Respondent's Motion for Protective Order; Respondent's Motion to Replace Dr. Natalie
Malovich as custody evaluator and Request to Appoint Different Custody Evaluator;
Respondent's Motion in Support to Amend Temporary Orders. Petitioner appeared in
person and was represented by his attorney Steven C Russell. Respondent appeared in
person and was represented by her attorney, David S. Dolowitz. The Guardian ad Litem,
Stacy Snyder, appeared on behalf of the parties' minor children. After examining the

<

&

-

*

*

pleadings submitted by each of the parties and having heard and considered the
arguments and representations of counsel and being advised in the premises,
Commissioner Bradford issued her recommendation from the bench. The parties reached
a partial stipulation which was read into the record and accepted by the Commissioner.
Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Petitioner shall exercise his telephone visits at 7:00PM on Tuesday,

Thursday and Sunday.
2.

Petitioner shall purchase new school uniforms for the parties minor

children and deliver them to the Guardian ad Litem. Respondent shall surrender the
children's old school uniforms to the Guardian ad Litem and pick up the new ones.
3.

Petitioner shall pay Respondent S854.00 per month for child support for

the two minor children commencing August 2004. Respondent shall provide a copy of
her 2004 W-2*s and 2004 tax to Petitioner and the parties shall exchange all information
necessary to set child support.
4.

The issue of Respondent's request that Petitioner reimburse her for costs

associated with a trip to Russia that was canceled is reserved for trial.
5.

The issue of attorney fees are reserved for trial.

43

6.

The issue of Petitioner picking up his personal property from Respondent

is reserved. Respondent will provide a list of Petitioner's personal property to his
counsel and the parties will attempt to work out the issue.
7.

The issue to Bifurcate is reserved.

8.

Both parties shall refrain from creating any distractions when the other
i

parent is speaking to the children on the telephone during their telephone contact visits.
COMMISSIONER'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON DISPUTED ITEMS
9.

The parties will submit no further recorded evidence to the Commissioner.

10.

Petitioner will have the right to have lunch with the children on Tuesday

and Friday from 11:00am to 1:00pm, on the school grounds. This parent time, when
exercised, will not be a violation of the Protective Order.
11.

Petitioner is hereby ordered to pay one-half the children's monthly lunch

costs directly to the school.
12*

Both parties are restrained from taking the children out of school except

for: visits with the custody evaluator, medical, dental, and therapist. Self-declaration is
not allowed.
13.

Unless the GAL can verify that it's a bona fide, not tainted therapist, Ms.

Hollenbeck will be removed as Therapist. The Guardian ad Litem will obtain copies of
all records from Ms. Hollenbeck and review them to verify Respondent has not biased or

m

tainted Ms. Hollenbeck. Respondent shall insure that a medical release is signed for
GAL. These records will not be released to anyone else.
14.

The Court herby descends the previous Order that Respondent reinstate

Petitioner on her health insurance.
15.

Petitioner shall ascertain the possibility of placing the minor children on

the parties life insurance policy as beneficiaries.
16.

Both parties are restrained from direct communication, and should

communicate through their attorneys.
17.

Both parties are mutually restrained from involving the Challenger school

staff in the case.
18.

The Court hereby decends the previous order of Petitioner's first right of

refusal for surrogate care for the minor children and awards the Petitioner an additional
alternate Wednesday evening parent-time visit from 3:00p.m. to 6:00p.m, commencing
march 2n 2005. With this order there is no need for Petitioner to try to determine if
Respondent is offering Petitioner parent time and if Respondent is not caring for the
children over two (2) hours.
19.

Both parties are prohibited from checking into pay stubs, time periods, or

other work related harassment, or having private investigators spy on the activities of the
other party when they do not have the children.

<A€>

20.

The Respondent's Request for Protective Order for Davidson Realty is

denied. It is hereby ordered that the records will be released to counsel. No copies will
be given to parties, family, etc. The information will be available only to counsel and to
their experts, and the information can be used for Court purposes.
21.

Respondent's Motion to Replace Dr. Natalie Malovich as custody

evaluator and Request to Appoint Different Custody Evaluator is denied. Dr. Malovich
remains as the Court appointed evaluator.
22.

Both parties may have a second custody evaluation conducted by an

evaluator of their choice so long as they pay the entire cost of this evaluation. Both
parties are ordered to cooperate in the performance of these second evaluations.
Respondent chooses Kim Peterson as her second evaluator.
23.

Each of the parties are restrained form video or audio tape recording in

this case. An exception for video taping minor children's activities for sentimental
reasons is granted, however these tapes may not be used as evidence before the
Commissioner.
24.

The issues of Respondent's contempt in making derogatory comments and

after school care are certified for trial.

25.

The issue of Petitioner reimbursing Respondent for his half of the monthly

health insurance obligation is moot. Petitioner has paid Respondent and is up to date on
this obligation.
26. Each of the parties is restrained from using alcohol six (6) hours prior to or
during the time when thev are caring for the children.
DATED this ^ w ^ d a y of

HON. CONSTANDINOS HIMCRAS
District Court Judge
Recommended this

/

^\

day of

Q

_, 2005.

HON. SUSAN C.
Domestic Relations5

OAT&

L\~l

Fx55

County of Salt Lake }
}SS
State of Utah
}
On September 3, 2005 Roger asked me, my daughter, and my husband to help him pick
up his stuff from the driveway of Svetlana's house and to witness the storage conditions.
Svetlana and an older lady were in the garage but went inside and closed the garage when
they saw us. We made no attempts to communicate with them and proceed directly to
pick up the bags then left immediately with what we could remove. They didn't
communicate with us either they simply shut the garage door.
There 3 garbage bags with open tops that would allow exposure to all the elements. They
were rotting and mildewed from prolonged exposure and sitting in water. The sheet
metal press was contained in a rotting wooden box with holes readily apparent. Rust was
visible and a hornets nest was inside the prevented it's removal. The motorcycle and side
car were rusted and had parts missing and flat tires. A tow truck will be necessary due to
a lack of key and the 2 flat tires.
I video taped the pickup, and we then came back to Roger's house and went through the
bags in his garage. We didn't take it inside due to the obvious condition and possible
infestations of mildew and bugs. All of the clothes showed evidence of extreme mildew
and some will stiU slightly dapp;""Ambng t#e remains were my fathers business suits
who is now deceased. Seefirfg them rume/distressed me.

/

//

c^

mm.

r~i

Signed li-lr^lJA^fUr.L

/
'Id'i^

Date

' Anne Brcler-uicker

f/-/'
'

County of Salt Lake }
} SS
State of Utah
}

Marry Anne Bigler-Tucker
Subscribed and sworn before me this

day of

, 2005.

Notary
My commission expires:

\\<h £x3

06-23-05 Filed: Respondent's Verified Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's
secont(sic) Motion for Order to Show Cause for Contempt
Case 044904183 Third District Judicial Cotirt Salt Lake, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
IK THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RESPONDENTS VERIFIED
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITIONER'S SECOND
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE
FOR CONTEMPT

ROGER BRYNER,
petitioner,

LANABRYNER,

Civil No*0449041 S3

Respondeat

Judfcc: Leslie A Uwis
Commissioner. Susaa Bradford

Image Skips to Page 5 "J 10.
arc ill." On March 25,2005, Respondent took the children to the guardian ad litem's office to
discuss what she could doregardingthe spring break issue and how she should handle the apparent
mis-communication. The guardian, at that time, was busy and unable to meet with the children.
Therefore, the Respondent called the police and requested a civil standby. The police report with
regard to that incident was attached to Petitioner's Motion as Exhibit B.
Image Skips to verification by Respondent on Page 6.

<rfJtmo,20O5.

STATE OJF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Oa this 3 3 day of June, 2005, before roc, the undersigned Notary, pexsoaafly appeared,
ttfho is the person whoso nanxa is signed oa tibe ptooediag docntnent, subscribed, sworn zad
adkaowledfiod to m*featshe tigrad it voluntarily for its said purpose.

Notary Pcblic
My cpmmuiwm expires:
NOTARY PUBLIC

USA WATTEfla

* * i aeum Sr»* eft. • 2 » e
My CO*<THM.O« &»*•«

, _ STATr O f UTAH

if / £*#
0

10-29-04 Filed: Verified Reply to Petitioner's Motion for Further Orders, ATR
Case 044904183 Third District Judicial Court. Salt Lake, Utah

ROGER BRYNER,
VERIFIED REPLY TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION FOR FURTHER ORDERS

Petitiooer,

vs.

Case No. 044904183
Judge Leslie A. Lewis
Comm. Susan C Bradford

LANA BRYNER,
Respondent

Image skips to p 4
10. On August 16 Respondent was surprised to receive a call from Challenger school asking
if the Petitioner could pick up the children at 3:30 p.m. Respondent indicated that he could
Petitioner then failed to appear on tune Respondent, not knowing the Petitioner's mtenuons, and after
receiving a phone cail from die parties' child Alex that nobody was there to pick them up, went to the
school to pick up the children. As she arrived at die school she saw the Petitioner walking into the
school. At this point the Respondent left, never exiting her vehicle.
Image skips to p. 8, verification block
STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake

)

ss.^
SVEILANA BRYNER beingfirstduly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that she has read
the foregoing Reply, understands the contents thereof, and venfles that the factual allegations
contained therein are true to the best of her knowledge, uiforrnadon and belie

S
_
Respondent)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
RUSSELLY.MIHAS ,

f #

2ST Cut fto«fe«yJ300 •

<« /

L^SUL - -$&«$£

I

1^

day of Othbtf

. 2004.

/

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires:

M
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Yahoo! Mail - brynervbryn^^yahoo.com

Yajigo! Mj^Vabaol Mail
^ S ^ T ^ T ^ t ^
jrJkMMmJ^JrS^

Make Yahoo! vour home page
MSktl
nfkllm

Addresses

Check Mai!

*\

Welcome, brynervbryner
FSion Out. Mv Account]

Calendar

*\

Notepad

Mail Home - Mail Tutorials - Hek

~;

What's New - Matt For Mobile - Upgrades Options

Compost

j B f f Vonage: Best Offer Yet
bOm Get 1 month FREE
Folders

Starch
the Wsb

y*fr
. Search the Web

Search Mail

2

Inbox
View: All Messages

]

f°^?t1??<»B

Messages 151-175 of 238 First | Previous | Next | Last

"'[Add-Edit]

Inbox (33)

.- -[

Draft

,'i i>,Mii|iii I.III l''if

.:<iiiwiii<i»iiiiii m l

Ell

Sender

E

Sent
Bulk

[Empty] j

Trash

[Empty] |

in nil ll mil IniiiiiinViimi • I

^ lS§ Lana Bryner

B ~ 8 Wells Fargo
tfjfi] Home Equity Loan

Q

* i £3 Lana Bryner

E]

53 Lana Bryner

A MasterCard
in 3 Days*

RE: time with the
children
RE: time with the
children
RE: Paying for
Private School
Tuition

E3 ^ G3 Lana Bryner
B

^ $175,000 Loan for
0 under $875/month)

Subject

gji

*» E3 Lana Bryner

I What's your
l Credit Score?

•>••• •• liiiili m iTn iiii:ii« r'ninmii if

I

| Date

Size

Fri Dec 30,2005

7k

Tue Jan 03,2006 10k
Wed Jan 04, 2006 6k

RE: Paying for
Wed Jan 04, 2006 8k
Private School
Tuition
RE: Communication
Thu Jan 05, 2006 9k
with Children

O '*> SB Lana Bryner

RE: Monday's plans Tue Jan 10, 2006 5k

E3 *& S3 Lana Bryner

RE: Phone call last
night

Wed Jan 11,2006 5k

B

RE: Re: Mediation

Tue Jan 17, 2006 5k

*> 63 Lana Bryner
MailerDaemon©

M Message status
*'
undeliverable
CRSLAW.COM

Wed Jan 11,2006 2k

3

MailerDaemon©
CRSUVWCOM

#

T h u J a n 1 2 , 2Q06

EJ

Roger Bryner

# Subpoenas

•

Roger Bryner & BRYNER Objection Wed Sep 28, 2005 102k

0

Roger Bryner

•

Roger Bryner § J g i J g g ^

E3

..
. .
Message status ^deliverable

# %£*™R

2k

Tue Sep 06, 2005 224k

Wed Sep 28, 2005 97k

Wed Sep 28, 2005 2126k

stay pending

Exhibits p. 42

Page l o t 2

Yahoo* Mail - brynervbryn^r^vahoo.com

TOOEiOOlMAlL

Print - Close Window

Subiact: RF! Communication with Children
Date:

Thu, 5 Jan 2006 08:05:30 -0700

From:

M

To:

"Roger Bryner" <brynervbryner@yahoo.com>

CC:

"EMILY BROADHEAD SMOAK (E-mail)" <EMILY@crslaw.com>, kim@icw.com

Lana Bryner" <LBryner@sico.org>

The reason why I called 15 times in a row is that each time I called, you answered the phone and immediately
hang up on me. When you didn't answer the phone and I got the voice mail, I left the message that "I am calling
to talk to the kids" and never called back again. I will call today at 7:00 pm (but just once), if you donl answer
the phone, I will assume that you elect that neither of us is going to talk to the children. So far there was not one
occasion when you allowed me to talk to the children when I call. I always have to leave a message and wait for
the children to call me back, and on one occasion I never received the call back.
—Original Message—
From: Roger Bryner [mailto:brynervbryner@yahoo.com]
Sent: Thursday, January 05, 2006 6:46 AM
To: EMILY BROADHEAD SMOAK
Cc: kim@icw.com; Lana Bryner
Subject: Re: Communication with Children
Emily, Svetlana called about 15 times in a row exactly at 7:00. Neither myself or the Children
could take the call at that time. This behavior of back to back calls is harassment.
Less than 10 minutes later the children called her and had a conversation with her.
The only thing different about me and her is that I have never called 15 times in a row back to back
as non-stop harassment, and as I am a man I would be in Jail if I did.
The children will call Svetlana at 7:00-7:15p.m. I expect her to do the same for me. Honestly they
should be able to call the other parent any time. I am willing to set up a dedicated line for the
children, or a chat program on their computer, that they can use whenever they like to talk to their
mother. Is Svetlana willing to do this?
EMILY BROADHEAD SMOAK <EMILV@crslaw.com> wrote:
I Dear Roger. I understand there was a problem with Lana reaching the children last night.
As I understand it, you both have the right to talk to the children on Tuesdays, Thursdays
and Sundays at 7pm when the children are with the other parent. Lana will try to call
again at 7pm on Thursday. If she does not reach the children, she will assume that from
now on, neither of you is going to speak with the children during your off week. If you
want to talk to the boys during your off week, you need to allow Lana the same courtesy.
Emily
Emily Broadhead Smoak
257 East 200 South
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(801) 532-2666
(801) 355-1813 fax
(800) 339-2660
(801) 355-1813 (FAX)
This is a confidential communication
I from Cohne, Rappaport & Segal and

Exhibits p. 43
2/23/2006

BIN date
Account tiumodr
Invoice number

Page 7 of 9

January 15,2O06
365567324-00001
2010*1113ft

U s a g e detail c o n t i n u e d
in Yotir Home Area
180 0'/03 07 OOP

P

Murray

UT

\8D 1/556-0065 Incoming

CL

A

I nek; & d

1ft!
"52
163
184
1&5

3''0J
0-/03
dim
01'OS
fJi*J3

07 01P
07 0 ' P
07 02P
07 02P
G"02P

P
P
P
P
P

1
1
J

Murray
Murray

UT
UT

(801)55e-00«5
(801)556-0065
(&01*556-0055
(aoi)£5eoo65
{801)556-0065

Incoming
Incoming
Inccnrung
incoming
Incoming

CL
CL
CL
CL
CL

A
A
A
A
A

IncfciCkx)

00

included

00
00
00
00

00
OG
00
00
DC

*1

Murray
Murray
Mu'ray

UT
UT
UT

1B8
1S7
166
leu
170

Q','03
QrfO&
F«J3
ym
0'A13

07 03P
0'03P
07 03P
0^03P
07 04P

P
P
P
P
P

1
1
1
1
1

Vurray
Murray
S*lt Law?
Murray
Murray

UT
UT
UT
UT
UT

(801)556-0065 incoming
(801)556 006S incoming
(801)556-0065 Irtcom-ng

A
A
A
A
A

Induced

(601)258-0085 tnoonrtng
(501)550-0065 InCO^JDO

CL
CL
CL
CL
CL

Include

00
00
00
00
00

00
00
00
00
00

171
17a
173
174

CT/03
TfQZ
01/03
0 /fl3

0705P
07 05P
D705P
0 7 QBP

P
P
P
P

1
?
1
6

Murray
S*t Lake
Murray
Murfav

UT
UT
UT
UT

(801)556-0065
(801)556-0065
(801,556-006$
,801)944-3308

CL
CL
CL
UT

A
A
A
A

Jncfu4*d
Included
Included
Incfewfed

00
00
00
00

00
00
00
00

incoming
Incoming
Incomms
CodWTWOCKf

Bin date
Account number
Invoice number

included
Inckded
Inducted

Included
Included
Included
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January 15,20G*
565567$24-00001
2010611136

U s a g e detail continued ~.
in Your Home Area
253 0 1 J 1 5 OaOUA
254 OV15 C£07A
255 0-/16 08 08A

W
W
W

SaltLaxe
$a:tl9«a
Sail lane

UT
UT
UT

(8G1)S42B?t5 Jncomtffi
(ao*)M2-0??5 incomes
(501)642 9715 I n c o m e

CL
CI
CL

258
257
258
250
230

W
W

SaU Lake
SeltUk*
Sal! UK*
SatfL««e
SattUrt*

UT
UT
UT
tjrr
UT

/801>fi»i2&?15
(801)642-0715
(B01)»42 9^15
(801)942^715
(80D&42-9715

Incomes
incoming
Incornma
Incomwg,
InconwC

CL
CL
CL
CL
CL

Sail lake

UT

(S0HM2-MT1S incoming

CL

0</15
01/^5
01/15
0</15
01/15

0B08A
QSOdA
08 094
0810*
OBtOA

261 01/15 06 HA

w
w
w

Y
Y
Y

inc'uded
inctatod
tndudad
.neludsrf
inducted
'ruaudad
'nciudad

Y

00
00
00

00
00
00

00
00
00
00

00
00
00
00

00

00
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01/09/06
13:54

Midvale Police Department
LAW Incident Table:

Page:

2829
1

Case Number: 06B000074
Image:
Nature: PRO ORD VIOL
Other Number:
Area: MVPD7 Midvale Area 7
Addr 1037 E WATERCRESS LN; 6995 S; 2x
Contact: bryner,roger
City; MIDVALE
St: UT Zip: 84047
+- Complainant: Cl-26282
j Lst: Bryner
Fst: Roger
Mid: S.
I
| DOB: 05/30/67
SSN: 528-41-7656 Adr 1037 E WATERCRESS LN; 6945 S; #2x
! Rac: W Sx: M Tel: (801)255-7729 Cty: Midvale
St: UT Zip: 84047
Offense Codes: POV
Reported:
Observed: POV
Circumstances: BM99 LT20 RSE
Rspndg Officers: BENNETT, KRESDO
Agency: MVPD
CAD Call IP: C2125984
Rspnsbl Officer: Argueta, Jose
Last RadLog: 15:27:07 01/04/06
24
Received By: ARBALLO, R
Clearance:
How Received: R Radio Trans.
Disposition: ECV Disp Date: 01/05/06
When Reported: 14:10:47 01/04/06
NIBRS done by:
Occurrd between: 14:07:49 01/04/06
Approved by: K Yurgelon
and: 14:07:49 01/04/06
MO:
Synopsis: (See below)
(See below)
Narrative: (See below}

INVOI.VEMENTS:
Type Record #
01-26282
NM
01-26282
NM
06-00129
NM
C2125984
CA

Date
/ /
/ /
/ /
01/04/06

Description
Bryner, Roger S.
Bryner, Roger S.
Bryner, Svetlana
14:10 01/04/06 HARASSMENT

LAW Incident Offenses Detail:
Offense Codes
Seq Code
1 POV Protective Order Violation

Relationship
^Complainant
victim
suspect
^Initiating Call

Amount
0.00

LAW Incident Circumstances:
Contributing Circumstances

Seq Code

Comments

1 BM99
2 LT20

Unknown Bias
Residence/Home

3 RSE

Victim '^as

Spouse

LAW Incident Responders Detail
Responding Officers
Seq Name
Unit
1 BENNETT, KRESDO 2P43
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Main Radio Log Table:
Time/Date
Typ
15:27:07 01/04/06
1
15:06:35 01/04/06
1
15:06:35 01/04/06
1
14:23:42 01/04/06
1
14:23:42 01/04/06
1
14:11.-33 01/04/06
1
14:11:33 01/04/06
1

Unit
2P43
2P43
2P43
2P43
2P43
2P43
2P43

Code

Zone

MVE
BUSY MVE
BUSY MVE
ARRVD MVE
ARRVD MVE
ENRT MVE
ENRT MVE
24

Agnc
MVPD
MVPD
MVPD
MVPD
MVPD
MVPD
MVPD

Description
incid#«06B000074
incid#^06B000074
incid#~06B000074
incid#=06B000074
incid#~06B000074
ER call=7541
ER call=7541

Assignment Co
Busy disp:LF
Busy disp:LF
Arrived on sc
Arrived on sc
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Narrative:
Ex-Wife called victim repeatedly.
requested No charges to be filed.

Victim has stalking injunction in place and

t Start 01/04/2006 15:09:35]
[ End 01/04/2006 15:09:35]
[ Start 01/04/2006 15:30:04]
nature: PRO ORD VIOL
not overwritten by : HARASSMENT
locatn: MVPD7 not overwritten by : MID
howrc: R not overwritten by : T
dispos: ACT not overwritten by : LF
[ End 01/04/2006 15:30:04]

Exhibits p. 47

13. SUSPECT STATEMENT:
The susoect SVETLANA Bryner said she did make repeat phone calls to
ROGER on 1/3/05" in the attempt to speak with her children. SVETLANA said her
custody order from the judge allows her to make phone contact with the children
on every other day at 17:00 hours. SVETLANA also stated that the Civil
Stalking Injunction had been dismissed on Dec 19 2005 by the judge.
No documents were provided to confirm the Injunction had been dismissed.
14. EVIDENCE:
None at this time. ROGER said he would provide telephone records as
soon as they were available.
15. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:
I informed the victim advocates of this incident and the victim being
uncooperative.
16. ARREST AND OR CITATION INFORMATION:
None at this time.
Date, time, reporting officer:
Wed Jan 04 15:22:06 MST 2006 K.Bennett
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Law Supplemental Narrative:
Supplemental Narratives
Sea Name
Date
Narrative
1 Bennett, Kresdo 15:12:02 01/04/06
Reporting Officer:K.Bennett
Midvale Police Department
Case Narrative
Case Number .-06B000074
1.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INCIDENT:
Yes- Ex Wife vs Ex Husband

2.

METHOD OF OFFENSE:
Telephone harassment.

3.

THREAT DOCUMENTATION:
None.

4.

THREAT TRACE:
None, Victim said he would provide telephone records of the incident.

5.

VICTIM ACTIVITY PRIOR TO OFFENSE:
Unknown.

6.

VICTIM ACTIVITY DURING OFFENSE:
Was receiving phone calls by his ex-wife.

7.

SUSPECT ACTIVITY PRIOR TO OFFENSE:
Unknown.

3.

SUSPECT ACTIONS DURING THE OFFENSE:
Placing back to back phone calls to the victim in attempt to speak with
children.
9.

RELATIONSHIP OF VICTIM AND SUSPECT:
Ex-Spouses.

10. EXACT STATEMENT OF SUSPECT:
No statements were made during this incident.
not answer the phone calls by the suspect.

The victim stated he did

11. SUSPECT VOICE:
None.
12. STATEMENT OF INVOLVED PARTIES:
The victim ROGER Bryner said on 1/3/05 at 18:50 his ex-wife SVETLANA
Bryner made 15 back to back phone calls to his phone. ROGER said he did not
answer any of the calls but did eventually receive a voice mail from SVETLANA
requesting to speak with the children.
ROGER said he does have a Civil Stalking Injunction against SVETLANA.
ROGER was informed that charges would be filed against SVETLANA for the
violation, ROGER said he did NOT want to press charges and would testify in
behalf of SVETLANA. ROGER said he only wanted this incident documented.
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Roger Bryner
1042 East Ft Union Blvd #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
801-255-7729
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROGER BRYNER
Petitioner^

EX PARTE CIVIL
STALKING INJUNCTION

vs.

Case No.

SVETLANA BRYNER

Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN

Respondent

Attention: This is an official court order* If you disobey this order, the court may find
you in contempt You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and
any other crime you may have committed in disobeying this order.

This injunction will be presumed valid until superseded by a
Subsequent order.
The court has reviewed Petitioner's Petition for Stalking Injunction and has determined
that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred and the Respondent is
the stalkerPursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a~101, the court therefore orders as follows:
1. The Respondent is enjoined from stalking Petitioner. According to Utah Code
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Ann. § 77-3a-106.5. Stalking is defined as follows:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats
implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person
who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household
within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer
emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member of
his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his immediate
family.
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions,
or intentionally or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction
issued pursuant to this section.
2. Respondent is enjoined from going near the following addresses frequented by
Petitioner:
Residence: Springs of Country Woods, Watercress Lane, Midvale UT 84047.
Work: Eagle Gate Plaza in Salt Lake; 4505 Wasatch Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT.
School: St SoplurStri*™! at 5341 HigfSand DT Salt Lake City, UT.
Other places frequented^y^ijKSner (describe): Smiths Grocery store 980 Fort Union Blvd,
Midvale, UT; Chilis 1070 E^Wqion Blvd Midvale, UT; Hoppers Seafood & Grill, 890 Fort
Union Blvd, M i d v a I e , J ^ F a m o u ^ ^ 1166 Fort Union Blvd, Midvale, UT; Dans, 2029
Fort Union Blvd S^klake City, UT; T&fcMail Center, 1042 East Ft. Union Blvd, Midvale,
UT; Kinko's Wfl East Ft. Union Blvd, Mictate, UT; Office Max, 1016 Fort Union Blvd,
Midvale, U#Jungle Jim's Playland (801) 568-lHL 739 Fort Union Blvd, Midvale, UT
84047; if^phet Elias Church 5335 S. Highland Dr. HbJJaday, UT 84117; Olive Garden 6305
S Statist, Murray, UT 84107;

3. Respondent is restrained from contacting the Petitioner, directly or indirectly,
through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic means, and the
Respondent is restrained from contacting the following persons:
AayJtilinx €oiporation Employee or it'o any of itV Jiulribuluu arsalt& reja^cuUli'.^, The tlllldrtfl While they'are on tfiBTfliniie'w& th^r fathcrt
—^
4. Other;
a) Respondent will not harass Petitioner's through his work.
b) Respondent wiitTTOt^ubmit any aim u fuluc icpom
c) Respondent urill simrndq' ^11 photographs of K
d) B«pgnnfc«t will u i * * p y n n ^ f n g a p l y ^ T g B o M PfeUUaneSf ImilUdhlM by UMllfe • '

pi i v alt inv csiigatefsr—*—^
_
cjrRcapouduil will mil i>al 1M uadyiiLU m U 'rigfete during dft>{> Off of ditrefa&kea-.
Notice to Respondent:
a. You may request, in writing, a hearing to contest this order.
b. You must file your request at the following Courthouse:
c. The bearing should be requested within 10 days from the date that the order is
served on you*
d. If you fail to request a hearing within 10 days, this order will become a civil
stalking injunction which will not expire until 3 years after it is served
e. You may request a hearing after the 10 day period, but you will have the burden
of challenging the injunction.

DATED this / ^ d a y of

^£fl/?2O0g?~
MfnVA

Serve Respondent at:
Street: 6751 south 2300 east
City/Town: Cottonwood
State, Zip: Utah, 84221
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals needing special accommodations
(including auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this proceeding should call the Clerk of
the Court immediately upon receipt of this notice.
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CASE NO.

D5D?!(f$®1^^

INFORMATION SHEET
(This information must be attached to the protective order)
(Fill out information as completely as possible. Please write cleariy)
* * * * * * * * *

Respondent's name:

A \/(^t/^Ayi^

Alias/nickname^:

fjSY/W

j^O[ ?\^

^

Date of birth: * ^ 7 ^ / 7 ^

^Z rup-^TA, / J^p y - & fc>txsy<?c*

SSN:

?

Home address:
Home phone: 4 H H~5?dg
Employer's name:

J>& lj~

Work: ST/'M6^0**;
( & \*&

W ?

^3T4%

C&UsiA \V

Employer's address: „
Oth*T addresses tfcat Respondent Sreqnents:
Age:
Weight:

55
\h U

Race:

/TA^/S

%
>ts»*^v

Height: £~~ feet

Special characteristics/Tattoos/Scars/etc:

% inches

<T/Afi1 ckJ

\r

Make, Model, Color and License no. of vehicle(s):

flAt f#**

Hair color:

Wk*+&„

fs ^ **4 &

.

Eye color: /L $>*+*, ^
/^>^u^ 7 ^

A^/T'

IA*ITS^

& $4 /

*~?*j <? fc&JL

Access to weapons/Violent history (prior violence): ~~ *-&. £ J? t**\ y

A/x<

tn* cfc f-£rz^7J &f violet**^
Additional information:
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FILES QiSTBlCT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN - % 2QQ6

Kathleen G. Arnovick #8968
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 211
Holladay, OT 84117
Telephone: (801)272-2373
Facsimile: (801}424-9137
Attorney for Petitioner

N j

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By-HLZ

Deputy Cfcrk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,

vs.
SVETLANA BRYNER,

:
:
Petitioner, :
:

MOTION AND ORDER TO DISMISS
WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM

:
:
Respondent«. :

Case No. 050916389
Judge Deno flimonas

COMES NOW, Petitioner, by and through his counsel of record, KATHLEEN
G. ARNOVICK and hereby moves the Court to dismiss the above-entitled matter
without prejudice.

The reasons for this Motion are a good faith effort to

end the disputes and ongoing litigation between the parties.
DATED this 19th day of December, 2005-

Kathleen G. Arnovick
Attorney for Petitioner
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^3

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Motion, the above-entitled matter is

dismissed

without prejudice.
DATED this

Y

day of

^€^5^^7^2005.

BY THE COORT:

Third District

4 CEflTlFYTHAT THIS 4&*T8t$lD0frf tflf
THfcTfffRD D&TfllCf C&QWSAU UfoE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Motion and Order for Continuance, this |^v^ciay of December, 2005, by
depositing the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the
following:
Emily Broadhead Smoak
Cohne Rappaport & Segal, PC
Attorney for Respondent
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHILD CUSTODY
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE
REPORT

Svetlana "Lana" Bryner
Petitioner
vs.

Case No.
044904183
Judge Dino Himonas
Commissioner Michelle Btomquist

Roger Scott Bryner
Respondent

APPOINTED CUSTODY EVALUATOR:
DATE REPORT COMPLETED:

Kim D. Peterson. M.S.W.
September 3. 2005

MINOR CHILD(REN) & DATES OF BIRTH:

Alex, age 8 (DQB:4-I9-9A Andy, age 6.

(DOB: 3-14-991
MOTHER:

Lana Bryner

FATHER:

Roger Bryner

OTHER PARTIES EVALUATED AND RELATIONSHIP TO CHILDREN:
(E.g. stepparent, parent's partner)
None
GUARDIAN ad LITEM:

Kim M, Luhn

MOTHER'S COUNSEL

David S Polowtte

FATHER'S COUNSEL

Steven C Russell
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L/jP

KIM D, PETERSON, M.S.WLICENSED CUNICAL SOCIAL WORKER
P O Box 58867
Salt lake City, UT 84158-0867
30L556.8021
Pax: 435.608.1067
kimp&terson{g}sisna.com

CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Children's Needs
The children's basic needs include: nutrition, shelter and medical
care* They need nurturing and support; as well as attention and positive
interaction with parents and significant others. They need appropriate,
guidance, structure and discipline and positive role models who will
teach them values and appropriate conduct They need educational
support as well as support for their emotional development The
children need to be raised in a stable environment; free of family
dysfunction or significant parental impairments where their relationship
with each parent \s supported.

Child Custody Evaluation Settlement Conference Continued
BiynervsBryncr

B.

Summary of each parent and Step-parenf s Ability and Propensity
to Provide for the Children's Needs.
Mother. There is a disagreement between the parents
regarding who the primary care giver was during the marriage. Based
on observation of others, as well as the children's report, it appears as
though the parents, for the most part, more or less shared equally in the
care of the children. However, it appears as though Una was more
involved in tasks, such as getting the children to medical appointments
and, previously transporting them to day care Lana has adequate
parenting skills and she appears, by and large, to meet the children's

Father.
Roger also claims that he has been the children's
primary care giver and* because he has workedfromhome, it is likely he
did infeet,have more time to parent prior to the separation and one of
the teachers at school indicates he was the parent most likely to bring

U>«b

Child Custody Evaluates Setttemeftt Conference Continued
Bryner ys Bryncr
P*ge4

presents with adequate parenting skills and he meets the children's bask:
needs. Roger presents as attentive and he has spent a lot of time doing
things with the children and involving them in enriching activities. He
has placed a lot of emphasis on helping the children academically and, for
Roger, teaching the children is fun, rather than a chore. Roger appears
to have adequate disciplinary skills and the children have a good

Impairments:
Both parents have negative traits, but neither presents
with emotional and/or behavioral deficits significant enough to
preclude them from being the children's custodial parent
Availability:

Both parents work full-time, tn addition, Lana runs a read
estate business and is involved in managing several investment
properties. On the other hand, Rpger works primarily from his
home and has a moreflexibleschedule and consequently, he is
more available to parent
Facilitating a Relationship with the Other Pwrmnk
Shortly after the separation, the parents appeared to be

Exhibits p. 60

Lr°1

Child Custody Evaiuatw Settlement Conference Continued
Bryner vs Bryner

cooperating and supporting the children's relationship with each
other. That, however, fell apart when Lana wanted to take the
children on vacation to Russia, something they had been planning
on doing for a long time, Roger was fearful that Lana would keep
the children \n Russia and, because it is not a member of the
Hauge Convention, he decided to keep the childrenfromher to
prevent her from leaving. Since then, things have been v&ry
contentious between Lana and Roger. Both are angry and
distrustful of the other and they are no longer able to

Lana, however, appears to be the more controlling and
vindictive parent It is noteworthy, that at onetime,they had
talked about a joint custody arrangement and Unas attorney had
even prepared the paper work for it She is now totally opposed
to joint custody which appears to be pay back for Roger's
decision to keep the childrenfromher and interfering with her
taking them to Russia. Lana now appears obstructionistic and she
wants to limit Roger's time with the children and, she has been
opposed to Roger caring for the children between the time they
are out of school and when she is off work. She also opposes
firstrightof refusal or Roger coming to the school to have lunch
with the children, except on a limited basis. In comparison,
Roger seems to have a better understanding of the importance of

likely to support the children's relatiortship with the other parent
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Child Custody Evaluation S&demestt Conference Continued
Brynervs Bryntr

Unique Fit Between Child's Needs and Parent's
Capabilities:

The major difference which
needs to be taken into consideration in developing die parenting
plan )s the fact that Roger works from home and has more
flexibility and is more available during the time the children are
out of school prior to Lana getting off work.
Rule-4-903 Considerations
1.

Chad's Preference

The children were interviewed twice. During the first interview
Alec indicated a preference to live with his father, whereas, Andy
indicated he wanted to live with both parents. During the second
interview, both children were unsure who they would rather spend
more time with. It should be noted that both children indicate they
want to see theirfathermorefrequentlythan they do currently,
2.

Benefit of Keeping Children Together.
The children are closely bonded to each other and there is
no reason to consider separating them.

3.

Relative Strength of the Children's Bond to One or Both of the
Prospective Custodians.
The children were somewhat more positive about their

ChM Custody Evaluation Settiement Confer*!** Continued
Brynar vs Bryner

4.

General Interest of Continuing Previously Determined Custody
Arrangements Where the Children are Happy and Well
Adjusted.

opinion, the parenting plan could be revised in ways that would
work better for the children. The children would like to spend
more time with their father and, in as much as he is more
available and has a more flexible schedule, this needs to be
incorporated in the parenting plan.
5.

Factors Relating to the Prospective Custodians Character or
Status or Their Capacity or Willingness to Function as Parents,
including:
I.

Moral Character and Emotional Stability.
It appears as though Lana experienced anxiety
symptoms towards the end of her relationship with Roger.

are negative traits which need to be considered. Lana has
been harboring a considerable amount of anger towards
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Child Custody Evaluation Settlement Conference Continued
Biyrver vs Bryner

Page8

Roger and she appearsrigidand vindictive in how she deals
with him. Her behavior in that regard, has interfered with
her ability to parent.

Roger presents as extremely intelligent, but
he comes across as somewhat "odd" and lacking socially.
He seems a bit paranoid or at least "distrustful" and he
comes across as self-centered, arrogant and somewhat
rebellious, k appears as though Roger does not like, being
told what to do and, since his time with the children has
been limited, he has subsequently been veryfrustratedand
angry. Never-the-less, Roger's emotional and behavioral
difficulties do not preclude him from being the custodial
parent.

it

Duration and Depth of Desire for Custody.
Shordy following the separation, die parents
discussed and agreed to joint legal and physical custody.
However, after the incident where Roger kept the children
from Una, their agreement fell apart Currently, Lana has
a strong desire to be the children's primary custodian. She
has some legitimate concerns about Roger, but anger and
wanting control appear to be her primary motivation.
When I initially met with Roger, he expressed a
desire for he and Lana to share joint legal and physical
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Child Custody Evaluation Settlement Conference Continued
Brynervs Bryner

custody. He has since vacillated on his position somewhat
and at one time, he talked about agreeing to Lana having
custody as long as he ted increased parent time.
Currently, he would like to see a joint physical custody
arrangement; but he feels he should be granted legal
custody. This way Lana would not be able to limit his time
with the children, and he would be much fairer and more
likely to support the children's relationship with the other
parent

ill.

Ability to Provide Personal Rather than Surrogate Care.
Roger's work schedule makes him more available to
parent the children. As indicated above, he works from
home most days and he has considerable flexibility in his

schedule. HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH

; the amount of time her real estate business and
property management takes. Never-the-less, she has less
flexibility and her responsibilities are more time consuming
and the bottom line is that Roger is less reliant on
surrogate care.
rv.

Significant Impairment of Ability to Function as a Parent
Through Drug Abuse, Excessive Drinking or Other
Causes.
Una reports sporadically using marijuana when
much younger. There are allegations of Lana drinking too Exhibits D. 6 5

~?4

Chad Custody Evaluation Settlement Conference Continued
Bryner vs Bryner

v.

Reasons for Having Relinquished Custody n the Past
Neither parent has ever voluntarily relinquished
custody.

vi.

Religious Compatibility With the Children.
The parents and the children do not participate in
any organized religion and this is not a factor in this case.

vil

Kinship, Including Extraordinary Circumstances and Stepparent Status.

viil

Financial Condition.
Both parents have adequate income to take care of
the children and meet their needs.

ChiW Custody Evaluation Settlement Conference Commuad
toyriGr v& Btyn&r
PSige II

be

Evidence of Abuse of Subject Child and Subject Spouse.

[there is no indication that he has ever
actually physically abused Lana. Both parents allege the
other has been abusive to the children, but there is
insufficient data to support such a conclusion.
Other Factors Deemed Important by the Evatuator, Other Parties
or the Court
Since the time of the separation the parent's negative
feelings about each other has escalated and die allegations they
make about each other appear to be blown out of proportion.
When ever one makes wft allegation, the odher parent appears to
retaliate by making additional allegations and a vicious cycle has
emerged- The parents need to realize their conflict is likely to
hurt the children more than the other parent and they need to
resolve their differences and establish a parenting plan. Both
parents love the children a great deal and are concerned for their
welfare and both contribute to their well being, growth and
development The parenting plan needs to take advantage of each
parent's strengths and they need to stop focusing on each other's
weaknesses. Each of the parents would benefitfromindividual
psychotherapy to help them resolve negative feelings and to learn
how to keep the children out of the middle The appointment of
a Special Master or Parenting Plan Coordinator would also be of
benefit
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER
Petitioner,

CASE HISTORY

vs.

Case No: 050916389 SK

SVETLANA BRYNER

Judge:
Date:

Respondent.

DENO HIMONAS
Jan. 12, 2006

CASE DISPOSITION
01/04/2006 Dismsd w/o prejudice by Judge DENO HIMONAS

tzodnf% STATE Of,14w^
reBtfryr

Page 1 ( l a s t )
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385216

1042 East Ft. Union Blvd #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
801-255-7729

M^^S^
CONSTABUE BBTZ, SA.LT U#E COUNTY UTAH
DCTIITV .^-

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Xtfjp

ROGER BRYNER

EX PARTE CIVIL

Petitioner,
vs.

§

cS

STALKING INJUNCTION 5

"*

3

Case No.

SVETLANA BRYNER
Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN
Respondent

,

Attention: This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find
you in contempt You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and
any other crime you may have committed in disobeying this order.

This injunction will be presumed valid until superseded by a
Subsequent order.
The court has reviewed Petitioner's Petition for Stalking Injunction and has determined
that there is reason to believe that an offense ofotalking has occurred and the Respondent is
the stalker.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101, the court therefore orders as follows:
1. The Respondent is enjoined from stalking Petitioner. According to Utah Code
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^G^
Roger Biyner
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
801-255-7729
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IMAGFn

ROGER BRYNER
EXPARTB CIVIL
STALKING INJUNCTION

Petitioner,
vs.

CaseNo.#S©?/£38^

SVETLANA BRYNER

Judge ANTHONY 8. QUiNM

S

^

Respondent

Attention: This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find
you in contempt You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and
any other crime you may have committed in disobeying this order.

This injunction will be presumed valid until superseded by a
Subsequent order.
The court has reviewed Petitioner's Petition for Stalking Injunction and has determined
that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred and the Respondent is
the stalker.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101, the court therefore orders as follows:
1. The Respondent is enjoined from stalking Petitioner. According to Utah Code

HD17M9002

050918388

a*™* 5 "™"
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Ann. § 77-3a-106*5. Stalking is defined as follows:
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats
implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person
who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household
within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will suffer
emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member of
his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his immediate
family.
(3) A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions,
or intentionally or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction
issued pursuant to this section.
2. Respondent is enjoined from going near the following addressesfrequentedby
Petitioner
Residence: Springs of Country Woods, Watercress Lane, Midvale UT 84047.
Work: Eagle Gate Plaza in Salt Lake; 4505 Wasatch Blvd, Salt Lake City, UT.
School: St. SoplurSebQol at 5341 Higf&and Dr Salt Lake City, UT.
Other places frequented^5^Ji<iaer (describe): Smiths Grocery store 980 Fort Union Blvd,
Midvale, UT; Chilis i 0 7 0 F ^ k 4 o n Blvd Midvale, UT; Hoppers Seafood & Grill, 890 Fort
Union Blvd, Midvale,J^PfFamous^ye's 1166 Fort Union Blvd, Midvale, UT; Dans, 2029
Fort Union Blvd S^ktake City, UT; TfesMail Center, 1042 East Ft. Union Blvd, Midvale,
UT; Kioto's IptfEast Ft. Union Blvd, MiSv^Je, UT; Office Max, 1016 Fort Union Blvd,
Midvale, U^Jungle Jim's Playland (801) 568-msL 739 Fort Union Blvd, Midvale, UT
84047^phet Elias Church 5335 S. Highland Dr. Hb^aday, UT 84117; Olive Garden 6305
S StatSSt,Murray, UT84107;
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3. Respondent is restrained from contacting the Petitioner, directly or indirectly,
through any form of communication mcluding wntten, oral, or electronic means, and the
Respondent is restrained from contacting the following persons:
AajLXilinxGorporQtion Employoo or if oftiiyof ifii dutrfljutuis unadca reprfrggatativoa; The children While they are on (h^ phone with their fatbcf?
—*
4. Other
a) Respondent will not harass Petitioner's through his work.
b) Respeudoil willflblrahmitany moro false l'cpottfl.
C) Bpfionrfant nnfl rnTrrPTifor ? ] | pftntQgraohs of 1
d) R*fipriru1i.Hl will .n»Lxpy ori Ytyrtn^f*r~^hArA

V>MU)i\iwr miWiuWiy hy UKIHU - '

private invesliguiuiiL "*
e^MReapondciit will net exit herresidanuo01 bi visible duririg drop'6ffoftfarehildrea.
Notice to Respondent:
a. You may request, in writing, a hearing to contest this order.
b. You must file your request at the following Courthouse:
c. The hearing should be requested within 10 daysfromthe date that the order is
served on you.
d If you fail to request a hearing within 10 days, this order will become a civil
stalking injunction which will not expire until 3 years after it is served
e. You may request a hearing after the 10 day period, but you will have the burden
of challenging the injunction.
DATED this /f'day of_

4^2C200£T~

Serve Respondent at:
Street: 6751 south 2300 east
City/Town: Cottonwood
State, Zip: Utah, 84121

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE
AN OWG1MAL DOCUMENT ~
THfcTWJQ QISTHICT COr~
C0$H7%
O*
COONT4 STATE OR

;^

fuutL

OSBgTY Ci

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities
(including auxiliary communicative aids and services,
the Court immediately upon receipt of this notice

; special accommodations
Eeding should call the Clerk of
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I, MATTHEW FERRE
being first duly sworn on oath and say: I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, SALT LAKE County, State of UT, a citizen of the
United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service herein, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the wrthin and hereto annexed,
EX PARTE CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION
& BLANK REQUEST FOR HEARING
ADDITIONAL ARTICLES LISTED IN NOTES

on September 26,2005 , and served the same upon
SVETLANA BRYNER
a ui/miin named Defendant in said artlcle(s) by serving a true copy of said ar&'cle(s) for the defendant with
SVETLANA BRYNER (PERSONALLY)
a person of suitable age and discretion there residing at
2001 S STATE ST. #S3200, SALT LAKE CITY
his/her usual place of BUSINESS,

on September 27,2005

I further certify that at the time of service of the said article(s), 1 endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and
official title thereto.
on September 27,2005

-^&£~——
SL8S6

Deputy

ROBERT J. REITZ, CONSTABLE. SALT LAKE County
7026 SOUTH COMMERCE PARK DR. SUfTE 1-B, MIDVALE, UT 84047,801-255-5468

MILEAGE CHARGE:
SERVICE CHARGES:

6.00
15.00

TOTAL CHARGES:

$21.00

NOTES
ADDITIONAL ARTICLES: INFORMATION SHEET, AND EXHIBITS.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,
RULING and ORDER

Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 050916389

SVETLANA BRYNER,
Hon. Deno G. EBmonas
Respondent.

Before the Court is Petitioner's Objection to Request [for] Hearing to Contest Civil Stalking
Injunction (the "Objection"). The Court denies &e Objection and sots a two (2) hour evidentiary
hearing on the civil stalking injunction for 10:00 a m , November 3,2005.
DATED this 25th day of October, 2005.
BYTHEtfOURT:

IAS
District Court Judge

I CBfTOFY THAT THIS
m,*m&$$frti
MH ORIGINAL D O C U W ^ ^ T ^ I t ^
THeTHCRO DISTRICT CGtfll*$M.T LAKE
COGfoTY, STATE Of* UT#"
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FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

NOV 1 5 2015
IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
ooOoo
Roger Bryner,
ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 20050992-CA
v.

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Svetlana Bryner,

NOV t 8 2QG5

Respondent.

SALT LAKE COUNT^

By.

DepjJtv^Clerk

Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thome.
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Respondent has requested
costs and attorney fees associated with responding to the
petition.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is denied. IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's
request of costs and attorney fees is denied.
Dated this

day of November, 2005.

FOR THE COURT:

4^yf
William A. Thome J r .

I CERTIFY THAT THIS l & * T * U £ COPY C$
AN ORIGINAL OOCUM£fct WT FltF*l&
TH£ THfflD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAfcfe
COUNTY STATE OF UTAH,

OAT6

UUfOl
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on November 16, 2005, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
ROGER BRYNER
1042 FT UNION BLVD APT 330
MIDVALE UT 84047
EMILY A BROADHEAD-SMOAK
COHNE RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
257 E 200 S STE 700
PO BOX 11008
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: SOPHIE ORVTN / JODI BAILEY
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this November 16, 2005.

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20050992
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 050916389
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Roger Bryner
1042 East Ft Union Blvd #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
801-255-7729
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROGER BRYNER
;
Petitioner,
vs.
SVETLANA BRYNER
Respondent

]i
i
]
i
]
I
'

ORDER ON OCTOBER 19th
HEARING
Case No. 050916389
Judge Hilder

The matter before the court is a hearing to see if agreement between the parties in this
case could be reached and if not to accommodate farther proceedings. Appearing for
Respondent was Emily Broadhead Smoak of the firm of Cohne Rappaport and Segal
Petitioner appeared and acted as his own counsel Upon review of the issues before the court
it is the ruling of the court that:
1) Agreement between the parties was not reached on the restraining order against
Respondent
2) Upon it's own motion, the court quashes the Subpoenas of Arline Johnson and
Felix McGowan making an hearing on Respondent's motion to quash moot.
3) Petitioner is not to deliver documents in this case by hand to Conne, Rappaport
and Segal's office, but may deliver pleadings by fax, mail or commercial messenger. Delivery
by fax is considered equivalent to delivery by hand
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4) Acting as Presiding Judge for the day, the Court ordered case reassigned to Judge
Himonas for any further proceedings.

5) Petitioner was admonished to not serve any subpoenas himself, unless they were to
attorneys.

Dated this / * / day

o^W^^^2005.

District Court Judge

^&w

i CBHwy^rmr THIS IS A rwEcofr a#.
MOmt^HM DOCUMENT ON FlLE.Itt

THE rmip Disiwct COURT, SALT LA'KH
COUNTY? STATE OF UTAH,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND FACSIMILE
I certify that on the g [ da^of October, 2005,1 did cause to be delivered by facsimile
and byfirstclass mail, postage prepaid, the forgoing document to the Mowing persons.
David S Dolowitz
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147-0008
By Fax 801-355-1813

Emily BroadHead Smoat
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147-0008
Fax 801-355-1813

A. Howard Lundgren
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147-0008
Fax 801-355-1813

Dana Serandos
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
257 E 200 S, Suite 700
Box 11008
SLC, UT 84147-0008
Fax 801-355-1813
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FILER DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

NOV - 9 2005

A. HOWARD LUNDGREN (Bar No. 2022)
EMILY BROADHEAD SMOAK (Bar No. 9831)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 700
P.O.Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Facsimile (801) 355-1813
Attorneys for Petitioner

»i|

SALT LAKE COUNTY
J

Deputy Gterk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR STAY
PENDING PETITION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

Petitioner,

:

v.

:
:

Civil No. 050916389

:

Judge: Himonas

SVETLANABRYNER,
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Judge Himonas, presiding, by telephonic
conference on Tuesday, November 1, 2005. Petitioner appeared through his attorney Kathleen
Amovick. Emily BroadheadSmoak appeared on behalf of Respondent Pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 7(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
The Court, having reviewed Petitioner's Motion for Stay Pending Petition for Permission to
File Interlocutory Appeal, hereby denies the Motion without the requirement of Respondent filing
a memorandum in objection to the Motion.
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DATED this ?

day of November, 2005.

BY THE COURT.

I CERTIFY THAT THJSJS A TRU£ DC^f Of
AN OfttGlNAL DO'pyM£WTJ'ON F l L E ^
THE THWD DISTRICT COJtfRT, SAjpT LAK6
COONTY. STATE OF UTAH,

bATjE-, -

T/tl/j
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the

15**
/
day of November, 2005,1 caused a true and correct

copyoftheforegoingOKI)H< ON VIOI'lONKOKSI \\ PENDING PFTIHON

lull

PERMISSION TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY ORDER to be matted, via first class mail,
postage prepaid, addressed to the following:

Kathleen G, Arnovick
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 211
Holladay,UT84!17

^ /jj

P:KBKTLY\Bryner.Svet:2ana\Order.Mtn

$t*y.vpd

(jjtfd^-
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROGER BRYNER vs. SVETLANA BRYNER
CASE NUMBER 050916389 Civil Stalking

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
DENO HIMONAS
PARTIES
Petitioner - ROGER BRYNER
MIDVALE, UT 84047
Respondent - SVETLANA BRYNER
SLC, UT 84121
Represented by: EMILY A BROADHEAD SMOAK
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
51,50
51.50
0.00
0.00

TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due
Amount Paid
Credit
Balance

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
15.00
Amount Paid:
15.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO TAPE COPY
Amount Due:
30.00
Amount Paid:
30.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFIED COPIES
Amount Due:
2.50
Amount Paid:
2.50
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: CERTIFICATION
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:20

4.00
4.00
0.00
0.00
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CASE NUMBER 050916389 Civil Stalking

CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
09-19-05
0 9 - 1 9 •05
0 9 - 1 9 -05
0 9 - 1 9 -05

Judge QUINN assigned
Filed: Complaint
Filed: Verified Petition for Civil Stalking Injunction
Filed order: Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction
Judge aquinn
Signed September 19, 2005
09-28-05 Filed: Request for Hearing to Contest Petitioner's Ex Parte
Civil Stalking Injunction
09-29-05 Filed return: Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction
Party Served: BRYNER, SVETLANA
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: September 27, 2005
09-30-05 Filed return: Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction on Return
Party Served: BRYNER, SVETLANA
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: September 27, 2005
09-3 0-05 Filed: Objection to Request Hearing to Contest Civil Stalking
Injunction
10-05-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050916389 ID 6414416
STALKING INJUNCTION is scheduled.
Date: 10/19/2005
Time: 01:30 p.m.
Location: Third Floor - S34
Third District Court
450 South State Street
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge; ROBERT K HILDER
10-05-05 STALKING INJUNCTION scheduled on October 19, 2005 at 01:30 PM
in Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER.
10-06 •05 Filed: Notice of Subpoenas
10-06-05 Issued Subpoena - Karl Bryner
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Linda Bryner
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Zach Bryner
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Chelsie Bryner
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Maryanne Biggler-Tucker
Judge ANTHONY B. QUINN
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Dolly Orgil
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Jared Coleman

Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:23
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CASE NUMBER 050916389 Civil Stalking
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Irina Zhovnirovskaya or Mother of Svetlana
Bryner
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Kim Peterson
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Alexey Trofimov
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Arline Johnson - Supervisor of Svetlana
Bryner
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - Felix McGowan or Human Resources Salt Lake
County Government
Clerk christim
10-06-05 Issued: Subpoena - John L Lundgren and 3 officers of SLPD
responding on case 2005-48990
Clerk christim
10-11-05 Filed: Respondent's Motion to Quash Subpoenas
10-11-05 Filed: Respondents Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash
Subpoenas
10-13-05 Filed return: Subpoena - Felix Mcgowan on Return
Party Served: FELIX MCGOWAN
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: October 10, 2005
10-13-05 Filed return: Subpoena on Return - Arline Johnson
Party Served: ARLINE JOHNSON
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: October 07, 2005
10-14-05 Filed: Final Rule 68 Offer
10-14-05 Filed return: Subpoena Irina Zhovnirovskaya on Return
Party Served: Irina Zhovnirovskaya
Service Type Personal
Service Date October 10, 2005
10-17-05 Filed return: Subpoena
Party Served CHELSIE BRYNER
Service Type Personal
Service Date October 15, 2005
10-17-05 Filed return: Subpoena
Party Served LINDA BRYNER
Service Type Personal
Service Date October 15, 2005
10-17-05 Filed return: Subpoena
Party Served MARYANNE BIGGLER-TUCKER
Service Type Personal
Service Date October 15, 2005
10-17-05 Filed return: Subpoena
Party Served JOHN L. LUNDGREN
Service Type Personal
Service Date October 11, 2005

Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:23
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CASE NUMBER 050916389 Civil Stalking
10-17-05 Filed: Objection To Respondents Motion To Quash Subpoenas And
Request To Reschedule
10-17-05 Filed: Objection And Statement Chelsie Bryner
10-17-05 Filed: Objection And Statement Linda Bryner
10-17-05 Filed: Objection And Statement Maryanne Biggler-Tucker
10-18-05 Filed: Notice Of Filing Draft Findings Of Fact And Law And
Civil Stalking Injunction
10-19-05 Filed: Motion For Temporary Restraining Order Against Cohne
Rapaport And Segal
10-19-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for STALKING INJUNCTION
Judge:
ROBERT K HILDER
Clerk:
lindav
PRESENT
Petitioner(s): ROGER BRYNER
Attorney for the Respondent: EMILY A BROADHEAD SMOAK
Video
Tape Count: 1:47

HEARING
COUNT: 1:47
Court ordered case reassigned to Judge Himonas for any further
proceedings. Court ordered deft may fax, mail or commercial
messenger pleadings to Conne, Rappaport and Segal*s office.
Ms.
Smoak to prepare order.
10-19 05 Judge HIMONAS assigned,
10-19 05 Filed: ***Filed unsigned*** findings of fact
10-19 05 Filed: ***Filed unsigned*** civil stalking injunction
10-20-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
15.00
10-20-05 VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
15.00
10-20-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
30.00
10-20-05 VIDEO TAPE COPY
Payment Received:
30.00
10-21-05 Filed: Notice of filing fax"* confirmation
10-21 -05
— --•-*-. - Final
-. - Rule
_ - 68 Offer
Filed Reworded
10-21 -05 Filed: Notice Of Communication With Judgment Order On Hearing
10-24 -05 Issued (4) Subpoena Duces Tecum - Delta Airlines, Svetlana
Bryner Alexey Trofimov, John Lundgren
Clerk larieh
10-24- •05 Filed: Notice of taking records deposition John L Lundgren
1 0 - 2 4 •05 Filed: Notice of taking records deposition Svetlana Bryner
1 0 - 2 4 -05 Filed: Notice of taking records deposition Delta Airlines
1 0 - 2 4 05 Filed: Notice to submit on objection to request hearing to
contest civil stalking injunction
10-24- 05 Filed: Objection to Petitioner's Order on October 19, 2005
Hearing
10-25-05 Filed order: Ruling and order: the court denies the objection -

Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:24
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CASE NUMBER 050916389 Civil Stalking
and sets a two (2) hour evidentiary hearing on the civil
stalking injunction for 10 AM Nov 3, 2005
Judge dhimonas
Signed October 25, 2005
10-25-05 Notice - NOTICE for Case 050916389 ID 6432203
2 HOUR EVIDENTIARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 11/03/2005
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S44
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS
10-25-05 2 HOUR EVIDENTIARY HEARING scheduled on November 03, 2005 at
10:00 AM in Fourth Floor - S44 with Judge HIMONAS.
10-26-05 Filed: Motion to Reconsider Ruling of October 25th 2005 and to
Strike Ex-Parte Documents and Communications
10-27-05 Filed: Transcript of hearing dated 10-19-05, Kelly Thacker, CCT
10-27-05 Filed: ***Filed unsigned*** order restricting ex-parte
documents and communication
10-27-05 Filed return: Subpoena Delta Airlines on Return (Anne Janssen,
agent)
Party Served: Delta Airlines, Inc.
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: October 25, 2005
10-27-05 Filed return: Subpoena John L. Lundgren on Return
Party Served: John L. Lundgren
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: October 25, 2005
10-28-05 Filed: Motion and Order for Continuance (Entry of Appearance,
Kathleen G, Arnovick)
10-28-05 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion to
Reconsider Ruling of October 25, 2005 and to Strike Ex-Parte
Documents and Communications
10-28-05 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Continuance
10-31-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.50
10-31-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
4.00
10-31-05 CERTIFIED COPIES
Payment Received:
2,50
Note: 20,00 cash tendered.
10-31-05 CERTIFICATION
Payment Received:
4.00
10-31-05 Filed: Objection to Hearing on November 3rd 2005 at 10:00 am
and Request to Reschedule
10-31-05 Filed: Objection to the Form of Draft Order with Mailing
Certificate Dated October 26th 2005
10-31-05 Filed: Motion to stay pending petition for permission to appeal
interlocutory order
10-31-05 Filed: Notice of filing of petition for permission to appeal
interlocutory
10-31-05 Bond Account created
Total Due:
4,00

Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:25
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CASE NUMBER 050916389 Civil Stalking
11-01-05 Filed order: Motion and order for continuance
Judge dhimonas
Signed November 01, 2005
11-01-05 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals - Petition for
Interlocutory Appeal filed 10-31-05 - 20050992-ca
11-01-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
Clerk:
patj
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: KATHLEEN G ARNOV1CK
Attorney for the Respondent: EMILY A BROADHEAD SMOAK
Video

HEARING
This case is before the court on a phone conference on
petitionees motion for a continuance of the Nov 3 hearing date.
The court grants the motion.
The new hearing date is set for Nov 15 at 2 PM.
Kathleen Arnovick's office to prepare the notice.
The court denies the motion to stay.
11-01-05 Filed: Motion to Order Petitioner to File Pleadings either Pro
Se or through Counsel but not both with Incorporated Memorandum
of Law
11-01-05 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Stay Pending
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order
11-02-05 Filed: Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to Petitioner's
Motion for Restraining Order against Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
11-02-05 Filed: Respondent's Reply to Petitioner's Objection to the Form
of Draft Order with Mailing Certificate Dated October 26, 2005
11-03-05 2 HOUR EVIDENTIARY HEARING Cancelled.
Reason: ATP requested continuance
11-03-05 CIVIL STALKING scheduled on November 15, 2005 at 02:00 PM in
Fourth Floor - S44 with Judge HIMONAS.
11-04-05 Filed: Notice of Hearing
11-04-05 Filed return: Subpoena Svetlana Bryner on Return
Party Served: BRYNER, SVETLANA
Service Type: Personal
Service Date: November 02, 2005
11-07-05 Filed: Rule 11 Request for Attorney's Re: Lack of Jurisdiction
over Non Court Procedures and Frivolous Argument on Pro-Se
Issues
11-08-05 Filed: Response to Motion to Order Petitioner to File Pleadings
either Pro-Se or through Counsel but not both
11-08-05 Filed: Rule 11 Motion Re: Response to Motion for Restraining

Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:26
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CASE NUMBER 25091638 9 Civil Stalking
Order against Cohne Rappaport and Segal
11-09-05 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision
11-09-05 Filed: Reply to Respondents Response to Motion for Restraining
Order against Cohne Rappaport and Segal
11-09-C5 Filed: Notice to Submit on Motion for Restraining Order Against
Cohne Rappaport and Segal
11-09-05 Filed order: Order on motion for stay pending petition for
permission to appeal interlockutory order
Judge dhimonas
Signed November 09, 2005
11-09-05 Filed: ***Filed unsigned*** order
11-15-05 Filed order: Order On October 19th Hearing
Judge rhilder
Signed November 14, 2005
11-17-05 Filed: Motion to Strike Notice to Submit for Decision with
Incorporated Memorandum of Law
11-18-05 Filed: Utah Court of Appeals - Order -matter before the court
on a petition for permission to appeal from an Interlocutory
order -Petition for Permission to appeal is Denied Respondent's request of costs and attorney fees is Denied 20050992-CA
12-21-05 Filed: Withdrawal of Counsel (Kathleen G Arnovick)
01-03-06 Filed: Notice to appear or appoint counsel
01-03-06 Filed: Waiver under rule 74(B)
01-04-06 Filed: Verified Rule 11 Motion Re Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel
01-04-06 Filed order: Motion and order to dismiss with incorporated
memorandum
Judge dhimonas
Signed January 04, 2006
01-04-06 Filed: ***Filed unsigned*** Temporary ex-parte restraining
order
01-04-06 Case Disposition is Dismsd w/o prejudice
patj
Disposition Judge is DENO HIMONAS
patj
01-04-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Hearing
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
Clerk:
patj
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
PRESENT
Petitioner(s): ROGER BRYNER
Other Parties: KATHLEEN ARNOVICK
Attorney for the Respondent; EMILY A BROADHEAD SMOAK
Video
Tape C o u n t : 2 . 0 0

HEKRIKG

Exhibits p. 89
Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:27
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CASE NUMBER 050916339 Civil Stalking

The court held a phone conference with Roger Bryner, Emily Smoak
and Kathleen Arnovick on the record.
The issue of the wrong case # being placed on the "Notice to
appear or appoint counsel" was discussed.
01-06-06 Piled: Objection to Notice to Appear - I already did on Dec 2nd
05
01-06-06 Piled: Verified petition for extraordinary relief under rule
65(B) and request to for hearing with Judge Himonas
01-09-06 Piled: Metnorandum Decision and Order - this case is dismissed,
pleadings need to be filed in the divorce case # 044904183
01-09-06 Filed: Withdrawal of Petition for Extraordinary Relief Under
Rule 65 (B) and Request for Hearing with Judge Himonas
01-09-06 Filed: Withdrawal of Objection to Notice to Appear

Printed: 01/12/06 13:21:27
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Utah Discount Realt)

Home

Utah Discount Realty, a licensed Utah Real Estat
offers the Utah home Owners a more efficient mi
effective system for selling your home (or an;
estate)
without paying big real estate listing commissions

Sellers
Buyers
Why Use Oar Services
Forms
Free Listing
Properties
FAQ
Tips and Advice

Why pay a 5%, 6% or 7% commission!? You can save thousands
listing commissions and don't limit your marketing to newspaper ads
flat fee or discount listing commission, Utah Discount Realty can
home in the MLS if you agree to pay a commission to an agent whc
an acceptable offer (the usual commission is 2-3%). We offer van
options as well as additional services that allow you to choose EXA<
you want Sell your home quickly & save money!!!
If you are a Buyer, you can receive SIGGQ's of dollars back at closin
buy your home or other real estate through us1 If you buy your home <
estate though us, we will give you up to 1% of the total sales price
closing
CONTACT INFORMATION
Lana Bryner, MJJJV. - Principal Broker
Phone: 801-556-0065
Fax: 866-219-4941
email: infoautahdiscountrealty.com

£-maif Us with Questions

info@utahdiscountrea?ty com

Of Call 801-556-0065

© Utah Discount Realty, 2003
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

4<£€T

l^ryr^r~

EX PARTE CIVIL
STALKING INJUNCTION

Petitioner,
CaseNo.<56^^0 S a ^ t T S

vs.

^ ^

J^ge JUDGE LEON A. DEVER
Respondent.

Attention: This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find you
in contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any
other crime you may have committed in disobeying this order.

This injunction will be presumed valid until superseded by a subsequent
order.
The court has reviewed Petitioner's Petition for Stalking Injunction and has determined
that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred and the Respondent is the
stalker.

| jif 11(11|)|| |||| ||||j fill! lllli I|||[ l|||l Mill Ifflj III! if II

060903365

HD20000645
BRYNER.SVETLANA

I)

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101, the court therefore orders as follows:
The Respondent is enjoined from stalking Petitioner. According to Utah Code
Ann. § 77-3a-106.5. Stalking is defined as follows:
3.

As used in this section*
a)

"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or
threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a
person.

b)

"immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other
person who regularly resided in the household or who regularly resided in
the household within the prior six months.

c)
4.

Repeatedly means on two or more occasions.

A person is guilty of stalking who:
a)

intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
1.

to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family:

2.

to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his
immediate family.

b)

has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
1.

will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or

2.

will suffer emotional distress or a member or his immediate family
will suffer emotional distress; and

3.

A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions,
or intentionally or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction
issued pursuant to this section.
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2.
Petitioner:

Respondent is enjoined from going near the following addresses frequented by

Residence:

Spr>>«/S
_^=

Work:
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School:
Other (describe)•

3.

"

,

_

Respondent is restrained from contacting the Petitioner, directly or indirectly,

through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic means, and the
Respondent is restrained from contacting the following persons:

^

4.

a in a

Any

^//V^/rW

Other:
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Notice to Respondent:
a.

You may request in writing, a hearing to contest this order.

U3

^

^

b.

You must file your request at the following Courthouse:

Third District Court, 450 South State, Room W17, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
c.

The hearing should be requested within 10 days, from the date that the order is
served on you.

d.

If >ou fail to request the hearing within 10 days, this order will become a Civil
Stalking injunction which will not expire until 3 years after it is served.

e.

You may request a hearing after the 10 day period, but you will nave the burden
of challenging the injunction.

DATED this

^ 7

day of

f<

$

, 20^.

District

Serve Respondent at:
Street;
City/Town:
State, Zip

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, Individuals needing special accommodations
(including auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this proceeding should call the Clerk of the
Court immediately upon receipt of this notice

I)

FILEO DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB 2 8 2006
3y

C-jttLTLAKE COUNTY
- — _ _ _
Deputy Clerk

Roger Bryner
1042 East Ft. Union Blvd #330
Midvale, Utah 84047
Fax: 877-519-3413 Phone: 255-7729

ORIGINAL

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROGER BRYNER
]
• AMENDED PETmON FOR STALKINC
Petitioner
]> INJUNCTION
vs.
>

Case No. 0609033655SK

)

Judge LEONADEVER

SVETLANA BRYNER
Respondent

]
i
Jury Trial Requested
Petitioner hereby amends his complaint under Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of civil
Procedure and seeks a permanent stalking injunction under Utah Code 77-3a-101. (2005) and
for the reasons set forth below:
Leave of the Court is not required to amend this action.
1) Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states "(a) Amendments. A party
may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20
days after it is served." Respondent has not been served. Rule 2 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure state 'There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action."5' Therefore
this action has been amended by Petitioner without leave of the court being required.

\\S

Jury trial is not precluded by statute and requested according to the rules,
2) Rule 38(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states "(b) Demand. Any party may
demand a trial by jury of any issue triable of right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee
and serving upon the other parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the
commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the party'." Rule 2
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state "There shall be one form of action to be known as
"civil action."5' The 14th amendment and 8th amendment of the Constitution requires Jury
trials when a party does not waive the right and Petitioner has not waived this right.
Therefore a Jury trial is requested, demanded, and required by Petitioner.
The form of this pleading is sufficient.
3) Petitioner cites Rule 8(f) and Conley v. Gibson 355 US 41 1957 which held:
To the contrary, all the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" 8 that
will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this.
Such simplified "notice pleading" is made possible by the liberal opportunity for
discovery and the other pretrial procedures [355 U.S. 41,48] established by the Rules
to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more
narrowly the disputed facts and issues.
First Cause of Action, Permanent Stalking Injunction
4) Respondent has admitted to calling Petitioner over 10 times in a row on more than
2 occasions. See Petition for Stalking Injunction filed on February 27th 2006 P. 1,5,
and Petition Exhibits p. 41-49.

\

5) Respondent has admitted to contacting Petitioner in violation of a stalking
injunction. See Petition for Stalking Injunction filed on February 27th 2006 P. 5, and
Petition Exhibits p. 41-49.
6) All additional facts and allegations in Petition for Stalking Injunction filed on
February 27th 2006 are hereby incorporated.
Claims of law for First Cause of Action.
7) Authority for issuance of a stalking injunction comesfromUtah Code Ann. 77~3a101. (2005) quoted in part below:
(1) As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of stalking as defined in
Section 76-5-106.5. Stalking injunctions may not be obtained against law
enforcement officers, governmental investigators, or licensed private investigators,
acting in their official capacity.
(2) Any person who believes that he or she is the victim of stalking may file a
verified written petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged stalker
with the district court in the district in which the petitioner or respondent resides or
in which any of the events occurred. A minor with his or her parent or guardian
may file a petition on his or her own behalf, or a parent, guardian, or custodian may
file a petition on the minor's behalf.
(5) If the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of
stalking has occurred, an ex parte civil stalking injunction may be issued by the
court that includes any of the following:
(a) respondent may be enjoined from committing stalking;
(b) respondent may be restrained from coming near the residence, place of
employment, or school of the other party or specifically designated locations or
persons;
(c) respondent may be restrained from contacting, directly or indirectly,
the other party, including personal, written or telephone contact with the other
party, the other party's employers, employees, fellow workers or others with whom
communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the other party; or
(d) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection of the
petitioner and other specifically designated persons under the circumstances.

i

8) The stalking statute in effect during the time of Respondent's is found in Utah
Code Ann. 76-5-106.5. (2005) and reads in part as follows:
As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats
implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family11 means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other
person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the
household within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his immediate
family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a member of
his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate family will
suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a member
of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of his
immediate family.
9) As set forth in sections 1-3 above, the normal rules of civil procedure should apply
to this case. As the law cited conflicts with these rules, and does not allow discovery,
confrontation of witnesses, or the redress of grievances guaranteed under the 1st
Amendment, and also has an unreasonable provision for a hearing to be held within 10
days to challenge the ex-parte injunction. This law is routinely ignored by the Court,
which instead holds a pre-hearing to seek agreement between the parties. To proceed with

u

this case outside the normal rules for any civil action may be in conflict with the
protections of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution and Article 1 section 24 of the Utah
Constitution for this reason. Also, the 2nd cause of action does not have this requirement,
and can be combined for judicial economy.
Second Cause of Action, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
10) Respondent has a duty to not engage in outrageous and intolerable in that it offends
the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.
11) Respondent has violated this duty.
12) Petitioner has been harmed by those action.
13) Respondent's actions are the proximate cause of those damages.
Claims of law on 2nd cause of action,
14) The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is well established in this
state. Emotional distress resultsfromconduct that is "outrageous and intolerable in that it
offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Russell v. Thomson
Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896,905 (Utah 1992). Several courts have defined
"emotional distress" in stalking statutes by looking to the definition provided in civil cases.
See State v. Martel, 902 P.2d 14,19 (Mont 1995); Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 447
SJL2d 530,533 (Va. Ct App. 1994); Luplow v. State, 897 P.2d 463,468 (Wyo. 1995).
15) Several courts have held that continuing to contact a person after it has been made
clear that they no longer wished any contact and a court order prohibiting that contact had
been entered has the elements of both emotional distress and of fear of bodily injury See

Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1264 (Utah Ct App. 1997) also Bailey v.
Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, f 9,18 P.3d 1129.
16) To the extent that the allegations found in the Petition for Stalking Injunction filed
on February 27th 2006 cause emotional distress, and continued actions would continue to
cause harm, the court may
Third Cause of Action, normal Bx-Parte Stalking Injunction procedures
17) An ex-parte stalking injunction has been granted by Judge Reese who made the
determination that the crime of stalking had likely occurred and a proper petition has been
presented. Under the principle of collateral estoppel there is no basis to challenge his
decision, absent additional facts being presented by Respondent which change the standard
of proof already adjudicated. Therefore the petition should be granted and a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will be forthcoming
as soon as allowed.
18) Consistent with the normal procedures in this case, failure to challenge or a
determination that a preponderance of evidence supports allegations 4-6 above herby
incorporated, a permanent stalking injunction should be issued.
Wherefore: Petitioner asks that a permanent stalking injunction be issued against
Respondent under either the first or 3Td cause of action, with the terms outlined in the order
attached as Exhibit A and attached to this motion, or in the alternative that as continuing
action by Respondent alleged under paragraphs 10 and 11 above could harm Petitioner,

Respondent should be restrained to prevent potential damages even if claims 12 and 13 are
not true. Petitioner requests monetary damages in an amount to be determined at trial
Dated this 27th day of February 2006,

Roger Bryner, Petitioner
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EX PARTE CIVIL
STALKING INJUNCTION

Petitioner,
Case No. £ 6 3 4 0 3 3 4 ^

vs

Respondent,
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Attention: This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find you
in contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any
other crime you may have committed in disobeying this order.

This injunction will be presumed valid until superseded by a subsequent
order.
The court has reviewed Petitioner's Petition for Stalking Injunction and has determined
that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred and the Respondent is the
stalker.
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Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77oa-101, the court therefore orders as follows:
^

1.

The Respondent is enjoined from stalking Petitioner, According to Utah Code

Ann. § 77-3a-106.5. Stalking is defined as follows:
3.

As used in this section:
a)

"Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or
threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a
person.

b)

"immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other
person who regularly resided in the household or who regularly resided in
the household within the prior six months.

c)
4.

Repeatedly means on two or more occasions.

A person is guilty of stalking who:
a)

intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a
specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
1.

to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family:

2.

to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his
immediate family.

b)

has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
1.

will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or

2.

will suffer emotional distress or a member or his immediate family
will suffer emotional distress; and

3.

A person is also guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates a
stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions,
or intentionally or knowingly violates a permanent criminal stalking injunction
issued pursuant to this section.
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Respondent is enjoined from going near the following addresses frequented by

PetitionerResidence:
Work-
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school:
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Respondent is restrained from contacting the Petitioner, directly or indirectly,

through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic means, and the
Respondent is restrained from contacting the following persons: /rA\/
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Notice to Respondent:
2L

You may request, in writing, a hearing to contest this order.

l^revftjLst^trk..

b>

You must file your request at the following Courthouse:

Third District Court, 450 South State, Room W17, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
c.

The hearing should, be requested within 10 days, from the date that the order is
served on you,

d.

If you fail to request the hearing within 10 days, this order will become a Civil
Stalking injunction which will not expire until 3 years after it is served.

e.

You may request a hearing after the .10 day period, but you will nave the burden
of challenging the injunction.

DATED this

27

j k y of_
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u

,20.

District Court Judge

Serve Respondent at:
Street:
City/Town:
State5 Zip

in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, Individuals needing special accommodations
(including auxiliary communicative aids and services) during this proceeding should call the Clerk of the
Court immediately upon receipt of this notice

